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Reports on Computer Systems Technology

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- 80 the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in
- 81 federal information systems.

82

Abstract

83 Space is a newly emerging commercial critical infrastructure sector that is no longer the domain

84 of only national government authorities. Space is an inherently risky environment in which to

85 operate, so cybersecurity risks involving commercial space – including those affecting

86 commercial satellite vehicles – need to be understood and managed alongside other types of risks

87 to ensure safe and successful operations. This report provides a general introduction to

88 cybersecurity risk management for the commercial satellite industry as they seek to start

89 managing cybersecurity risks in space. This document is by no means comprehensive in terms of

90 addressing all of the cybersecurity risks to commercial satellite infrastructure, nor does it explore

91 risks to satellite vehicles, which may be introduced through the implementation of cybersecurity

92 controls. The intent is to present basic concepts, generate discussions, and provide sample

93 references for additional information on pertinent cybersecurity risk management models.

94

Keywords

95 commercial space satellite operations; cybersecurity; cybersecurity risk management; risk 96 management.

97

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99 Greg Witte for their technical contributions, Scott Kordella for his tireless assistance, and Isabel 100 Van Wyk for her outstanding technical editing.

101

Audience

102 The primary audience for this publication includes chief information officers (CIOs), chief

103 technology officers (CTOs), and risk officers of organizations who are using or plan to use

104 commercial satellite operations and are new to cybersecurity risk management for these

105 operations.

106 Trademark Information

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141 **Executive Summary**

- 142 As stated in the September 2018 United States National Cyber Strategy, the U.S. Government
- 143 considers unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space vital to advancing the security,
- economic prosperity, and scientific knowledge of the Nation. Space Policy Directive 5 (SPD-5)
- 145 was released in 2020 to address the need for cybersecurity in space systems and directed federal
- agencies to work with non-government space operators to define and establish cybersecurity-
- 147 informed norms for space systems. This profile is part of NIST's effort to support SPD-5 and its
- 148 goals for securing space.
- 149 Cyber-related threats to space assets (e.g., commercial satellites) and supporting infrastructure
- 150 pose increasing risk to this economic promise and commercial space emerging markets.
- 151 Commercial satellite operations occur in an inherently risky environment. Physical risks to these
- 152 operations are generally quantifiable and have the most likely potential to adversely impact the
- 153 businesses that operate commercial satellites, usually in low-earth orbit. While this is the primary
- risk consideration for satellite operations, continued growth in this new commercial
- 155 infrastructure allows for opportunities to address cybersecurity risks along with other risk
- 156 elements.¹
- 157 Methods for the creation, maintenance, and implementation of a cybersecurity program for many
- 158 of the commercial and international markets include products in national and international
- 159 standard-setting organizations (SSOs), as well as the use of risk management guidance from the
- 160 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST risk management guidance
- 161 includes specific technical references, cybersecurity control catalogues, the IT Risk Management
- 162 Framework, and the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF).
- 163 The intent of this document is to introduce the CSF to commercial space businesses. This
- 164 includes describing a specific method for applying the CSF to a small portion of commercial
- 165 satellite operations (e.g., a small sensing satellite), creating an example CSF set of desired
- 166 security outcomes based on missions and anticipated threats, and describing an abstracted set of
- 167 cybersecurity outcomes, requirements, and suggested cybersecurity controls.
- 168 NIST asks the commercial satellite operations community to use this document as an informative
- 169 reference to assist in managing cybersecurity risks and to consider how cybersecurity
- 170 requirements might coexist within space vehicle system requirements. The example requirements
- 171 listed in this document could be used to create an initial baseline. However, NIST recommends
- that organizations use this document in coordination with the set of NIST references and
- applicable SSO materials to create cybersecurity outcomes, requirements, and controls
- 174 customized to support an organization's particular business needs and address its individual
- 175 threat models.

¹ These can include but are not limited to physical risks, EMI/EMC, financial risks, and supplier and customer risks.

- 176 This report focuses on uncrewed commercial space vehicles that will not dock with human-
- 177 occupied spacecraft.

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1 Introduction

The concept of a commercial space sector has been evolving for some time. In 2007, the U.S.
 Leadership in Space Commerce Strategic Plan stated,

From television and data communications, to personal navigation, to internet-based satellite imagery, space commerce has enabled countless new economic benefits for our nation. In addition, the expansion of the global market for commercial space capabilities has generated robust worldwide competition. [3]

- 228 The White House National Space Policy stated this in 2010:
- The term "commercial," for the purposes of this policy, refers to space goods, services, or activities provided by private sector enterprises that bear a reasonable portion of the investment risk and responsibility for the activity, operate in accordance with typical market-based incentives for controlling cost and optimizing return on investment, and have the legal capacity to offer these goods or services to existing or potential nongovernmental customers. [4]
- Today, space continues to be an evolving commercial sector that is no longer the domain of only national government authorities. The commercial uses of space for research and development, material sciences, communication, and sensing are growing in size, scale, and importance for the future of the U.S. economy. Space is an inherently risky environment in which to operate, so cybersecurity risks involving commercial space need to be understood and managed alongside
- 240 other types of risks to ensure safe and successful operations.

241 **1.1 Purpose and Scope**

- 242 This report provides a general introduction to cybersecurity risk management for the commercial
- space commerce industry. This document does not apply to federally acquired and operated
- systems, which are regulated by other authorities. This document is by no means comprehensive
- in terms of addressing all cybersecurity risks to commercial space infrastructure, nor does it
- explore how cybersecurity solutions might introduce risk to a space vehicle. The intent is to
- 247 introduce basic concepts, generate discussions, clear confusion, and provide references for
- 248 additional information on pertinent cybersecurity risk management concepts. *This report focuses*
- 249 on uncrewed commercial space vehicles that will not dock with human-occupied spacecraft.
- 250 The Cybersecurity Policy For Space Systems Used to Support National Security Missions
- 251 (CNSSP-12) governs the acquisition of national security space systems. The CSF is non-
- regulatory, and the scope applies to commercial entities that operate space vehicles and payloads
- that are not owned, operated, controlled, or leased by the U.S. Government.

254 **1.2 Report Structure**

- 255 This report is organized into the following sections and appendices:
- Section 2 provides a notional, conceptual, high-level architectural view of commercial satellite operations.
- Section 3 describes the steps of the Cybersecurity Framework.
- Section 4 provides a notional example of how a satellite organization might apply the
 Cybersecurity Framework steps to their space vehicles.
- Appendix A provides examples of regulations that may be relevant to commercial satellite operations.
- Appendix B lists the acronyms used in this report.
- Appendix C list the glossary terms used in this report.

265 2 Conceptual High-Level Architecture of Satellite Operations

266 This section provides a notional, conceptual, high-level architectural view of commercial,

267 uncrewed space operations. This view can be helpful in understanding, assigning, and managing

cybersecurity requirements and risks associated with different owners and operators of different

269 parts of the architectures. This architecture can be under the sole control of one system owner or

270 shared among numerous public, commercial, and private owners.

