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92 93

Abstract

94 This document provides the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) Version 1.1 implementation details

95 developed for the manufacturing environment. The "Manufacturing Profile" of the CSF can be

96 used as a roadmap for reducing cybersecurity risk for manufacturers that is aligned with

97 manufacturing sector goals and industry best practices. This Manufacturing Profile provides a

98 voluntary, risk-based approach for managing cybersecurity activities and reducing cyber risk to 99 manufacturing systems. The Manufacturing Profile is meant to enhance but not replace current

100 cybersecurity standards and industry guidelines that the manufacturer is embracing.

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Keywords

104 Computer security; Cybersecurity Framework (CSF); distributed control systems (DCS);

105 industrial control systems (ICS); information security; manufacturing; network security;

106 programmable logic controllers (PLC); risk management; security controls; supervisory control

107 and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.

108

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- 117 118

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Note to Readers on the Update

120 NISTIR 8183 Revision 1 updates the Manufacturing Profile to include the sub-category

121 enhancements established in NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure

122 Cybersecurity Version 1.1. These updates include managing cybersecurity within the supply

123 chain, self-assessing cybersecurity risk, vulnerability disclosure, system integrity, and more

124 comprehensive controls for identity management. Additional changes include updating language

125 to change references from "security levels" to "impact levels."

Call for Patent Claims

127 This public review includes a call for information on essential patent claims (claims whose use 128 would be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements in this Information 129 Technology Laboratory (ITL) draft publication). Such guidance and/or requirements may be 130 directly stated in this ITL Publication or by reference to another publication. This call also 131 includes disclosure, where known, of the existence of pending U.S. or foreign patent applications 132 relating to this ITL draft publication and of any relevant unexpired U.S. or foreign patents. 133 134 ITL may require from the patent holder, or a party authorized to make assurances on its behalf, 135 in written or electronic form, either: 136 137 a) assurance in the form of a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does not hold 138 and does not currently intend holding any essential patent claim(s); or 139 140 b) assurance that a license to such essential patent claim(s) will be made available to 141 applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of complying with the guidance 142 or requirements in this ITL draft publication either: 143 144 i. under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair 145 discrimination; or 146 without compensation and under reasonable terms and conditions that are ii. 147 demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination. 148 149 Such assurance shall indicate that the patent holder (or third party authorized to make assurances 150 on its behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the 151 assurance, provisions sufficient to ensure that the commitments in the assurance are binding on 152 the transferee, and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of 153 future transfers with the goal of binding each successor-in-interest. 154 155 The assurance shall also indicate that it is intended to be binding on successors-in-interest regardless of whether such provisions are included in the relevant transfer documents. 156 157 158 Such statements should be addressed to: CSF Manufacturing Profile@nist.gov

159 Executive Summary

167

- 160 This document provides the Cybersecurity Framework implementation details developed for the
- 161 manufacturing environment. The "Manufacturing Profile" of the Cybersecurity Framework can
- 162 be used as a roadmap for reducing cybersecurity risk for manufacturers that is aligned with
- 163 manufacturing sector goals and industry best practices.
- 164 The Profile gives manufacturers:
- A method to identify opportunities for improving the current cybersecurity posture of the
 manufacturing system
 - An evaluation of their ability to operate the control environment at their acceptable risk level
- A standardized approach to preparing the cybersecurity plan for ongoing assurance of the manufacturing system's security
- 171 The Profile is built around the primary functional areas of the Cybersecurity Framework which
- enumerate the most basic functions of cybersecurity activities. The five primary functional areas
- are: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. These primary functional areas comprise a
- 174 starting point from which to develop a manufacturer-specific or sector-specific Profile at the
- 175 defined risk levels of Low, Moderate and High.
- 176 This Manufacturing "Target" Profile focuses on desired cybersecurity outcomes and can be used
- as a roadmap to identify opportunities for improving the current cybersecurity posture of the
- 178 manufacturing system. The Manufacturing Profile provides a prioritization of security activities
- 179 to meet specific business/mission goals. Relevant and actionable security practices that can be
- 180 implemented to support key business/mission goals are then identified.
- 181 This Manufacturing Profile provides a voluntary, risk-based approach for managing
- 182 cybersecurity activities and reducing cyber risk to manufacturing systems. The Manufacturing
- 183 Profile is meant to enhance but not replace current cybersecurity standards and industry
- 184 guidelines that the manufacturer is embracing.

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209 **1.** Introduction

210 The Executive Order 13636, "Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity," [1] directed the

- 211 development of the voluntary Cybersecurity Framework that provides a prioritized, flexible,
- 212 repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach to manage cybersecurity risk [1] for
- 213 those processes, information, and systems directly involved in the delivery of critical
- 214 infrastructure services.
- 215 The Cybersecurity Framework is a voluntary risk-based assemblage of industry standards and
- 216 best practices designed to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks [2]. The Framework,
- 217 created through collaboration between government and the private sector, uses a common
- 218 language to address and manage cybersecurity risk in a cost-effective way based on business
- 219 needs without imposing additional regulatory requirements.
- 220 The Profile defines specific cybersecurity activities and outcomes for the protection of the
- 221 manufacturing system, its components, facility, and environment. Through use of the Profile, the
- 222 manufacturer can align cybersecurity activities with business requirements, risk tolerances, and
- 223 resources. The Profile provides a manufacturing sector-specific approach to cybersecurity from
- 224 standards, guidelines, and industry best practices.

225 **1.1 Purpose & Scope**

- 226 This document represents a "Target" Profile that focuses on the desired cybersecurity outcomes
- and provides an approach to the desired state of cybersecurity posture of the manufacturing
- system. It can be used to identify opportunities for improving cybersecurity posture by
- comparing the current state with the desired (Target) state. Creating a Target Profile is Step 5 of
- 230 Section 3.2 Establishing or Improving a Cybersecurity Program of the Cybersecurity
- Framework, Version 1.1 [2]. The Target Profile can also be used for comparison with the current
- state to influence process improvement priorities for the organization. The manufacturing
- 233 system's "Current" Profile represents the outcomes from the Framework Core that are currently
- being achieved.
- 235 The Manufacturing "Target" Profile focuses on desired cybersecurity outcomes and can be used
- as a guideline to identify opportunities for improving the current cybersecurity posture of the
- 237 manufacturing system. The Manufacturing Profile provides a prioritization of security activities
- to meet specific business/mission goals. Relevant and actionable security practices that can be
- 239 implemented to support key business/mission goals are then identified.
- 240 Comparison of Profiles (e.g., the Current Profile and Target Profile) may reveal gaps to be
- addressed to meet cybersecurity risk management objectives. Prioritization of gap mitigation is
- driven by the organization's business needs and risk management processes. This risk-based
- 243 approach enables an organization to gauge resource estimates (e.g., staffing, funding) to achieve
- 244 cybersecurity goals in a cost-effective, prioritized manner. The following are examples of how
- the Target Profile may be used:
- A manufacturer may utilize the Target Profile to express cybersecurity risk management requirements to an external service provider.

- A manufacturer may express a system's cybersecurity state through a Current Profile to report results relative to the Target Profile, or to compare with acquisition requirements.
- A critical infrastructure owner/operator, having identified an external partner upon whom
 that infrastructure depends, may use the Target Profile to convey required cybersecurity
 outcomes.
- A critical infrastructure sector may establish a baseline that can be used among its constituents as a sector-specific starting point from which to build tailored Target Profiles.
- The Manufacturing Profile provides a voluntary, risk-based approach for managing cybersecurity activities and reducing cyber risk to manufacturing systems.

258 **1.2 Audience**

259 This document covers details specific to manufacturing systems. Readers of this document

- should be acquainted with operational technology, general computer security concepts, and
- 261 communication protocols such as those used in networking. The intended audience is varied and
- 262 includes the following:
- Control engineers, integrators, and architects who design or implement secure manufacturing systems.
- System administrators, engineers, and other information technology (IT) professionals
 who administer, patch, or secure manufacturing systems.
- Managers who are responsible for manufacturing systems.
- Senior management who are trying to understand implications and consequences as they
 justify and implement a manufacturing systems cybersecurity program to help mitigate
 impacts to business functionality.
- Researchers, academic institutions and analysts who are trying to understand the unique security needs of manufacturing systems.