271 Once in operation, space vehicles share an ecosystem that has no national and few natural


boundaries and where safety is a communal concern. For the purposes of this paper and to

- 273 facilitate subsequent discussions in setting, expressing, or meeting cybersecurity requirements,
- NIST notionally defines the scope of a commercial space operations architecture to include the
- 275 following:

276 2.1 Space Architecture Segments

277 **2.1.1 Space Segment:**

278The space vehicle or satellite consists of the platform and one or more payloads. The bus279consists of the components of the vehicle associated with the "flying of the satellite,"280such as power, structure, attitude control system, processing and command control, and281telemetry. The spacecraft can carry many specialized payloads to conduct missions,282including remote sensing and communications. The bus and the payload generally283combine to form the satellite.




- Figure 1 reflects major parts of the conceptual, high-level architecture of satellite operations.
- This architecture is for uncrewed spacecraft and does not include cybersecurity requirements for
- human space systems, human spacecraft, or systems that will dock with human systems and/orlunar landers.

290 **2.1.2** Key Considerations and Communications:

291 Link sub-segment: Command and control are the signaling operations sent to the 292 satellite to conduct a mission function, perform diagnostics, reset the state of the 293 equipment, send updates, and/or activate the propulsion systems of the vehicle. 294 Command and control operations are generated on the ground and can be transmitted to 295 the vehicle in several ways. The commands may be sent via a fiber link to a remote 296 ground station, which then transmits the commands via a direct radio frequency (RF) or 297 optical link to the satellite from the ground. The second method uses a set of space relays, 298 where the original commands are sent from the ground via RF or optical to a relay 299 satellite and then transmitted via RF or optical to the target satellite. Finally, mobile 300 devices and technologies not associated with a specific ground operations location, such 301 as intra-vehicle communications, can be used to deliver commands to a satellite or its 302 payload.

303 **Internal Satellite Cybersecurity sub-segment:** Internal vehicle cybersecurity refers to 304 the cybersecurity capabilities of the satellite vehicle itself, including its ability to protect 305 itself against cybersecurity threats, detect threat actions, respond to cybersecurity attacks, 306 and recover when necessary. These capabilities should be designed as part of security 307 development and integrated early in the system life cycle. Often, internal vehicle 308 cybersecurity is the primary responsibility of small commercial satellite owners and 309 operators, and much of the rest of the architecture is outsourced to external suppliers and 310 providers. Internal vehicle cybersecurity is a feature owned by a satellite in the space 311 segment.

312 Satellite-to-Satellite Communications sub-segment: Communications between 313 operational satellites for mission functions - such as command and control, networking 314 of compute capabilities, redundancy of operations and mission functions, tracking, and 315 communications – are known as *inter-vehicle communications*. Therefore, the integrity, 316 availability, and confidentiality of these communications are critical. Satellite-to-satellite 317 communications is a capability of a satellite in the space segment and can be for both 318 docked systems as well as space stations, which are composed of separate operational 319 vehicles.



322 2.1.3 Other Space Architecture Segments

Ground segment: *Ground operations* are terrestrial-based activities that can be automated or conducted by human operators. They often include some or all of the space operations (i.e., station keeping and payload commanding) and can be co-located with launch facilities or at a separate set of facilities. Ground operations can be outsourced in whole or in part. Even at launch, the payload operator may not be collocated with the launch facility.

User segment: These are consumers, such as GPS receivers, satellite phone users,
 satellite TV receivers, vehicles, 5G users, industrial systems, mobile devices, or aircraft.

331 2.2 Spacecraft Vehicle Life Cycle Phases

The space vehicle will experience different phases of operations, each of which may have unique risks that need to be addressed. This document focuses on the operations phase of the satellite

334 life cycle.

335 2.2.1 Operational Phase

- **Operations Sensing, Information Processing, Data Acquisition, and**
- 337 **Communication:** The satellite conducts a mission operation that involves some function
- 338 or combination of functions for sensing, information processing, data acquisition, and
- 339 communication. These are functional requirements directly related to the business
- 340 mission of the satellite and are conducted by the satellite and/or its payloads.

341 2.2.2 Other Phases

342 **Design/Development:** Is it important to have robust software and hardware design 343 processes where developers add in security and perform proper security testing. 344 Manufactures and companies should be aware of the long lifetime of some spacecraft and 345 build in flexibility to address cyber threats over the lifetime of the vehicle. Specific attention should be placed on the cryptographic modules that may potentially allow for 346 upgrades for post-quantum cryptography. Current operationally deployed systems should 347 348 also consider using compensating controls to achieve outcomes if the legacy technologies 349 are insufficient.

350 Assembly: Spacecraft components are procured from across the world and brought 351 together to allow the spacecraft to perform various missions. This step should include 352 tests to validate the functions of components and software, including cybersecurity 353 functionality. The hardware, firmware, and software supply chain is, therefore, a critical 354 component of cybersecurity. Once vehicles are launched, the ability to modify hardware 355 is limited, if not impossible. Hardware implants or vulnerabilities are difficult to mitigate 356 and can have a foundational impact on cybersecurity. However, software on a space 357 vehicle can often be patched or modified from the ground. To deter or minimize supply 358 chain attacks, organizations should understand the security and privacy policies of their 359 suppliers and communicate their requirements to their suppliers and their capabilities to 360 their customers. The profile can be a tool to help manage the supply chain, and the 361 importance of the acquisition process cannot be stressed enough (e.g., using trusted 362 vendors, designing/embedding required security).

363 Prelaunch: This is a critical time for the vehicle during which operators will test RF
364 links and utilize an umbilical cord to the launch vehicle for diagnostics and telemetry. It
365 is important for operators to understand the connectivity and access that the various
366 satellite health and status monitoring systems have during prelaunch and to ensure the
367 cybersecurity of the test environment. This phase also includes transit to the launch
368 facility from the factory and storage at the launch facility before launch –activities that
369 should be controlled for physical access to the vehicle.

Launch: Launch is the phase of space commerce that entails moving the space system to
its operational environment (e.g., from a pad, rack, ramp, or other device or installation).
Launch can include launch devices and installations, fuel operations and storage, and
launch safety and destruct systems. Launch can have significant overlap with ground
operations, and the two are often combined. However, due to the current cost,
complexity, and safety concerns associated with launch, it is often outsourced for small
commercial satellites.

On-orbit checkout: Once the satellite is placed into orbit, the satellite must beacon and
establish a link to the ground command and control system. The satellite typically
undergoes several checks to ensure that the systems have survived launch and are
operational. The satellite will then enter operational status. Another critical aspect during

- 381this time is that command and control of the satellite transfers from the development382organization to the operating organization. This phase of the satellite mission should383remain a focus from a cybersecurity perspective due to the change in custody and the384visibility of these events, which can potentially provide opportunities for malicious385actors.
- 386 **Decommissioning:** The decommissioning of a commercial satellite is a high-risk 387 endeavor with requirements for the post-mission disposition of satellites. General good practices include maintaining control of orbital debris released during normal operations, 388 389 minimizing debris generated by accidental explosions, and ensuring the post-mission 390 disposal of space structures, either by re-entry and burn up in Earth's atmosphere or by 391 moving the structure to the graveyard orbit. Decommissioning other areas of the space 392 operations architecture can include the need to handle and dispose of sensitive materials, 393 intellectual property, and hazardous materials.
- 394The cybersecurity risks of decommissioning should consider appropriate confidentiality,395integrity, and availability considerations, as well as related physical threats to commercial396satellite systems once decommissioned. Industry practices such as following ISO397standards for decommissioning, international treaty obligations, and domestic regulations398– should also be considered.




Figure 3. Phases of Operations

402 3 An Introduction to the Cybersecurity Framework

403 The Cybersecurity Framework was developed in reponse to Executive Order 13636, *Improving*

- 404 *Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.* The framework is based on a risk management approach to
- 405 cybersecurity that can be tailored to various industries. It provides a common terminology and 406 methodology that can be implemented by organizations based on their resources and business
- 407 needs. The Cybersecurity Framework consists of five functions: identify, protect, detect,
- 408 respond, and recover. The functions are shown in a circultar format to communicate to the user
- 409 that cybersecurty is an iterative and continuous process that enables an organization to navigate
- 410 the changing landscape of cybersecurity risks. Figure 4 shows a visual representation of the CSF
- 411 and its functions.



- 414 In addition to the five primary functions of the Cybersecurity Framework, there are categories
- 415 and subcategories that express cybersecurity outcomes and informative references to assist in the
- 416 implementation of controls that can achieve those outcomes.

Functions	Categories	Subcategories	Informative References
IDENTIFY			
PROTECT			
DETECT			
RESPOND			
RECOVER			

419 To help explain the context of the categories, subcategories, and informative references, an

420 example of the first row of *Identify* with the category "asset management" is provided in Figure

421 6. Each category has associated subcategories, which describe specific outcomes. The last

422 column of information includes references for that particular outcome that cite applicable NIST

423 and SSO publications.

424 The following section will highlight specific NIST 800-53, Revision 4 and Revision 5, controls

425 that map to the subcategories for the notional scenario.

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
IDENTIFY (ID)			CCS CSC 1
			COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02
		ID.AM-1: Physical devices and systems within the	ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4
		organization are inventoried	ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8
			 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8
			· CCS CSC 2
			 COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02, BAI09.05
		ID.AM-2: Software platforms and applications within	ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4
		the organization are inventoried	ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8
	Asset Management (ID.AM): The data, personnel, devices, systems, and facilities that enable the organization to achieve business purposes are identified and managed consistent with their relative importance to business objectives and the organization's risk strategy.		ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8
			CCS CSC 1
			COBIT 5 DSS05.02
		ID.AM-3: Organizational communication and data flows are mapped	ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4
			· ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.2.1
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, CA-3, CA-9, PL-8
			COBIT 5 AP002.02
		ID.AM-4: External information systems are catalogued	ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.6
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-20, SA-9
			 COBIT 5 APO03.03, APO03.04, BAI09.02
		ID.AM-5: Resources (e.g., hardware, devices, data, and software) are prioritized based on their	ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.6
		classification, criticality, and business value	 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.1
	Classific		NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, RA-2, SA-14
			 COBIT 5 APO01.02, DSS06.03
		ID.AM-6: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for	· ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.3.3
		the entire workforce and third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners) are established	· ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1
		suppliers, customers, paraters) are established	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, PS-7, PM-11

429 What is a profile?

- 430 A profile is a set of the subcategories from the framework that are selected by an organization to
- 431 represent either their current cybersecurity state (i.e., current profile) or their desired
- 432 cybersecurity state (i.e., target profile). The gap analysis between a current and target profile can
- 433 help an organization develop an action plan to enhance their cybersecurity posture.

4 4 Creating a Cybersecurity Program for Space Operations

435 The application of high-level processes from the Cybersecurity Framework may help satellite 436 operators with the creation and maintenance of a cybersecurity program. While the overall 437 process is applicable to all parts of commercial space architectures and phases of operation, this

document also provides a notional example of applying the CSF to generating cybersecurity
 requirements for the satellite during sensing, information processing, data acquisition, and

- 437 requirements for the satellite during sensing, information processing, data acquisition, and 440 communication to illustrate how these steps are used and to derive example cybersecurity
- 441 outcomes, requirements, and controls for this specific use.
- 441 outcomes, requirements, and controls for this specific use.

442 **4.1** Using the Cybersecurity Framework to Develop a Profile

The Cybersecurity Framework can be used to develop a profile that helps organizations
 communicate their cybersecurity posture and organize cybersecurity-related tasks and activities.

445 The Framework profile can be used to communicate cybersecurity requirements to suppliers and

446 to manage how risk is mitigated, managed, transferred, or accepted when outsourcing one or

- 447 more aspects of space operations. Commercial space operations can be hybrid modes with few
- 448 organizations owning or controlling all parts. Therefore, communicating clear expectations,
- 449 capabilities, and requirements across the different owners of the space operations scope is critical
- 450 to understanding and managing cybersecurity risks. Notably, the risk to an organization is
- 451 impacted by changes in that organization's reliance on the assets, an adversary's capability, and
- 452 an adversary's intent. Effective risk management requires the steps presented in this section to be
- 453 visited and revisited on a regular basis.
- 454 **Step 1: Establish Scope and Priorities.** It is most effective to address cybersecurity in the 455 earliest stages of building the components of the space architecture and embedding risk-456 reducing measures that meet organizational mission and business objectives into the design 457 and supply chain. However, many commercial satellite operators have already deployed 458 several generations of their vehicles, and many parts of an architecture are in use.
- For companies that have already begun deployment, a current cybersecurity profile should be created to describe what cybersecurity outcomes are being achieved. A target profile can be created to describe the outcomes needed to meet the cybersecurity risk management goals of the organization. A gap analysis of the differences between the current profile and the target profile provides information that the organization can use to make decisions regarding cybersecurity.
- 465 Step 2: Orient. Once the scope of the cybersecurity program has been determined for
 466 mission and business needs, the organization identifies related systems, assets, regulatory
 467 requirements,² and its overall risk approach. The organization then works to identify threats
 468 and vulnerabilities applicable to those systems and assets.

² Some examples of regulatory requirements can be found in Appendix A.

- 469 Step 3: Create a Current Profile. This step allows the organization to understand their
 470 current cybersecurity posture. An organization can assess how it is currently implementing
 471 the CSF functions by creating a Current Profile a list of subcategory activities that are
 472 currently being implemented within the organization.
- 473 Step 4: Conduct a Risk Assessment. This initial assessment could be guided by the
 474 organization's overall risk management process or previous risk assessment activities. The
 475 organization analyzes the operational environment, identifies emerging risks, and uses cyber
 476 threat information from internal and external sources to discern the likelihood of a
 477 cybersecurity event and the impact that the event could have on the organization.
- 478 Step 5: Create a Target Profile. The organization creates a Target Profile by selecting the
 479 subcategories that support the organization's desired cybersecurity outcomes. Each
 480 organization will have a unique risk posture, which will result in a unique set of
 481 subcategories.
- 482 Step 6: Determine, Analyze, and Prioritize Gaps. The organization compares the Current
 483 Profile and the Target Profile to identify potential gaps. When paired with a threat, a risk
 484 assessment can be conducted to determine an overall risk rating. This will allow
 485 organizations to create a prioritized action plan to address those gaps.
- 486 Step 7: Implement Action Plan. The organization determines which actions to take to
 487 address the gaps. The Framework is an iterative process that must be repeated at regular
 488 intervals, when the impact to the organization changes, or when the cyberthreat landscape
 489 changes. Regularly scheduled reviews of the security profile, gap reassessment, updated
 490 action plans, and completed action plans should be conducted at least every two years and/or
 491 after relevant cybersecurity incidents or discoveries in the industry.