273 **1.3 Document Structure**

- 274 The remainder of this guide is divided into the following major sections:
- 275 • Section 2 provides an overview of manufacturing systems. 276 • Section 3 provides an overview of the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 277 Cybersecurity (Cybersecurity Framework). • Section 4 discusses the manufacturing profile development approach. 278 279 • Section 5 provides rationale for integrating cybersecurity into manufacturing 280 Business/mission objectives. 281 • Section 6 discusses cyber risk management and the risk categorization of the manufacturing system. 282 Section 7 provides the manufacturing implementation of the CSF subcategories. 283 284 References provides a list of references used in the development of this document. • 285 Appendix A provides a list of acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. • 286 Appendix B provides a glossary of terms used in this document. •

287 2. Overview of Manufacturing Systems

- 288 Manufacturing is a large and diverse industrial sector. Manufacturing industries can be 289 categorized as either *process-based*, *discrete-based*, or a combination of both [3].
- 290 *Process-based* manufacturing industries typically utilize two main process types:
- Continuous Manufacturing Processes. These processes run continuously, often with
 phases to make different grades of a product. Typical continuous manufacturing
 processes include fuel or steam flow in a power plant, petroleum in a refinery, and
 distillation in a chemical plant.
- Batch Manufacturing Processes. These processes have distinct processing steps,
 conducted on a quantity of material. There is a distinct start and end to a batch process
 with the possibility of brief steady state operations during intermediate steps. Typical
 batch manufacturing processes include food, beverage, and biotech manufacturing.
- 299 *Discrete-based* manufacturing industries typically conduct a series of operations on a product to 300 create the distinct end product. Electronic and mechanical parts assembly and parts machining 301 are typical examples of this type of industry. Both process-based and discrete-based industries
- 302 utilize similar types of control systems, sensors, and networks. Some facilities are a hybrid of
- 303 discrete and process-based manufacturing.
- 304 Additionally, to support both process-based and discrete-based manufacturing processes,
- 305 manufacturers must also manage the supply chain for both technology-based input products (e.g.
- 306 programmable logic controllers, sensors, robotics, data collection systems, and other information
- 307 technologies) and non-technology input products (e.g., non-IT components manufactured by
- 308 third-party suppliers that are utilized to manufacture the final product).
- 309 Manufacturing industries are usually located within a confined factory or plant-centric area.
- 310 Communications in manufacturing industries are typically performed using fieldbus and local
- 311 area network (LAN) technologies that are reliable and high speed. Wireless networking
- 312 technologies are gaining popularity in manufacturing industries. Fieldbus includes, for example,
- 313 DeviceNet, Modbus, and Controller Area Network (CAN) bus.
- 314 The Manufacturing sector of the critical infrastructure community includes public and private
- 315 owners and operators, along with other entities operating in the manufacturing domain.
- 316 Members of the distinct critical infrastructure sector perform functions that are supported by
- 317 industrial control systems (ICS) and by information technology (IT). This reliance on
- technology, communication, and the interconnectivity of ICS and IT has changed and expanded
- the potential vulnerabilities and increased potential risk to manufacturing system operations.

320 3. Overview of the Cybersecurity Framework

The Profile defines specific practices to address the Framework Core. It is the next layer of detail for implementing cybersecurity best practices for each category expressed in the Framework.

323 **3.1 Framework Core**

324 The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity activities and desired outcomes determined to be

325 essential across critical infrastructure sectors [2]. The Core presents industry standards,

326 guidelines, and practices in a manner that allows for communication of cybersecurity activities

327 and outcomes across the organization from the executive level to the implementation/operations

328 level. The Framework Core consists of five concurrent and continuous Functions—Identify, 220 Brotest, Detect, Bernard, Bernard, When considered to action these Functions provide a high

Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover. When considered together, these Functions provide a highlevel, strategic view of the organization's management of cybersecurity risk. The Framework

331 Core then identifies underlying key Categories and Subcategories for each Function and matches

them with example Informative References such as existing standards, guidelines, and practices

333 for each Subcategory [2].

- 335 The five Framework Functions can be performed concurrently and continuously to form an
- 336 operational culture that addresses the dynamic cybersecurity risk.

Table 1 Cybersecurity Framework Functions and Categories

Function Unique Identifier	Function	Category Unique Identifier	Category
		ID.AM	Asset Management
		ID.BE	Business Environment
ID	Identify	ID.GV	Governance
		ID.RA	Risk Assessment
		ID.RM	Risk Management Strategy
		ID.SC	Supply Chain Management
		PR.AC	Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control
		PR.AT	Awareness and Training
PR	Protect	PR.DS	Data Security
		PR.IP	Information Protection Processes and Procedures
		PR.MA	Maintenance
		PR.PT	Protective Technology
		DE.AE	Anomalies and Events
DE	Detect	DE.CM	Security Continuous Monitoring
		DE.DP	Detection Processes
		RS.RP	Response Planning
		RS.CO	Communications
RS	Respond	RS.AN	Analysis
		RS.MI	Mitigation
		RS.IM	Improvements
	_	RC.RP	Recovery Planning
RC	Recover	RC.IM	Improvements
		RC.CO	Communications

341 The five "functions" of the Framework Core are:

342 **Identify** – Develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities. The activities in the Identify Function are foundational for effective 343 344 use of the Framework. Understanding the business context, the resources that support critical 345 functions and the related cybersecurity risks enables an organization to focus and prioritize its 346 efforts, consistent with its risk management strategy and business needs. Examples of outcome 347 Categories within this Function include: Asset Management; Business Environment; 348 Governance; Risk Assessment; and Risk Management Strategy. 349

350 **Protect** – Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical 351 infrastructure services. The activities in the Protect Function support the ability to limit or 352 contain the impact of a potential cybersecurity event. Examples of outcome Categories within

- 353 this Function include: Access Control; Awareness and Training; Data Security; Information
- 354 Protection Processes and Procedures; Maintenance; and Protective Technology.
- 355

356 **Detect** – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a

357 cybersecurity event. The activities in the Detect Function enable timely discovery of

358 cybersecurity events. Examples of outcome Categories within this Function include: Anomalies

- 359 and Events; Security Continuous Monitoring; and Detection Processes.
- 360

361 **Respond** – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action regarding a detected

362 cybersecurity event. The activities in the Respond Function support the ability to contain the

363 impact of a potential cybersecurity event. Examples of outcome Categories within this Function

- 364 include: Response Planning; Communications; Analysis; Mitigation; and Improvements.
- 365

366 Recover – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and

to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event. The 367

- activities in the Recover Function support timely recovery to normal operations to reduce the 368 369 impact from a cybersecurity event. Examples of outcome Categories within this Function
- 370 include: Recovery Planning; Improvements; and Communications.

371

372 The Manufacturing Profile for the Cybersecurity Framework presents detailed implementation

373 language for the cybersecurity standards expressed in the Framework categories and

374 subcategories. The Profile is intended to support cybersecurity outcomes based on business

375 needs that the manufacturer has selected from the Framework Categories and Subcategories [2].

376 The Profile can be characterized as the alignment of standards, guidelines, and practices to the

377 Framework Core in a practical implementation scenario.

4. Manufacturing Profile Development Approach

379 The manufacturing profile was developed to be an actionable approach for implementing

380 cybersecurity controls into a manufacturing system and its environment. The specific statements

in the subcategories in Section 7 are derived from the security controls of the NIST SP 800-53

382 Rev.4 [4] and are customized to the manufacturing domain using relevant informative references.

- 383 The general informative references of ISA/IEC 62443 [5] from the Framework are also listed in
- the References column. COBIT 5 is sourced for subcategories that have no corresponding 800-
- 385 53 references. Additional input came from NIST SP 800-82, Rev. 2, both in section 6.2
- 386 (Guidance on the Application of Security Controls to ICS) and in Appendix G (ICS Overlay) [3].
- For informative references to an entire control family or set of controls (such as subcategory
- 388 ID.GV-1's informative reference to all "policy and procedures" controls), the approach took a
- 389 holistic view of the controls comprising the family/set.
- 390 Section 7 provides the customized CSF subcategory language developed using informative
- 391 references relevant to the manufacturing domain. In the Reference column in Section 7,

392 hyperlinks are provided to the specific and relevant source influences for the subcategory

393 statements.