492 **4.2 Case Study Example**

- This section provides a short example walk-through using the Cybersecurity Framework steps
 for a notional low-Earth orbit (LEO) "small satellite vehicle," which represents only one portion
 of larger space operations. The same process³ can be applied to the other areas of space
 operations, if needed. In this notional example, a Framework Profile is created to address the
 core cybersecurity areas below:
- 498
 Identify assets, threats to those assets, vulnerabilities to those assets, threat models, and regulatory requirements.
- **Protect** assets using outcomes that are then traced to controls and standards.
- **Detect** cybersecurity incidents that result from a risk exposure where an attack has exploited a vulnerability and the realization of threats as they materialize.

³ It is important to note that the CSF is not prescriptive about how the steps should be applied, and this use case is intended for use as one of many possible methods.

- **Respond** to those incidents..
- **Recover** from those incidents.

505 4.2.1 Scenario Background

506 This scenario describes a small company that manufactures and operates a small satellite. The 507 satellite is for commercial use and is only under NOAA regulation⁴ for licensing commercial 508 imagery satellites. Initially, this company is focusing on the satellite (platform and payload).

- 509 For Step 1 The notional use case is scoped to just the following aspects of Figure 1: the
- 510 satellite vehicle itself; internal satellite communication cybersecurity (the interaction and
- 511 interfaces to components within the vehicle); what the satellite receives, consumes, and produces
- 512 to outside entities; Command and Control; and Sensing, Information Processing, Data
- 513 Acquisition and Communication. The notional company only owns and controls the satellite
- 514 vehicle part of the operations. They will use its generated target profile to express cybersecurity
- 515 requirements for their vehicle and to compare products and services offered for other areas of
- 516 space operations that are hybrid and/or outsourced.

517 <u>For Step 2</u> – The organization's business leaders identify relevant regulatory requirements as

518 well as critical systems and critical data, and they model potential high-level threats and

519 vulnerabilities to assets (and their potential impacts). The organization defines its critical systems

- 520 as those with a direct impact on the satellite itself and their business model, which acquires "data
- 521 over a geographic area." Organizational leadership determines that the business and mission-
- 522 critical systems are:
- Communications technologies
- Guidance control
- Sensor systems

526 The organization then generates a high-level cybersecurity risk model that can help identify its 527 most severe cybersecurity vulnerabilities, the threat events that are most likely to occur, and 528 events that could have the highest negative impact on the business. This analysis is less rigid 529 than the detailed risk evaluation that occurs in Step 4 and is intended to spur discussion regarding

- 530 the types of risk events that might have some impact on the organization. The resulting risk
- understanding helps shape the Current State Profile described in Step 3.
- A list of the potential threats and their business impacts is then generated (see Table 1).

⁴ See <u>Licensing | nesdis (noaa.gov)</u>.

5	3	3

Table 1. Mapping of cybersecurity potential threats to business impacts

	Cybersecurity potential threats	Business Impacts
1	Intentional jamming and spoofing of sensor data	Communications technologies Guidance control Sensor systems
2	Interception and theft of sensor data	Communications technologies
3	Intentional corruption of sensor systems	Sensor systems
4	Denial-of-service attack of sensor	Communications technologies
5	Intentional jamming and spoofing of guidance control	Guidance control
6	Hijacking and unauthorized commands to guidance control	Guidance control
7	Malicious code injection	Communications technologies Sensor systems
8	Denial-of-service attack of guidance	Guidance control

534

535 To mitigate these high-impact, high-probability events, a set of needed cybersecurity 536 outcomes is generated. These are, in effect, the inverse of the threat models to the critical 537 systems and are placed in the terms used in the core of the CSF where they are most 538 appropriate for the outcomes. For example:

- *Identify/Protect/Detect/Respond/Recover* from jamming, spoofing, and data interception
 of communication technologies.
- *Protect/Detect/Respond/Recover Guidance Control* from unauthorized access,
 unauthorized commands, and unauthorized jamming.
- *Protect/Detect/Respond/Recover* from spoofing, interception, and the corruption of
 sensor data.
- *Protect/Detect/Respond/Recover Satellite Operations* from malicious code attacks.
- *Protect/Detect/Respond/Recover* communication technologies, sensors, and guidance
 controls from denial-of-service attacks.

548 Regulations and other requirements for each component of operations, specifically for the 549 sensing satellite vehicle, are identified and used to generate outcomes that are added to the above

- 550 list when needed. These are then tagged to identify their sources as regulatory and to ensure that
- any needed records are generated and maintained on the implementation of these requirements.
- 552 Currently, many federal agencies hold oversight over and requirements in different elements of
- 553 space operations. These are the primary inputs for identifying initial cybersecurity requirements
- 554 for space commerce systems. Some examples of relevant regulations are described in Appendix
- 555 A.
- 556 <u>For Step 3</u> Assume that the current cybersecurity program is driven solely by regulatory
- 557 requirements. In the example use case, these are the NOAA requirements for the Licensing of
- 558 Private Remote Sensing Space Systems. The organization will need to assure and state that:
- 559 The methods applicant will use to ensure the integrity of its operations, including 560 plans for: Positive control of the remote sensing space system and relevant 561 operations centers and stations; denial of unauthorized access to data 562 transmissions to or from the remote sensing space system; and restriction of 563 collection and/or distribution of unenhanced data from specific areas at the 564 request of the U.S. Government.⁵
- 565 The organization documents the policies, processes, and technologies that are in place, especially 566 those related to the high-level cybersecurity risk issues described in Step 2. The organization 567 should walk through all of the subcategories outlined in the Cybersecurity Framework and select 568 those that are currently in practice. The list of subcategories being addressed forms the Current 569 Profile (Table 2).
- 570 For the purposes of this example, the company has found that they are currently implementing
- 571 the following, which will serve as their "Current Profile."
- 572

Table 2. Current Profile

Function	Subcategory	Informativ SP 800-53, Rev 4	ve Reference SP 800-53, Rev 5
Protect	PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized devices, users, and processes.	IA-8	IA-8

⁵ See <u>https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/licenseHome.html</u>.