394 The Profile expresses tailored values for cybersecurity controls for the manufacturing system

environment. These represent the application of the Categories and Subcategories from the

396 Framework based on domain-specific relevance, business drivers, risk assessment, and the

397 manufacturer's priorities. Users of the Profile can also add Categories and Subcategories as

398 needed to address unique and specific risks.

399 5. Manufacturing Business/Mission Objectives

400 The development of the Manufacturing Profile included the identification of common

401 business/mission objectives to the manufacturing sector. These business/mission objectives

402 provide the necessary context for identifying and managing applicable cybersecurity risk

403 mitigation pursuits [2]. Five common business/mission objectives for the manufacturing sector

404 were initially identified: Maintain Human Safety, Maintain Environmental Safety, Maintain

405 Quality of Product, Maintain Production Goals, and Maintain Trade Secrets. Other

406 business/mission objectives were identified for the manufacturing sector but not included in this

- 407 initial profile. Key cybersecurity practices are identified for supporting each business/mission
- 408 objective, allowing users to better prioritize actions and resources according to the user's defined
- 409 needs.
- 410 These Business/Mission Objectives Are Not Listed in Prioritized Order.

411 Maintain Human Safety

- 412 Manage cybersecurity risks that could potentially impact human safety. Cybersecurity risk on the
- 413 manufacturing system could potentially adversely affect human safety. Personnel should
- 414 understand cybersecurity and safety interdependencies.

415 Maintain Environmental Safety

- 416 Manage cybersecurity risks that could adversely affect the environment, including both
- 417 accidental and deliberate damage. Cybersecurity risk on the manufacturing system could
- 418 potentially adversely affect environmental safety. Personnel should understand cybersecurity and
- 419 environmental safety interdependencies.

420 Maintain Quality of Product

- 421 Manage cybersecurity risks that could adversely affect the quality of product. Protect against
- 422 compromise of integrity of the manufacturing process and associated data.

423 Maintain Production Goals

- 424 Manage cybersecurity risks that could adversely affect production goals. Cybersecurity risk on
- 425 the manufacturing system, including asset damage, could potentially adversely affect production
- 426 goals. Personnel should understand cybersecurity and production goal interdependencies

427 Maintain Trade Secrets

- 428 Manage cybersecurity risks that could lead to the loss or compromise of the organization's
- 429 intellectual property and sensitive business data.

430 **5.1** Alignment of Subcategories to Meet Mission Objectives

- 431 To align cybersecurity goals with overall mission success, the Profile subcategories are
- 432 prioritized in order to support specific business/mission objectives. This allows the manufacturer
- 433 to focus on implementing those cybersecurity measures against threats that could severely
- 434 compromise their ability to perform their essential mission.

436 For each business/mission objective, the most critical Subcategories initially determined to

437 support the objective are highlighted in the tables under each Function. The selection of

438 Subcategories to business/mission objectives was based on a broad range of manufacturing

439 sectors and operations. The most critical Subcategories may differ for individual manufacturers.

440 *Identify* - The Identify Function is critical in the development of the foundation for cybersecurity

- 441 *management, and in the understanding of cyber risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities.*
- 442

Table 2 IDENTIFY Business Mission Objectives

		Maintain Human Safety	Maintain Environmental Safety	Maintain Quality of Product	Maintain Production Goals	Maintain Trade Secrets
	Category Subcategories					
		ID.AM-1	ID.AM-1	ID.AM-1	ID.AM-1	ID.AM-1
		ID.AM-2	ID.AM-2	ID.AM-2	ID.AM-2	ID.AM-2
	Asset	ID.AM-3	ID.AM-3	ID.AM-3	ID.AM-3	ID.AM-3
	Management	ID.AM-4	ID.AM-4	ID.AM-4	ID.AM-4	ID.AM-4
		ID.AM-5	ID.AM-5	ID.AM-5	ID.AM-5	ID.AM-5
		ID.AM-6	ID.AM-6	ID.AM-6	ID.AM-6	ID.AM-6
		ID.BE-1	ID.BE-1	ID.BE-1	ID.BE-1	ID.BE-1
	Business	ID.BE-2	ID.BE-2	ID.BE-2	ID.BE-2	ID.BE-2
	Environment	ID.BE-3	ID.BE-3	ID.BE-3	ID.BE-3	ID.BE-3
	Environment	ID.BE-4	ID.BE-4	ID.BE-4	ID.BE-4	ID.BE-4
		ID.BE-5	ID.BE-5	ID.BE-5	ID.BE-5	ID.BE-5
	Governance	ID.GV-1	ID.GV-1	ID.GV-1	ID.GV-1	ID.GV-1
		ID.GV-2	ID.GV-2	ID.GV-2	ID.GV-2	ID.GV-2
		ID.GV-3	ID.GV-3	ID.GV-3	ID.GV-3	ID.GV-3
ID		ID.GV-4	ID.GV-4	ID.GV-4	ID.GV-4	ID.GV-4
		ID.RA-1	ID.RA-1	ID.RA-1	ID.RA-1	ID.RA-1
		ID.RA-2	ID.RA-2	ID.RA-2	ID.RA-2	ID.RA-2
	Risk	ID.RA-3	ID.RA-3	ID.RA-3	ID.RA-3	ID.RA-3
	Assessment	ID.RA-4	ID.RA-4	ID.RA-4	ID.RA-4	ID.RA-4
		ID.RA-5	ID.RA-5	ID.RA-5	ID.RA-5	ID.RA-5
		ID.RA-6	ID.RA-6	ID.RA-6	ID.RA-6	ID.RA-6
	Risk	ID.RM-1	ID.RM-1	ID.RM-1	ID.RM-1	ID.RM-1
	Management	ID.RM-2	ID.RM-2	ID.RM-2	ID.RM-2	ID.RM-2
	Strategy	ID.RM-3	ID.RM-3	ID.RM-3	ID.RM-3	ID.RM-3
		ID.SC-1	ID.SC-1	ID.SC-1	ID.SC-1	ID.SC-1
	Supply Chain	ID.SC-2	ID.SC-2	ID.SC-2	ID.SC-2	ID.SC-2
	Supply Chain Management	ID.SC-3	ID.SC-3	ID.SC-3	ID.SC-3	ID.SC-3
	wanagement	ID.SC-4	ID.SC-4	ID.SC-4	ID.SC-4	ID.SC-4
		ID.SC-5	ID.SC-5	ID.SC-5	ID.SC-5	ID.SC-5

445

Protect – The Protect Function is critical to limit the impact of a potential cybersecurity event.

Table 3 PROTECT Business Mission Objectives

		Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain
		Human	Environmental	Quality of	Production	Trade
		Safety	Safety	Product	Goals	Secrets
	Category			Subcategories		
		PR.AC-1	PR.AC-1	PR.AC-1	PR.AC-1	PR.AC-1
		PR.AC-2	PR.AC-2	PR.AC-2	PR.AC-2	PR.AC-2
	Identity Management,	PR.AC-3	PR.AC-3	PR.AC-3	PR.AC-3	PR.AC-3
	Authentication and	PR.AC-4	PR.AC-4	PR.AC-4	PR.AC-4	PR.AC-4
	Access Control	PR.AC-5	PR.AC-5	PR.AC-5	PR.AC-5	PR.AC-5
		PR.AC-6	PR.AC-6	PR.AC-6	PR.AC-6	PR.AC-6
		PR.AC-7	PR.AC-7	PR.AC-7	PR.AC-7	PR.AC-7
		PR.AT-1	PR.AT-1	PR.AT-1	PR.AT-1	PR.AT-1
	Awareness and	PR.AT-2	PR.AT-2	PR.AT-2	PR.AT-2	PR.AT-2
	Training	PR.AT-3	PR.AT-3	PR.AT-3	PR.AT-3	PR.AT-3
	manning	PR.AT-4	PR.AT-4	PR.AT-4	PR.AT-4	PR.AT-4
		PR.AT-5	PR.AT-5	PR.AT-5	PR.AT-5	PR.AT-5
	Data Security	PR.DS-1	PR.DS-1	PR.DS-1	PR.DS-1	PR.DS-1
		PR.DS-2	PR.DS-2	PR.DS-2	PR.DS-2	PR.DS-2
		PR.DS-3	PR.DS-3	PR.DS-3	PR.DS-3	PR.DS-3
		PR.DS-4	PR.DS-4	PR.DS-4	PR.DS-4	PR.DS-4
		PR.DS-5	PR.DS-5	PR.DS-5	PR.DS-5	PR.DS-5
		PR.DS-6	PR.DS-6	PR.DS-6	PR.DS-6	PR.DS-6
		PR.DS-7	PR.DS-7	PR.DS-7	PR.DS-7	PR.DS-7
PR		PR.DS-8	PR.DS-8	PR.DS-8	PR.DS-8	PR.DS-8
		PR.IP-1	PR.IP-1	PR.IP-1	PR.IP-1	PR.IP-1
		PR.IP-2	PR.IP-2	PR.IP-2	PR.IP-2	PR.IP-2
		PR.IP-3	PR.IP-3	PR.IP-3	PR.IP-3	PR.IP-3
	Γ	PR.IP-4	PR.IP-4	PR.IP-4	PR.IP-4	PR.IP-4
		PR.IP-5	PR.IP-5	PR.IP-5	PR.IP-5	PR.IP-5
	Information Protection	PR.IP-6	PR.IP-6	PR.IP-6	PR.IP-6	PR.IP-6
	Processes and	PR.IP-7	PR.IP-7	PR.IP-7	PR.IP-7	PR.IP-7
	Procedures	PR.IP-8	PR.IP-8	PR.IP-8	PR.IP-8	PR.IP-8
		PR.IP-9	PR.IP-9	PR.IP-9	PR.IP-9	PR.IP-9
		PR.IP-10	PR.IP-10	PR.IP-10	PR.IP-10	PR.IP-10
		PR.IP-11	PR.IP-11	PR.IP-11	PR.IP-11	PR.IP-11
		PR.IP-12	PR.IP-12	PR.IP-12	PR.IP-12	PR.IP-12
	Matala	PR.MA-1	PR.MA-1	PR.MA-1	PR.MA-1	PR.MA-1
	Maintenance	PR.MA-2	PR.MA-2	PR.MA-2	PR.MA-2	PR.MA-2
		PR.PT-1	PR.PT-1	PR.PT-1	PR.PT-1	PR.PT-1
	-	PR.PT-2	PR.PT-2	PR.PT-2	PR.PT-2	PR.PT-2
	Protective Technology	PR.PT-3	PR.PT-3	PR.PT-3	PR.PT-3	PR.PT-3
		PR.PT-4	PR.PT-4	PR.PT-4	PR.PT-4	PR.PT-4
		PR.PT-5	PR.PT-5	PR.PT-5	PR.PT-5	PR.PT-5

446 *Detect* – The Detect Function enables timely discovery of cybersecurity events. Real time awareness and
 447 continuous monitoring of the systems is critical to detect cybersecurity events.

448

Table 4 DETECT Business Mission Objectives

		Maintain Human Safety	Maintain Environmental Safety	Maintain Quality of Product	Maintain Production Goals	Maintain Trade Secrets
	Category			Subcategories		
		DE.AE-1	DE.AE-1	DE.AE-1	DE.AE-1	DE.AE-1
		DE.AE-2	DE.AE-2	DE.AE-2	DE.AE-2	DE.AE-2
	Anomalies and Events	DE.AE-3	DE.AE-3	DE.AE-3	DE.AE-3	DE.AE-3
		DE.AE-4	DE.AE-4	DE.AE-4	DE.AE-4	DE.AE-4
		DE.AE-5	DE.AE-5	DE.AE-5	DE.AE-5	DE.AE-5
	Security Continuous Monitoring	DE.CM-1	DE.CM-1	DE.CM-1	DE.CM-1	DE.CM-1
		DE.CM-2	DE.CM-2	DE.CM-2	DE.CM-2	DE.CM-2
		DE.CM-3	DE.CM-3	DE.CM-3	DE.CM-3	DE.CM-3
DE		DE.CM-4	DE.CM-4	DE.CM-4	DE.CM-4	DE.CM-4
DE		DE.CM-5	DE.CM-5	DE.CM-5	DE.CM-5	DE.CM-5
		DE.CM-6	DE.CM-6	DE.CM-6	DE.CM-6	DE.CM-6
		DE.CM-7	DE.CM-7	DE.CM-7	DE.CM-7	DE.CM-7
		DE.CM-8	DE.CM-8	DE.CM-8	DE.CM-8	DE.CM-8
		DE.DP-1	DE.DP-1	DE.DP-1	DE.DP-1	DE.DP-1
		DE.DP-2	DE.DP-2	DE.DP-2	DE.DP-2	DE.DP-2
	Detection Processes	DE.DP-3	DE.DP-3	DE.DP-3	DE.DP-3	DE.DP-3
		DE.DP-4	DE.DP-4	DE.DP-4	DE.DP-4	DE.DP-4
		DE.DP-5	DE.DP-5	DE.DP-5	DE.DP-5	DE.DP-5

- *Respond The Respond Function supports the ability to contain the impact of a potential*
- *cybersecurity event.*

Table 5 RESPOND Business Mission Objectives

		Maintain Human Safety	Maintain Environmental Safety	Maintain Quality of Product	Maintain Production Goals	Maintain Trade Secrets
	Category		:	Subcategories		
	Response Planning	RS.RP-1	RS.RP-1	RS.RP-1	RS.RP-1	RS.RP-1
		RS.CO-1	RS.CO-1	RS.CO-1	RS.CO-1	RS.CO-1
		RS.CO-2	RS.CO-2	RS.CO-2	RS.CO-2	RS.CO-2
	Communications	RS.CO-3	RS.CO-3	RS.CO-3	RS.CO-3	RS.CO-3
		RS.CO-4	RS.CO-4	RS.CO-4	RS.CO-4	RS.CO-4
		RS.CO-5	RS.CO-5	RS.CO-5	RS.CO-5	RS.CO-5
	Analysis	RS.AN-1	RS.AN-1	RS.AN-1	RS.AN-1	RS.AN-1
DC.		RS.AN-2	RS.AN-2	RS.AN-2	RS.AN-2	RS.AN-2
RS		RS.AN-3	RS.AN-3	RS.AN-3	RS.AN-3	RS.AN-3
		RS.AN-4	RS.AN-4	RS.AN-4	RS.AN-4	RS.AN-4
		RS.AN-5	RS.AN-5	RS.AN-5	RS.AN-5	RS.AN-5
		RS.MI-1	RS.MI-1	RS.MI-1	RS.MI-1	RS.MI-1
	Mitigation	RS.MI-2	RS.MI-2	RS.MI-2	RS.MI-2	RS.MI-2
	_	RS.MI-3	RS.MI-3	RS.MI-3	RS.MI-3	RS.MI-3
	luc a neuro a sente	RS.IM-1	RS.IM-1	RS.IM-1	RS.IM-1	RS.IM-1
	Improvements	RS.IM-2	RS.IM-2	RS.IM-2	RS.IM-2	RS.IM-2

Recover – *The Recover Function supports timely recovery to normal operations to reduce the*

impact from a cybersecurity event. Defined Recovery objectives are needed when recovering

456 from disruptions.

Table 6 RECOVER Business Mission Objectives

		Maintain Human Safety	Maintain Environmental Safety	Maintain Quality of Product	Maintain Production Goals	Maintain Trade Secrets
	Category		Subcate	gories		
	Recovery Planning	RC.RP-1	RC.RP-1	RC.RP-1	RC.RP-1	RC.RP-1
20	Improvements	RC.IM-1	RC.IM-1	RC.IM-1	RC.IM-1	RC.IM-1
		RC.IM-2	RC.IM-2	RC.IM-2	RC.IM-2	RC.IM-2
RC –		RC.CO-1	RC.CO-1	RC.CO-1	RC.CO-1	RC.CO-1
	Communications	RC.CO-2	RC.CO-2	RC.CO-2	RC.CO-2	RC.CO-2
		RC.CO-3	RC.CO-3	RC.CO-3	RC.CO-3	RC.CO-3

6. Manufacturing System Categorization and Risk Management

460 In addition to the Business/Mission Objectives for aligning a focused set of cybersecurity

461 controls to support critical business goals, the Manufacturing Profile is also structured into three

462 levels of security to be applied to a manufacturing system according to its categorization of Low,

463 Moderate, or High.

464 **6.1 Categorization Process**

465 The Profile guidance is provided at three impact levels: Low, Moderate, and High. These

466 designations identify the security capability, functionality, and specificity for a defined risk level.