Function	Subcategory	Informative Reference SP 800-53, Rev 4 SP 800-53, Rev 5	
	PR.AC-4: Access permissions and authorizations are managed to incorporate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties.	AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, AC-24	AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, AC-24
	PR.AC-7: Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated (e.g., single- factor, multi-factor) commensurate with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks).	IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA- 5, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11	IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11
	PR.DS-1: Data at rest is protected.	SC-28	SC-28
	PR.DS-2: Data in transit is protected.	SC-8	SC-8
	PR.DS-4: An adequate capacity to ensure availability is maintained.	CP-2, SC-5	CP-2, SC-5
	PR.DS-6: Integrity-checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity.	SI-7	SI-7, SI-10
	PR.IP-12: A vulnerability management plan is developed and implemented.	RA-1, RA-3, RA-5, SI-2	RA-1, RA-3, RA-5, SI-2
	PR.PT-5: Mechanisms (e.g., fail- safe, load balancing, hot swap) are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations.	PL-8, SC-6	PE-11, PL-8, SC-6
Detect	DE.AE-3: Event data is collected and correlated from multiple sources and sensors.	AU-6, CA-7, IR-4, IR- 5, IR-8, SI-4	AU-6, CA-7, IR-4, IR- 5, IR-8, SI-4
	DE.CM-1: The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.	SC-5	AU-12, CA-7, CM-3, SC-5, SC-7, SI-4
	DE.CM-4: Malicious code is detected.	SI-3	SI-4

Function	Subcategory	Informativ SP 800-53, Rev 4	ve Reference SP 800-53, Rev 5
	DE.CM-7: Monitoring for unauthorized personnel, connections, devices, and software is performed.	AU-12, CA-7, CM-3, CM-8, SI-4	AU-12, CA-7, CM-3, CM-8, SI-4

574 For Step 4 – The organization prioritizes and validates the needed cybersecurity outcomes from

575 Step 3 and uses them to inform the specific technical cybersecurity controls to be selected to 576 meet those outcomes.

577 The organization considers the costs of cybersecurity mitigation and the potential risks addressed

578 in light of each subcategory recorded in the Current State Profile. The team consults various

authorities at the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense to better

580 understand potential threats to space-based network operations. The organization joins a local

581 Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) so that company representatives will have a

venue for sharing and receiving prioritized information regarding known risks as the threat and

583 technology landscapes evolve.

584 The organization applies the principles described in NIST SP 800-30, *Guide for Conducting Risk*

585 Assessments, to set a scale for likelihood and impact and to prioritize outcomes and controls that

586 can manage the risks with the most negative impacts and/or that are most cost-effective for their

risk management results. The results of this notional risk assessment are presented in Table 3.

588 Supported by this information, the organization is then prepared to determine the outcomes that

- 589 will achieve the desired risk posture in a cost-effective way.
- 590

Table 3. Notional Risk Assessment Example

	Cybersecurity Potential Threats	Business Impacts	Severity	Likelihood
1	Intentional jamming and spoofing of sensor data	Loss of data assets for customers	Moderate	Moderate, based on availability of jamming equipment.
2	Interception and theft of sensor data	Loss of markets and customers	High	Moderate, based on availability of receiver equipment
3	Intentional corruption of sensor system	Loss of satellite vehicle or loss of data	Critical	Moderate
4	Denial-of-service attack of sensor	Loss of data and/or loss of service	Moderate	Moderate

	Cybersecurity Potential Threats	Business Impacts	Severity	Likelihood
5	Intentional jamming and spoofing of guidance control	Loss of satellite vehicle	Moderate	Moderate
6	Hijacking and unauthorized commands to guidance control	Loss of satellite vehicle	Critical	Critical
7	Malicious code injection	Loss of satellite vehicle, data corruption, and data loss	Critical	Moderate
8	Denial-of-service attack of guidance	Loss of data and/or loss of guidance	Moderate	Moderate

592 For Step 5 – The organization creates the following Target Profile to express its desired satellite

593 vehicle cybersecurity requirements. Table 4 maps threats identified in Step 2 to CSF

594 subcategories. These subcategories map to specific SP 800-53 technical controls as found in the

595 informative references section of the Framework.⁶ An ordinal count is made for the amount of

individual subcategories and threat-pairing that a control might address. This will further assist in

establishing priorities and helping with investment decisions. For example, one cybersecuritycontrol might be effective in achieving many of the outcomes sought. This information can assist

in understanding priorities as well as mitigations that might need stronger monitoring, detection,

600 and recovery capabilities.

601 The creation of this mapping builds a list of CSF subcategories and associated informative

references that can be used to express the specific technical requirements of the SP 800-53

603 control. The selection of the subcategories results in Table 5, which is the Target Profile. These

604 include NIST references and those from other sources, such as Standards Development

605 Organizations (SDOs), the Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 1200,

and others that are relevant to the organization.

⁶ SP 800-53, Revision 4 and Revision 5 are given in this example.

Table 4. Selection of subcategories to cybersecurity potential threats

Functions	Subcategories	1 Intentional jamming and spoofing of sensor data	2 Interception and theft of sensor data	3 Intentional corruption of sensor systems	4 Denial-of-service attack of sensor	5 Intentional jamming and spoofing of guidance control	6 Hijacking and unauthorized commands to guidance control	7 Malicious code injection	8 Denial-of-service attack of guidance
Identify	ID.AM-1								
	ID.AM-2								
	ID.AM-3								
	ID.AM-4								
	ID.AM-5								
	ID.AM-6								
	ID.BE-1								
	ID.BE-2								
	ID.BE-3								
	ID.BE-4								
	ID.BE-5								
	ID.GV-1								
	ID.GV-2								
	ID.GV-3								
	ID.GV-4								
	ID.RA-1								
	ID.RA-2								

Functions	Subcategories	1 Intentional jamming and spoofing of sensor data	2 Interception and theft of sensor data	3 Intentional corruption of sensor systems	4 Denial-of-service attack of sensor	5 Intentional jamming and spoofing of guidance control	6 Hijacking and unauthorized commands to guidance control	7 Malicious code injection	8 Denial-of-service attack of guidance
	ID.RA-3								
	ID.RA-4								
	ID.RA-5								
	ID.RA-6								
	ID.RM-1								
	ID.RM-2								
	ID.RM-3								
	ID.SC-1								
	ID.SC-2								
	ID.SC-3								
	ID.SC-4								
	ID.SC-5								
Protect	PR.AC-1								
	PR.AC-2								
	PR.AC-3								
	PR.AC-4								
	PR.AC-5								

Functions	Subcategories	ng and ata	heft of	otion of	attack of	ng and e control	ands to	ection	ittack of
		1 Intentional jamming and spoofing of sensor data	2 Interception and theft of sensor data	3 Intentional corruption of sensor systems	4 Denial-of-service attack of sensor	5 Intentional jamming and spoofing of guidance control	6 Hijacking and unauthorized commands to guidance control	7 Malicious code injection	8 Denial-of-service attack of guidance
	PR.AC-6								
	PR.AC-7								
	PR.AT-1								
	PR.AT-2								
	PR.AT-3								
	PR.AT-4								
	PR.AT-5								
	PR.DS-1								
	PR.DS-2								
	PR.DS-3								
	PR.DS-4								
	PR.DS-5								
	PR.DS-6								
	PR.DS-7								
	PR.DS-8								
	PR.IP-1								
	PR.IP-2								

Functions	Subcategories	1 Intentional jamming and spoofing of sensor data	2 Interception and theft of sensor data	3 Intentional corruption of sensor systems	4 Denial-of-service attack of sensor	5 Intentional jamming and spoofing of guidance control	6 Hijacking and unauthorized commands to guidance control	7 Malicious code injection	8 Denial-of-service attack of guidance
	PR.IP-3								
	PR.IP-4								
	PR.IP-5								
	PR.IP-6								
	PR.IP-7								
	PR.IP-8								
	PR.IP-9								
	PR.IP-10								
	PR.IP-11								
	PR.IP-12								
	PR.MA-1								
	PR.MA-2								
	PR.PT-1								
	PR.PT-2								
	PR.PT-3								
	PR.PT-4								
	PR.PT-5								

Functions	Subcategories	1 Intentional jamming and spoofing of sensor data	2 Interception and theft of sensor data	3 Intentional corruption of sensor systems	4 Denial-of-service attack of sensor	5 Intentional jamming and spoofing of guidance control	6 Hijacking and unauthorized commands to guidance control	7 Malicious code injection	8 Denial-of-service attack of guidance
Detect	DE.AE-1								
	DE.AE-2								
	DE.AE-3								
	DE.AE-4								
	DE.AE-5								
	DE.CM-1								
	DE.CM-2								
	DE.CM-3								
	DE.CM-4								
	DE.CM-5								
	DE.CM-6								
	DE.CM-7								
	DE.CM-8								
	DE.DP-1								
	DE.DP-2								
	DE.DP-3								
	DE.DP-4								

Functions	Subcategories	1 Intentional jamming and spoofing of sensor data	2 Interception and theft of sensor data	3 Intentional corruption of sensor systems	4 Denial-of-service attack of sensor	5 Intentional jamming and spoofing of guidance control	6 Hijacking and unauthorized commands to guidance control	7 Malicious code injection	8 Denial-of-service attack of guidance
	DE.DP-5								
Respond	RS.RP-1								
	RS.CO-1								
	RS.CO-2								
	RS.CO-3								
	RS.CO-4								
	RS.CO-5								
	RS.AN-1								
	RS.AN-2								
	RS.AN-3								
	RS.AN-4								
	RS.AN-5								
	RS.MI-1								
	RS.MI-2								
	RS.MI-3								
	RS.IM-1								
	RS.IM-2								

Functions	Subcategories	1 Intentional jamming and spoofing of sensor data	2 Interception and theft of sensor data	3 Intentional corruption of sensor systems	4 Denial-of-service attack of sensor	5 Intentional jamming and spoofing of guidance control	6 Hijacking and unauthorized commands to guidance control	7 Malicious code injection	8 Denial-of-service attack of guidance
Recover	RC.RP-1								
	RC.IM-1								
	RC.IM-2								
	RC.CO-1								
	RC.CO-2								
	RC.CO-3								

Table 5: Target Profile

Functions	Subcategories	Informat SP 800-53 Rev 4	ive Reference SP 800-53 Rev 5		
Identify	ID.RA-1: Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented.	CA-2, CA-7, CA- 8, RA3, RA-5, SA-5, SA-11, SI- 2, SI-4, SI-5	CA-2, CA-7, CA-8, RA-3, RA-5, SA-5, SA-11, SI-2, SI-4, SI- 5, PM-15		
	ID.RA-2: Cyber threat intelligence is received from information-sharing forums and sources.	SI-5, PM-15, PM-16	SI-5, PM-15, PM-16, RA-10		

		Informat	ive Reference
Functions	Subcategories	SP 800-53 Rev 4	SP 800-53 Rev 5
	ID.SC-4: Suppliers and third- party partners are routinely assessed using audits, test results, or other forms of evaluations to confirm that they are meeting their contractual obligations.	AU-6, PS-7, SA- 9	AU-6, CA-2, CA-7, PS-7, SA-9, SA-11
Protect	PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized devices, users, and processes.	IA-8	IA-8
	PR.AC-3: Remote access is managed.	AC-1, AC-19, SC-15	AC-1, AC-19, SC-15
	PR.AC-4: Access permissions and authorizations are managed to incorporate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties.	AC-1, AC-2, AC- 3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, AC-24	AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, AC-24
	PR.AC-6: Identities are proofed and bound to credentials and asserted in interactions.	AC-16, IA-1, IA- 2, IA-4, IA-5, IA- 12, PE-2, PS-3	AC-16, IA-1, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-12, PE-2, PS-3
	PR.AC-7: Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated (e.g., single-factor, multi-factor) commensurate with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks).	IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-9, IA- 10, IA-11	IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA- 5, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11
	PR.DS-1: Data-at-rest is protected.	SC-28	SC-28
	PR.DS-2: Data-in-transit is protected.	SC-8	SC-8
	PR.DS-4: An adequate capacity to ensure availability is maintained.	CP-2, SC-5	CP-2, PE-11, SC-5

Functions	Subcategories	Informat SP 800-53 Rev 4	ive Reference SP 800-53 Rev 5
	PR.DS-6: Integrity-checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity.	SI-7	SI-7, SI-10
	PR.DS-8: Integrity-checking mechanisms are used to verify hardware integrity.	SI-7	SI-7
	PR.IP-1: A baseline configuration of information technology/industrial control systems that incorporates security principles (e.g. concept of least functionality) is created and maintained.	CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM-7, CM-9, SA-10	CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM-7, CM-9, SA-10
	PR.IP-3: Configuration change control processes are in place.	CM-3, 4, 10	CM-3, 4, SA-10
	PR.IP-9: Response plans (Incident Response and Business Continuity) and recovery plans (Incident Recovery and Disaster Recovery) are in place and managed.	PS 2,3,4,5,6,7, CM-7	CM-7
	PR.IP-12: A vulnerability management plan is developed and implemented.	RA-1, RA-3, RA- 5, SI-2	RA-1, RA-3, RA-5, SI-2
	PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with policy.	AU Family	AU1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16
	PR.PT-3: The principle of least functionality is incorporated by configuring systems to provide only essential capabilities.	AC-3, 8, 9,19	AC-3, CM-7

Functions	Subcategories	Informative Reference		
T unctions		SP 800-53 Rev 4	SP 800-53 Rev 5	
	PR.PT-4: Communications and control networks are protected.	SC-32, AC-4, AC-17, SC-7	AC-12, AC-17, CP-8, SC-5, SC-7, SC-10, SC-20, SC-21, SC-22, SC-23, SC-31, SC- 37, SC-38, SC-47	
	PR.PT-5: Mechanisms (e.g., fail- safe, load balancing, hot swap) are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations.	PL-8, SC-6	PE-11, PL-8, SC-6	
Detect	DE.AE-3: Event data are collected and correlated from multiple sources and sensors.	AU-6, CA-7, IR- 4, IR-5, IR-8, SI- 4	AU-6, CA-7, IR-4, IR-5, IR-8, SI-4	
	DE.CM-1: The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.	SC-5	AU-12, CA-7, CM-3, SC-5, SC-7, SI-4	
	DE.CM-4: Malicious code is detected.	SI-3	SI-4	
	DE.CM-7: Monitoring for unauthorized personnel, connections, devices, and software is performed.	AU-12, CA-7, CM-3, CM-8, SI- 4	AU-12, CA-7, CM-3, CM-8, SI-4	
	DE.DP-4: Event detection information is communicated.	AU-6, CA-2, CA- 7, RA-5, SI-4	AU-6, CA-2, CA-7, RA-5, SI-4	
Respond	RS.CO-5: Voluntary information-sharing occurs with external stakeholders to achieve broader cybersecurity situational awareness.	SI-5, PM-15	SI-5, PM-15	
	RS.AN-1: Notifications from detection systems are investigated.	AU-6, CA-7, IR- 4, IR-5, PE-6, SI- 4	AU-6, CA-7, IR-4, IR-5, PE-6, RA-5, SI- 4	
	RS.AN-3: Forensics are performed.	AU-7, IR-4	AU-7, IR-4	