- 467 A manufacturer or industry sector applies the Profile to a manufacturing system by categorizing
- 468 its system or component(s) to an impact level of Low, Moderate, or High.
- 469 The categorization is based on the potential impact if a security breach jeopardizes the
- 470 manufacturing system or components, operational assets, individuals, or the organization.
- 471 Security categorizations are to be used in conjunction with vulnerability and threat information

472 in assessing the risk to an organization. FIPS 199, for example, defines three levels of potential

473 impact on systems should there be a breach of security (i.e., a loss of integrity, availability, or

474 confidentiality). The application of these definitions must take place within the context of the

- 475 organization, facility, and manufacturing system.
- 476 The Profile defines the three impact levels as follows:
- The *potential impact* is LOW if the loss of integrity, availability, or confidentiality could be expected to have a **limited** adverse effect on manufacturing operations, manufactured product, assets, brand image, finances, personnel, the general public, or the environment.
- 480 2. The *potential impact* is **MODERATE** if the loss of integrity, availability, or
- 481 confidentiality could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on manufacturing
 482 operations, manufactured product, assets, brand image, finances, personnel, the general
 483 public, or the environment.
- The *potential impact* is **HIGH** if the loss of integrity, availability, or confidentiality could
 be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on manufacturing
 operations, manufactured product, assets, brand image, finances, personnel, the general
 public, or the environment.
- The security categorization process influences the level of effort expended when implementing the Profile. Manufacturing systems supporting the most critical and/or sensitive operations and
- 490 assets demand the greatest level of attention and effort to ensure that appropriate operational
- 491 security and risk mitigation are achieved.

493 The tables below provide examples of mission-based rationale for selecting the security

- categorization of the manufacturing system: 494
- 495

Table 7 Manufacturing System Impact Levels [3]						
Impact Category	Low-Impact	Moderate-Impact	High-Impact			
Injury	Cuts, bruises requiring first aid	Requires hospitalization	Loss of life or limb			
Financial Loss (\$)	Tens of thousands	Hundreds of thousands	Millions			
Environmental Release	Temporary damage	Lasting damage	Permanent damage, off-site damage			
Interruption of Production	Hours	Days	Weeks			
Public Image	Temporary damage	Lasting damage	Permanent damage			

496

497 Table 8 Manufacturing System Impact Levels Based on Product Produced and Industry Concerns [3]

Category	Low-Impact	Moderate-Impact	High-Impact
Product Produced	Non-hazardous materials or products Non-ingested consumer products	Some hazardous products or steps during production High amount of proprietary information	Critical infrastructure (e.g., electricity) Hazardous materials Ingested products
Industry Examples	Plastic injection molding Warehousing	Automotive metal stamping Pulp and paper Semiconductors Automotive production	Utilities Petrochemical Food and beverage Pharmaceutical

498

499 A limited adverse effect means that, for example, the loss of integrity, availability, or

confidentiality might: 500

- 501 • cause a degradation in mission capability to an extent and duration that the system is able 502 to perform its primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions is noticeably 503 reduced;
- 504 • result in minor damage to operational assets;
- result in minor financial loss; 505 •
- 506 result in minor harm to individuals. •

507 A serious adverse effect means that, for example, the loss of integrity, availability, or 508 confidentiality might:

- 509 • cause a significant degradation in mission capability to an extent and duration that the system is able to perform its primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions is 510 511 significantly reduced;
- result in significant damage to operational assets; 512
- result in significant financial loss; 513 •
- result in significant harm to individuals but does not involve loss of life or serious life-514 • 515 threatening injuries.

- 517 A severe or catastrophic adverse effect means that, for example, the loss of integrity, availability,
- 518 or confidentiality might:
- cause a severe degradation in or loss of mission capability to an extent and duration that
 the system is not able to perform one or more of its primary functions;
- result in major damage to operational assets;
- result in major financial loss;
- result in severe or catastrophic harm to individuals involving loss of life or serious life threatening injuries.

525 6.2 Profile's Hierarchical Supporting Structure

526 The Profile guidance is scalable and supports intensifying security protections where needed, 527 while maintaining a conventional baseline. Each higher impact level builds from the baseline 528 starting with the Low designation. The Moderate and High each include all of the stipulations 529 from the levels below.

- A Moderate categorization includes all Moderate and Low security implementations
- A High categorization includes all High, Moderate, and Low security implementations

532 Each impact level is positioned as the platform to support the next higher impact level

533 implementation, or categorization. The impact level implementation starts with Low and

increases in rigor through the Moderate and High implementations. The Low impact level

represents the starting baseline for all manufacturing systems. The Moderate impact level will

536 implement the Low security guidance as well as the Moderate. The High impact level will

537 implement all of the Low and Moderate guidance as well as the High inputs. Section 7 provides

538 CSF subcategory language for each impact level customized to the manufacturing domain.

539 6.3 Risk Management

540 The Profile relies on the manufacturer's risk management processes to inform and prioritize

541 decisions regarding cybersecurity. It supports recurring risk assessments and validation of

- 542 business drivers to help manufacturers select target states for cybersecurity activities that reflect
- 543 desired outcomes.

544 To manage cybersecurity risks, a clear understanding of the business drivers and security

545 considerations specific to the Manufacturing system and its environment is required. Each

546 organization's risk is unique, along with its use of ICS and IT, thus the implementation of the

- 547 profile will vary.
- 548 The Manufacturing Profile is meant to enhance but not replace current cybersecurity standards
- and industry guidelines that the manufacturer is currently embracing. Manufacturers can
- 550 determine activities that are important to critical service delivery and can prioritize investments
- 551 to maximize the impact of each dollar spent. Ultimately, the Profile is aimed at reducing and
- better managing cybersecurity risks. The Profile, along with the Cybersecurity Framework, are
- 553 not one-size-fits-all approaches to managing cybersecurity risk for critical infrastructure.
- 554 Manufacturers will continue to have unique risks different threats, different vulnerabilities,
- 555 different risk tolerances and how they implement security practices will vary.