Functions	Subcategories	Informat SP 800-53 Rev 4	ive Reference SP 800-53 Rev 5
	RS.MI-1: Incidents are contained.	IR-4	IR-4, CP-2, IR-8
Recover	RC.RP-1: The recovery plan is executed during or after a cybersecurity incident.	CP-10, IR-4, IR-8	CP-10, IR-4, IR-8,
	RC.IM-2: Recovery strategies are updated.	CP-2, IR-4, IR-8	CP-2, IR-4, IR-8

610

611 For Step 6 – The organization compares the desired cybersecurity state (as reflected in Table 5)

and the current cybersecurity state (as reflected in Table 2). The organization determines a new

613 cybersecurity baseline, and each row in the Target Profile (Table 5) that is not adequately

614 addressed in the Current Profile (Table 2) will be part of the new action plan. For example, in the

615 Target Profile, it is desirable to have all sources of cyberthreat intelligence. Since the

organization does not currently participate in any industry forum, ID.RA-2 is a part of the action

617 plan. Similarly, subcategories that are in the Target Profile and are sufficiently addressed in the

618 Current Profile are *not* a part of the action plan.

In subsequent iterations, this step will identify gaps between the current and target states and willprovide an opportunity to add or update plans.

621 In light of the desired state, as described in the profile, the following action plans for protecting

622 the cybersecurity of the satellite vehicle service are created.

To protect the satellite and its data from communications spoofing, interception, corruption, tampering, and denial of service:

- In order to appropriately protect systems, the first task is to identify asset vulnerabilities
 and document those vulnerabilities as part of a cybersecurity program within the
 organization. This includes communicating with suppliers to understand their
 cybersecurity program. ID.RA-1, ID.SC-4.
- 629629 2. Only allow authorized devices to communicate with the satellite, and employ the630 following requirements:
- a. Authenticate the claimed identity of any device attempting to communicate. CSF:
 PR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7
- b. Drop all communication attempts for which the access authorization of the other
 device cannot be confirmed. CSF: PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4

635 636		c. Check the integrity of communications and drop any communications where integrity appears to have been violated. CSF: PR.DS-2
637 638	3.	Only allow authorized devices to access sensitive data within the satellite's communications.
639 640		a. Use encryption to protect the contents of communications. CSF: PR.DS-2, PR.DS-4
641 642		b. Require that the recipient of encrypted communications be authenticated before they can decrypt the communications and access their contents. (See 1a above.)
643	4.	Make the satellite's communications resilient to adverse conditions.
644		a. Use communication protocols that ensure delivery. CSF: PR.PT-5
645 646 647		b. Have a secondary or alternate communications channel available at all times, and automatically fail over to it when the primary communications channel is not functioning properly. CSF: PR.PT-5
648 649		c. When communications are unavailable, store any unsent sensor data and send it after communications are restored. CSF: PR.PT-5
650 651	5.	Build protections into the satellite to thwart DDoS-related connection attempts. CSF: PR.PT-4, PR.PT-5
652	6.	Protect the vehicle if communications are compromised.
653 654 655 656		a. Implementation of control PR. IP-9 response and recovery plans are in place in case the command-and-control link is attacked to ensure the safety of the vehicle, such as the ability to act in autonomous safe mode and to avoid collision in the case of a congested orbital slot.
657 658	7.	Enhance the ability of the vehicle to ingest and share threat data and to react to that data. ID.RA-2
659 660 661 662 663		b. Currently, threat information-sharing and decision-making happen in the ground segment. However, in the future, spacecraft may autonomously activate or deactivate an on-orbit function as a means to mitigate a potential attack. An additional enhancement of this would be automated threat-sharing that can be ingested by the vehicle.
664 665	-	otect the satellite and its data from unauthorized access, use, corruption, tampering, enial of service:
666 667	1.	Use secure device design and development practices for the satellite hardware, firmware, operating system, and applications.
668		a. Isolate executing processes from each other. See the SSDF publication.
669 670		b. Validate all input, including commands and data (e.g., allow listings, input constraints). See the SSDF publication.

671 672 673 674 675 676 677		c.	Satellites typically have multiple redundant paths to account for failures in orbit. For example, the MIL-STD-1553 data bus has multiple redundant paths. The standard also calls for an "A" side and a "B" side for space vehicles and associated redundant hardware that will allow the satellite to operate if any component fails. The isolation of the data bus is logical, not physical, and space operators should consider isolation as part of their design, understanding the SWAP (i.e., size, weight, and power) impacts that this may produce.
678		d.	Build protections into the device for DoS attacks.
679	2.	Prever	at and deter attacks against the satellite.
680 681 682		a.	Use a hardware root of trust to perform a secure boot, which will be the basis for conducting system integrity checks and other health checks/self-tests. CSF: PR.DS-6, PR.DS-8
683 684		b.	Provide update, upgrade, and uninstall capabilities for firmware and software. (Also see items 1 and 2 above.) CSF: PR.IP-12
685 686		c.	Configure the satellite to avoid known security weaknesses. CSF: PR.IP-1, PR.IP-3
687 688 689		d.	Prevent unauthorized software from executing (e.g., anti-malware software, application allow listings software, code signing). CSF: DE.CM-4, DE.CM-7, PR.PT-3
690	3.	Only a	llow authorized parties to access and alter sensor data stored on the satellite.
691		a.	Enforce the principle of least privilege. CSF: PR.AC-4, PR.DS-1
692		b.	Protect the integrity of all stored sensor data. CSF: PR.DS-1, PR.DS-6
693 694			spond to, and recover from attacks and incidents involving the satellite, its communications:
695 696	1.	Log s DE.C	ecurity-related events, and continuously review the logs. CSF: PR.PT-1, DE.AE-3, M-1
697	2.	Inves	tigate suspicious events. CSF: DE.DP-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-3, RS.CO-5
698	3.	Preve	ent an incident from continuing or expanding (e.g., by failing safe). CSF: RS.MI-1
699	4.	Reco	ver from incidents by restoring data and software. RC.RP-1, RC.IM-2
700	To ob	tain th	e most current and accurate threat data to inform the residual risk analysis:
701 702 703	1.	compa	ganization joins a local Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) so that any representatives will have a venue for sharing and receiving prioritized nation regarding known risks as the threat and technology landscapes evolve.
704 705 706	2.	FAA,	ganization defines a protocol to consult various authorities at the NASA, NOAA, Department of Homeland Security, and/or the Department of Defense to better stand potential threats to space-based network operations.

- 707 For Step 7 Security leaders present the action plan, business case, and requests for appropriate
- resources to key company stakeholders and executives for approval. Processes to monitor and
- review the plan's implementation ensure that the activities sufficiently address cybersecurity
- risks to satellite operations, allow for future updates to the profiles, and maintain oversight over
- 711 external service providers.
- An organization repeats the steps as needed to continuously assess and improve its cybersecurity.
- 713 For instance, organizations may find that more frequent repetition of the Orient step improves
- the quality of risk assessments. Furthermore, organizations may monitor progress through
- 715 iterative updates to the Current Profile, subsequently comparing the Current Profile to the Target
- 716 Profile. Organizations may also use this process to align their cybersecurity program with their
- 717 desired Framework Implementation Tier.

718 **4.3 Conclusion**

- 719 NIST has provided this example to show how an organization might apply the steps of the
- 720 Cybersecurity Framework to evaluate and address possible security risks. NIST recommends that
- 721 organizations apply the steps that best apply to their threat models, business cases, and risk
- tolerance. As the industry expands, NIST will continue to support the community through
- research products and risk management guidance.

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725

726 Appendix A—Examples of Relevant Regulations

727 This appendix provides examples of regulations that may be relevant to some but not all

- commercial satellite operations. It is important for each organization to identify the potential
- regulation and regulatory agency that applies to their specific operations and business.

730 DoD/IC/NGA

- 731 From the National Information Assurance Policy for Space Systems Used to Support National
- 732 Security Missions by the Committee on National Security Systems Publication (CNSSP) No. 12:
- 733 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-4), National Space Policy of the United States of 734 America...reiterates that United States national security is critically dependent upon space capabilities and this dependence will grow. Space activities are also closely linked 735 736 to the operation of the United States Government's (USG) critical infrastructures and 737 have increasingly been leveraged to satisfy national security requirements. Therefore, 738 increased assurance and resilience are needed for the mission-essential functions of 739 national security space systems, including their supporting infrastructure, to help protect 740 against disruption, degradation, and destruction, whether from environmental, 741 mechanical, electronic, or hostile means.
- 742 The primary objective of this policy [CNSSP-12] is to help ensure the success of national 743 security missions that use space systems, by fully integrating information assurance into 744 the planning, development, design, launch, sustained operation, and deactivation of those 745 space systems used to collect, generate, process, store, display, or transmit national 746 security information, as well as any supporting or related national security systems. Fully 747 addressing information assurance is especially important for the space platform portion of 748 space systems, since any vulnerability in them normally cannot be eliminated once 749 launched.
- 750 Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
- Regarding the International Bureau Satellite Division, Federal Communications Commission(FCC):
- The primary mission of the Satellite Division is to serve U.S. consumers by promoting a
 competitive and innovative domestic and global telecommunications marketplace. The
 Division strives to achieve this goal by:
- Authorizing as many satellite systems as possible and as quickly as possible to facilitate deployment of satellite services;
- Minimizing regulation and maximizing flexibility for satellite telecommunications
 providers to meet customer needs;
- Fostering efficient use of the radio frequency spectrum and orbital resources. The
 Division also provides expertise about the commercial satellite industry in the domestic

spectrum management process and advocates U.S. satellite radiocommunication interests
 in international coordinations and negotiations.

764 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

- 765 Regarding the Office of Commercial Space Transportation:
- The Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) was established in 1984...as part
 of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation within the Department of Transportation
 (DOT). In November 1995, AST was transferred to the Federal Aviation Administration
 (FAA) as the FAA's only space-related line of business. AST was established to:
- Regulate the U.S. commercial space transportation industry, to ensure compliance with
 international obligations of the United States, and to protect the public health and safety,
 safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States;
- Encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launches and reentries by the private sector;
- Recommend appropriate changes in Federal statutes, treaties, regulations, policies, plans,
 and procedures; and
- Facilitate the strengthening and expansion of the United States space transportation
 infrastructure.
- 779 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- 780 Regarding the Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs (CRSRA) Licensing Program:
- 781 This web site is intended to provide U.S. laws, regulations, policies, and guidance
- 782 pertaining to the operation of commercial remote sensing satellite systems. Pursuant to
- the National and Commercial Space Programs Act (NCSPA or Act), 51 U.S.C. § 60101,
- 784 et seq, responsibilities have been delegated from the Secretary of Commerce to the
- 785 Assistant Administrator for NOAA Satellite and Information Services (NOAA/NESDIS)
- for the licensing of the operations of private space-based remote sensing systems.
- In accordance with the Act, the regulations 15 CFR Part 960 concerning the licensing of
 private remote sensing space systems have been promulgated.
- 789 **Space Policy Directive 5 (non-regulatory)**
- (SPD-5) <u>Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-5 Cybersecurity Principles for Space</u>
 Systems. Policy will foster practices across the commercial space industry that protect
 space assets and their supporting infrastructure from cyber threats and ensure continuity
 of operations. SPD-5 states adoption by industry should include practices aligned with
 the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Cybersecurity Framework to reduce
 the risk of malware infection and malicious access to systems.

796 Appendix B—Acronyms

- 797 Selected acronyms and abbreviations used in this paper are defined below.
- 798 AST Office of Commercial Space Transportation
- 799 CFR Code of Federal Regulations
- 800 CIO Chief Information Officer
- 801 CNSS Committee on National Security Systems
- 802 CNSSP Committee on National Security Systems Publication
- 803 CRSRA Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs
- 804 CSF Cybersecurity Framework
- 805 CTO Chief Technology Officer
- 806 DOT Department of Transportation
- 807 FAA Federal Aviation Administration
- 808 FCC Federal Communications Commission
- 809 FOIA Freedom of Information Act
- 810 IR Internal Report
- 811 ITL Information Technology Laboratory
- 812 LEO Low Earth Orbit
- 813 NCSPA National and Commercial Space Programs Act
- 814 NESDIS National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service
- 815 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
- 816 NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
- 817 NSA National Security Agency
- 818 OSC Office of Space Commercialization
- 819 PPD Presidential Policy Directive

- 820 SDO Standard Development Organization
- 821 SP Special Publication
- 822 SSO Standard Setting Organization
- 823 TT&C Telemetry Tracking and Command
- 824 USG United States Government

825	Appendix C—Glo	ssary
826 827 828	beacon	Initial signal by satellite conducted when first put into mission operation in order to establish communications with command and control and report initial operating status
829 830 831 832	bus	The infrastructure of a space platform typically consisting of the basic physical structures, mechanisms, and subsystems for propulsion, power, thermal control, attitude determination and control, and TT&C (telemetry, tracking, and command) communications and processing
833	crosslinks	Communication between satellites
834	current profile	The 'as is' state of system cybersecurity
835	downlink	Communication originating from the satellite to the ground
836 837	payload	Mission-specific items of the overall satellite that are not part of the overall operations or "flying" of the satellite
838 839	profile	A representation of the outcomes that a particular system or organization has selected from the Framework Categories and Subcategories
840 841 842 843	risk	The level of impact on organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals resulting from the operation of an information system given the potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of that threat occurring
844	satellite	Bus and payload combined into one operational asset
845 846	space structures	Term referring to "space debris" or "space junk" that is no longer in use for any business or mission need; any human-made assets in space
847	target profile	The desired outcome or "to be" state of cybersecurity implementation
848 849 850	telemetry	The science of measuring a quantity or quantities, transmitting the results to a distant station, and interpreting, indicating, and/or recording the quantities measured
851 852 853 854 855 856	threat	Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service; the potential for a threat-source to successfully exploit a particular information system vulnerability
857	umbilical cord	During prelaunch, this cable connects the space vehicle to the launch pad

858 859 860		to monitor the vehicle health and is disconnected or cut when the vehicle launches; enables the exchange of data with ground launch mission systems
861	uplink	Communication originating from the ground to the satellite
862 863	vehicle	Space operational items that include the launching items used to place the satellite, bus, and/or payload into orbit
864 865 866	vulnerability	Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source
867		