7. Manufacturing Profile Subcategory Guidance

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
Function	Category	ID.AM-1	Low Document an inventory of manufacturing system components that reflects the current system. Manufacturing system components include for example PLCs, sensors, actuators, robots, machine tools, firmware, network switches, routers, power supplies, and other networked components or devices. System component inventory is reviewed and updated as defined by the organization. Information deemed necessary for effective accountability of manufacturing system components includes, for example, hardware inventory specifications, component owners, networked components or devices, machine names and network addresses. Inventory specifications include, for example, manufacturer, device type, model, serial number, and physical location. Moderate Identify individuals who are both responsible and accountable for administering manufacturing system components. High	62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 <u>CM-8</u>
IDENTIFY	Asset Management (ID.AM)		Identify where automated mechanisms are safe and feasible to implement for detecting the presence of unauthorized hardware and firmware components within the manufacturing system.	<u>CM-8 (2)(3)</u>
	(12.414)		Low Document an inventory of manufacturing system software components that reflects the current system. Manufacturing system software components include for example software license information, software version numbers, HMI and other ICS component applications, software, operating systems. System software inventory is reviewed and updated as defined by the organization.	62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 <u>CM-8</u>
		ID.AM-2	Moderate	
			Update the inventory of manufacturing system software as an integral part of component installations, removals, and system updates. Identify individuals who are both responsible and accountable for administering manufacturing system software.	<u>CM-8 (1)(4)(5)</u>
			High	
			Identify where automated mechanisms are safe and feasible to implement for detecting the presence of unauthorized software within the manufacturing system.	<u>CM-8 (2)(3)</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4
			Document all connections within the manufacturing system, and between the manufacturing system and other systems. All connections are documented, authorized, and reviewed.	4.2.3.4 <u>CA-3</u>
		ID.AM-3	Connection information includes, for example, the interface characteristics, data characteristics, ports, protocols, addresses, description of the data, security requirements, and the nature of the connection.	
			Moderate and High	<u>AC-4</u>
			Map the flow of information within the manufacturing system and to external systems.	
			Low	
			Identify and document all external connections for the manufacturing system.	<u>AC-20</u>
		ID.AM-4	Examples of external systems include engineering design services, and those that are controlled under separate authority, personal devices, and other hosted services.	
			Moderate and High	SA-9(2)
IDENTIFY	Asset Management		Require external providers to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for use with the manufacturing system.	
	(ID.AM)	0	Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.6
			Identify and prioritize manufacturing system components and functions based on their classification, criticality, and business value.	
			Identify the types of information in possession, custody, or control for which security safeguards are needed (e.g. sensitive or protected information).	<u>CP-2</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009
		Establish and maintain personnel cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for the manufact system. Include cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for third-party providers. Third-party providers are required to notify the organization of any personnel transition (i	Establish and maintain personnel cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for the manufacturing system. Include cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for third-party providers.	4.3.2.3.3
			Third-party providers are required to notify the organization of any personnel transition (including transfers or terminations) involving personnel with physical or logical access to the manufacturing system components.	<u>CP-2</u>
			Third-party providers include, for example, service providers, contractors, and other organizations providing manufacturing system development, technology services, outsourced applications, or network and security management.	<u>PS-7</u>

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Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low and Moderate	
			Define and communicate the organization's role in the supply chain.	<u>CP-2(1)(3)(8)</u>
		ID.BE-1	Identify the upstream and downstream supply channels that are outside of the organization's operations. Identify the overall mission supported by the manufacturing system.	
		ID.DE-I	High	
			Protect against supply chain threats to the manufacturing system, system components, or system services by employing security safeguards as part of a comprehensive, defense-in-depth security strategy.	<u>SA-12</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	
		ID.BE-2	Define and communicate the manufacturer's place in critical infrastructure and its industry sector.	<u>PM-8</u>
		ID.BE-2	Define and communicate critical infrastructure and key resources relevant to the manufacturing system. Develop, document, and maintain a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan.	
	Business		Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.2.2.1
IDENTIFY	Environment (ID.BE) ID.BE-3	ID.BE)	Define and communicate priorities for manufacturing missions, objectives, and activities with consideration for security and the resulting risk to manufacturing operations, components, and individuals.	<u>PM-11</u>
			Identify critical manufacturing system components and functions by performing a criticality analysis.	<u>SA-14</u>
			Low	
			Identify and prioritize supporting services for critical manufacturing system processes and components.	<u>PM-8,SA-14</u>
		ID.BE-4	Provide an uninterruptable power supply for identified critical manufacturing system components to facilitate the transition of the manufacturing system to long-term alternate power in the event of a primary power source loss.	<u>PE-11</u>
			Moderate and High	PE-9(1)
			Identify alternate and redundant supporting services for critical manufacturing system processes and components.	

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Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low	
			Define resilience requirements for the manufacturing system to support delivery of critical services.	<u>CP-2</u>
			Moderate	
	Business		Define recovery time objective and recovery point objective for the resumption of essential manufacturing system processes.	<u>CP-2(3)</u>
	Environment	ID.BE-5	Identify critical manufacturing system assets that support essential manufacturing system processes.	
	(ID.BE)		High	<u>CP-2(8)</u>
			Conduct capacity planning for manufacturing system processing, telecommunications, and environmental support as required during contingency operations.	<u>CP-2(2)</u>
			Conduct contingency planning for the continuance of essential manufacturing functions and services with little or no loss of operational continuity and sustain that continuity until full system restoration.	<u>CP-2(4)(5)</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.6
IDENTIFY		ID.GV-1	Develop and disseminate a security policy that provides an overview of the security requirements for the manufacturing system. The policy includes, for example, the identification and assignment of roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance. It also reflects coordination among organizational entities responsible for the different aspects of security (i.e., technical, physical, personnel, cyber-physical, access control, media protection, vulnerability management, maintenance, monitoring), and covers the full life cycle of the manufacturing system. Review and update the security policy as determined necessary.	800-53 Security Policies-1
			Ensure the security policy is approved by a senior official with responsibility and accountability for the risk being incurred by manufacturing operations.	
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.3.3
	Governance (ID.GV)	ID.GV-2	Develop and disseminate a security program for the manufacturing system that includes, for example, the identification of personnel security roles and assignment of responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance. This includes security requirements, roles and responsibilities for third-party providers. Review and update the security program as determined necessary.	<u>PM-1, PS-7</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009
		ID.GV-3	Ensure that legal and regulatory requirements affecting the manufacturing operations regarding cybersecurity are understood and managed.	4.4.3.7 <u>800-53 Security</u> <u>Policies-1</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009
		ID.GV-4	Develop a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to manufacturing operations. Include cybersecurity considerations in the risk management strategy. Review and update the risk management strategy as determined necessary.	4.2.3.1, 4.2.3.3, 4.2.3.8, 4.2.3.9 <u>PM-9</u> , <u>PM-11</u>
			Determine and allocate required resources to protect the manufacturing system.	

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low and Moderate	62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 4.2.3.7, 4.2.3.9,
			Develop a plan to identify, document, and report vulnerabilities that exist on the manufacturing system. Include the use of vulnerability scanning where safe and feasible on the manufacturing system, its components, or a representative system.	4.2.3.7, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 <u>CA-2</u>
			Develop a plan for continuous monitoring of the security posture of the manufacturing system to facilitate ongoing awareness of vulnerabilities.	<u>CA-7</u>
		ID.RA-1	Conduct risk assessments on the manufacturing system that take into account vulnerabilities and potential impact to manufacturing operations and assets.	<u>RA-3</u>
		ID.KA-I	High	<u>CA-2(2)</u> ,
			Conduct performance/load testing and penetration testing on the manufacturing system with care to ensure that manufacturing operations are not adversely impacted by the testing process.	
			Identify where manufacturing system vulnerabilities may be exposed to adversaries.	<u>RA-5(4)</u>
			Production systems may need to be taken off-line before testing can be conducted. If the manufacturing system is taken off-line for testing, tests are scheduled to occur during planned manufacturing outages whenever possible. If penetration testing is performed on non-manufacturing networks, extra care is taken to ensure that tests do not propagate into the manufacturing network.	
	D . 1 A		Low and Moderate	62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3,
IDENTIFY	Risk Assessment (ID.RA)		Establish and maintain ongoing contact with security groups and associations to receive security alerts and advisories. Security groups and associations include, for example, special interest groups, forums, professional associations, news groups, and/or peer groups of security professionals in similar organizations. Implement a threat awareness program that includes a cross-organization information- sharing capability. Organizations should consider having both an unclassified and classified information sharing capability.	4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 <u>PM-15</u>
		ID.RA-2	Collaborate and share information about potential vulnerabilities and incidents. The DHS National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) [6] serves as a centralized location where operational elements involved in cybersecurity and communications reliance are coordinated and integrated. The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) [7] collaborates with international and private sector Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) to share control systems-related security incidents and mitigation measures.	<u>PM-16</u>
			High	<u>SI-5(1)</u>
			Identify where automated mechanisms can be implemented to make security alert and advisory information available to relevant organization stakeholders.	
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3,
		ID.RA-3	Conduct and document periodic assessment of risk to the manufacturing system to identify threats and likelihood of impact to manufacturing operations and assets. The risk assessment includes threats from insiders and external parties.	4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 <u>RA-3</u>

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Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
	entigery		Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12
		ID.RA-4	Conduct criticality reviews of the manufacturing system that define the likelihood and potential adverse impacts to manufacturing operations, assets, and individuals if compromised or disabled.	<u>RA-2</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	
	Risk Assessment (ID.RA)	ID.RA-5	Conduct risk assessments of the manufacturing system incorporating threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, and impact to manufacturing operations, assets, and individuals. Disseminate risk assessment results to relevant stakeholders.	<u>RA-3, PM-16</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	
		ID.RA-6	Develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to the manufacturing system that includes the identification and prioritization of risk responses.	<u>PM-9</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.2
IDENTIFY	Y Risk Management Strategy (ID.RM)	ID.RM-1	Establish a risk management process for the manufacturing system that effectively identifies, communicates, and facilitates addressing risk-related issues and information among key stakeholders internally and externally.	ч.э.ч.2 <u>РМ-9</u>
		ID.RM-2	Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009
			Define the risk tolerance for the manufacturing system.	4.3.2.6.5 <u>PM-9</u>
		ID.RM-3	Low, Moderate and High	
			Ensure the risk tolerance for the manufacturing system is informed by the organization's role in critical infrastructure and sector-specific risk analysis.	<u>PM-9, PM-8</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	
		ID.SC-1	Implement a cyber supply chain risk management process that effectively identifies, assesses, communicates, and facilitates addressing risk-related issues associated with the sharing of sensitive information or the use of information technology, operational technology, services, technology-based input products, and non-technology-based input products supporting the manufacturing system. The cyber supply chain risk management process should be approved by organizational stakeholders including those responsible for informational technology and operational technology systems.	SA-9
	Supply Chain		Low, Moderate and High	
	(ID.SC)	ID.SC-2	Conduct and document cyber supply chain risk assessments at least annually or when a change to the manufacturing system or operational environment occurs. This assessment should identify and prioritize potential negative impacts to the manufacturing system from the sharing of sensitive information or the use of information technology, operational technology, services, technology-based input products, or non-technology-based input products supporting the manufacturing system. Disseminate results to relevant stakeholders including those responsible for informational technology and operational technology systems.	RA-3

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low	
			Implement contract cybersecurity requirements for suppliers and third-party partners requiring access to sensitive information or providing information technology, operational technology, services, technology-based input products, or non-technology-based input products supporting the manufacturing system. Cyber supply chain risk assessment results should be used in the development of cybersecurity requirements.	SA-9
			Moderate	
		ID.SC-3	Implement contract cybersecurity requirements for suppliers and third-party partners to implement a verifiable flaw remediation process, and correct flaws identified during cybersecurity testing and evaluation.	SA-11
			High	
		upply Chain (ID.SC) ID.SC-4	Implement contract requirements permitting the organization to review the cybersecurity programs implemented by suppliers and third-party partners.	SA-12
IDENTIFY	Supply Chain (ID.SC)		Implement contract requirements for suppliers and third-party partners to implement a documented development life cycle for the information technology, operational technology, services, technology-based input products, or non-technology-based input products supporting the manufacturing system.	
			Low and Moderate	
			Review assessments of suppliers and third-party partner compliance with contractual obligations by routinely reviewing audits, test results, and other evaluations.	AU-2 AU-6
		ID.5C-4	High	
			Review assessments of suppliers and third-party partner compliance with contractual obligations by routinely reviewing third-party independent audits, test results, and other evaluations.	PS-7
			Low and Moderate	
			Identify and document key personnel from suppliers and third-party partners to include as stakeholders in response and recovery planning activities.	CP-4, IR-3, IR-4
		ID.SC-5	High	
			Identify and document key personnel from suppliers and third-party partners to include as stakeholders in testing and execution of the response and recovery plans.	CP-4, IR-3, IR-4

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low Establish and manage identification mechanisms and credentials for users of the manufacturing system.	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.5.1; SR 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5,1.7 <u>IA-Family</u> AC-2(1)
			Moderate	<u>AC-2(1)</u>
		PR.AC-1	Establish and manage identification mechanisms and credentials for users and devices of the manufacturing system. Implement automated mechanisms where feasible to support the management and auditing of information system credentials.	<u>AC-2(5)</u>
			High	
			Deactivate system credentials after a specified time period of inactivity, unless this would result in a compromise to safe operation of the process.	<u>AC-2(12)(13)</u>
	Identity		Monitor the manufacturing system for atypical use of system credentials. Credentials associated with significant risk are disabled.	
PROTECT	Management, Authentication	ication ccess	Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.2
INOTECT	and Access Control (PR.AC)		Protect physical access to the manufacturing facility. Determine access requirements during emergency situations.	PE-Family,
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		Maintain and review visitor access records to the facility where the manufacturing system resides.	<u>PE-8</u>
			Physical access controls may include, for example, lists of authorized individuals, identity credentials, escort requirements, guards, fences, turnstiles, locks, monitoring of facility access.	
		PR.AC-2	Moderate	
			Protect power equipment, power cabling, network cabling, and network access interfaces for the manufacturing system from accidental damage, disruption, and physical tampering. Ensure availability and integrity of wireless systems, especially safety related systems.	<u>PE-9 (1)</u>
			Implement redundant and physically separated power systems for critical manufacturing operations.	
			High	<u>PE-3 (1)</u>
			Control physical access to the manufacturing system in addition to the physical access for the facility.	

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low Establish usage restrictions, connection requirements, implementation guidance, and authorizations for remote access to the manufacturing system. Provide an explicit indication of active remote access connections to users physically present at the	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.6 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.13,2.6
		PR.AC-3	devices. Remote access methods include, for example, wireless, dial-up, broadband, VPN connections, mobile device connections, and communications through external networks.	<u>AC-17,19,20</u> <u>SC-15</u>
			Moderate and High	<u>AC-17(1)(2)(3)(4)</u>
			Allow remote access only through approved and managed access points. Monitor remote access to the manufacturing system and implement cryptographic mechanisms where determined necessary. Allow only authorized use of privileged functions from remote access. Establish agreements and verify security for connections with external systems.	<u>AC-20(1)(2)</u>
			Low	62443-2-1:2009
Μ	Identity Management, Authentication		Define and manage access permissions for users of the manufacturing system. Identify and document user actions that can be performed on the manufacturing system without identification or authentication (e.g. during emergencies).	4.3.3.7.3; 62443-3- 3:2013 SR 2.1 <u>AC-Controls</u> <u>AC-14</u>
	and Access	ess	Moderate	
	Control (PR.AC)		Implement automated mechanisms where feasible to support the management of manufacturing system user accounts, including the disabling, auditing, notification, and removal of user accounts. Implement separation of duties for manufacturing system users. Limit, document, and explicitly authorize privileged user access to the manufacturing system. Audit the execution of privileged functions on the manufacturing system.	<u>AC-2(1)(3)</u> <u>AC-5</u>
			Separation of duties includes, for example: dividing operational functions and system support functions among different roles; conducting system support functions with different individuals; and ensuring security personnel administering access control functions do not also administer audit functions.	<u>AC-6(1)(2)(5)(9)</u>
			High	<u>AC-2(11)(12)(13)</u>
			Enforce account usage restrictions for specific time periods and locality. Monitor manufacturing system usage for atypical use. Disable accounts of users posing a significant risk.	
			Specific restrictions can include, for example, restricting usage to certain days of the week, time of day, or specific durations of time. Privileged user access through non-local connections to the manufacturing system is restricted and managed.	

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.4 62443-3-
			Protect network integrity of the manufacturing system, incorporating network segmentation and segregation where appropriate. Identify and control connections between system components. Monitor and control connections and communications at the external boundary and at key internal boundaries within the manufacturing system. Implement boundary protection devices.	4.3.3.4 6.2443-3- 3:2013 SR 3.1, 3.8 <u>SC-7</u>
			Boundary protection mechanisms include, for example, routers, gateways, unidirectional gateways, data diodes, and firewalls separating system components into logically separate networks or subnetworks.	
			Moderate	
		PR.AC-5	Limit external connections to the manufacturing system. Monitor and use managed interfaces to conduct external system connections. Deny by default connections to the managed interface. Disable split tunneling and covert channel options in conjunction with remote devices. Ensure the manufacturing system fails securely in the event of the operational failure of a boundary protection device.	<u>AC-4</u>
			High	<u>SC-7(8)</u>
	Identity		Implement, where feasible, authenticated proxy servers for defined communications traffic between the manufacturing system and external networks.	<u>SC-7(21)</u>
	Management,		Isolate manufacturing system components performing different missions.	
PROTECT	Authentication and Access	and Access	Low and Moderate	
	Control (PR.AC)		Implement procedures for verifying identity of individuals before issuing credentials that provide access to the manufacturing systems.	IA-5
		PR.AC-6	High	
		I K.AC-0	Issue unique credentials bound to each verified user, device, and process interacting with the manufacturing systems.	IA-5
			Ensure credentials are authenticated and the unique identifiers are captured when performing system interactions.	
			Low	IA-1; IA-2; IA-4; IA-
			Perform a risk assessment on manufacturing user transactions to document and implement the authentication mechanisms required (e.g. single- or multi-factor) for each transaction.	5; IA-8
			Moderate	IA-1; IA-2; IA-4; IA-
		PR.AC-7	Perform a risk assessment on manufacturing system transactions and the associated user, device, or other asset authentication mechanism to document and implement the authentication mechanisms required (e.g. single- or multi-factor) for each transaction.	IA-1; IA-2; IA-4; IA- 5; IA-8
			High	$IA_{2}(1)(2)(2)$
			Implement multi-factor or certificate-based authentication for transactions within the manufacturing systems determined to be critical.	IA-2 (1) (2) (3)

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low Provide security awareness training for all manufacturing system users and managers.	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2
		PR.AT-1	Training could include, for example, a basic understanding of the protections and user actions needed to maintain security of the system, responding to suspected cybersecurity incidents, and awareness of operational security.	<u>AT-2</u>
			Moderate and High	<u>AT-2(2)</u>
			Incorporate insider threat recognition and reporting into security awareness training.	
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009
		PR.AT-2	Ensure that users with privileged access to the manufacturing system understand the requirements and responsibilities of their assignments.	4.3.2.4.2 <u>AT-3</u>
			Establish standards for measuring, building, and validating individual qualifications for privileged users.	<u>PM-13</u>
		i PR.AT-3	Low	ISA 62443-2-1:2009
PROTECT	Awareness and T Training (PR.AT)		Establish and enforce security requirements for third-party providers and users. Ensure that third- party providers understand their responsibilities regarding the security of the manufacturing system and the responsibilities of their assignments. Require notifications be given for any personnel transfers, termination, or transition involving personnel with physical or logical access to the manufacturing system components.	4.3.2.4.2 <u>PS-7</u>
			Ensure that providers of external system services comply with defined security requirements. Monitor and audit external service providers for security compliance.	<u>SA-9</u>
			Moderate and High	SA-9(2)
			Require external service providers to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and services necessary for the connection services.	<u>3A-9(2)</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2
		PR.AT-4	Ensure that senior executives understand the requirements for the security and protection of the manufacturing system, and their responsibilities for achieving them.	<u>AT-3</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009
		PR.AT-5	Ensure that personnel responsible for the physical protection and security of the manufacturing system and facility are trained and understand their responsibilities.	4.3.2.4.2 <u>AT-3</u>
			Establish standards for measuring, building, and validating individual qualifications for physical security personnel.	<u>PM-13</u>

CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK VERSION 1.1 VERSION 1.1 MANUFACTURING PROFILE

NISTIR 8183 REV. 1 (DRAFT)

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low	62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.4, 4.1
			None	5.4, 4.1
		PR.DS-1	Moderate and High	<u>SC-28</u>
			Protect manufacturing system information determined to be critical while at rest.	<u> </u>
			Low	62443-3-3:SR
			None	3.1,3.8,4.1
			Moderate and High	
		PR.DS-2	Protect manufacturing system information determined to be critical when in transit.	<u>SC-8</u> <u>SC-8(1)</u>
			Implement cryptographic mechanisms where determined necessary to prevent unauthorized access, distortion, or modification of system data and audit records.	
			Low	62443-2-1:2009 4. 4.3.3.3.9
			Enforce accountability for all manufacturing system components throughout the system lifecycle, including removal, transfers, and disposition.	4.3.3.9 62443-3-3:2013 SR 4.2
PROTECT	Data Security (PR.DS)		Sanitize portable media prior to disposal, release, or reuse. All system components entering and exiting the facility are authorized, monitored, and controlled, and records are maintained of those items.	<u>PE-16</u> MP-6_
		PR.DS-3	Moderate	
			Update the inventory of manufacturing system components as an integral part of component installations, removals, and system updates.	
			High	
			Implement automated mechanisms where safe and feasible to maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available inventory of manufacturing system components.	<u>CM-8(1)</u> <u>CM-8(2)</u> MP-6(1)
			Ensure that disposal actions are approved, tracked, documented, and verified.	
			Low	62443-3-3:2013 SR
			Ensure that adequate resources are maintained for manufacturing system information processing, networking, telecommunications, and data storage.	7.1, 7.2 <u>CP-2(a).1.4.5</u>
		PR.DS-4	Off-load audit records from the manufacturing system for processing to an alternate system.	
			Moderate and High	
			Protect the manufacturing system against, or limit the effects of, denial of service attacks.	<u>AU-4(1)</u> <u>SC-5</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low	62443-3-3:2013 SR 5.2
			Protect the manufacturing system against data leaks.	5.2
			Monitor the manufacturing system at the external boundary and at key internal points to detect unauthorized access and use.	<u>SI-4</u> <u>SC-7</u>
			Develop and document access agreements for all users of the manufacturing system.	
		PR.DS-5	Moderate and High	<u>PS-6</u>
			Regulate the information flow within the manufacturing system and to outside systems. Enforce controls restricting connections to only authorized interfaces.	<u>AC-4</u> SC-7(3)(4) SI-4(4)
			Heighten system monitoring activity whenever there is an indication of increased risk to manufacturing operations and assets.	<u>PE-19</u>
			Protect the system from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.	
			Low	62443-3-3:SR 3.1,
			None	3.3, 3.4,
PROTECT	Data Security		Moderate	
	(PR.DS)	2.DS)	Implement software, firmware, and information integrity checks to detect unauthorized changes to manufacturing system components during storage, transport, startup and when determined necessary.	<u>SI-7(1)</u>
		PR.DS-6	Incorporate the detection of unauthorized changes to the manufacturing system into the system's incident response capability.	
			High	<u>SI-7(7)</u> <u>SI-7(2)</u>
			Implement automated tools where feasible to provide notification upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification.	<u>SI-7(5)</u>
			Implement automatic response capability with pre-defined security safeguards when integrity violations are discovered.	
			Low and Moderate	
			None	
		PR.DS-7	High	
			Implement an off-line development and testing system for implementing and testing changes to the manufacturing system.	<u>CM-2</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low and Moderate	
		None	None	
			High	
	Data Security (PR.DS)	y PS.DS-8	Implement hardware integrity checks to detect unauthorized tampering (e.g. tamper evident tape or labels, computer port protection, power-on self-tests, etc.) to manufacturing system hardware determined to be critical.	SI-7
			Incorporate the detection of unauthorized tampering to the manufacturing system hardware into the organization incident response capability.	
			Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.2,
			Develop, document, and maintain a baseline configuration for the manufacturing system.	4.3.4.3.2, 62443-3-3:2013 SR
			Baseline configurations include for example, information about manufacturing system components (e.g. software license information, software version numbers, HMI and other ICS component applications, software, operating systems), current version numbers and patch information on operating systems and applications; and configuration settings/parameters), network topology, and the logical placement of those components within the system architecture.	7.6 <u>CM-2</u> <u>CM-6</u>
			Configure the manufacturing system to provide only essential capabilities.	
			Review the baseline configuration and disable unnecessary capabilities.	
PROTECT		Moderate	CM-7	
FROIECI	Information		Review and update the baseline configuration of the manufacturing system as an integral part of system component installations and upgrades. Retain previous versions of the baseline configuration to support rollback.	<u>CM-7(1)</u>
	Protection		Implement software program usage restrictions.	
	Processes and Procedures	PR.IP-1	Develop a configuration management plan for the manufacturing system.	
	(PR.IP)		The plan includes, for example, configuration processes, roles, lifecycle definition, configuration items, and control methods.	
			Define configuration parameters, capabilities, and fail to known state procedures such that, upon a system failure (or failure conditions), assets revert to a state that achieves a predetermined mode of operation.	<u>CM-2(1)(3)</u>
			Implement a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of only authorized software programs.	
			High	CM-7(2)
		Implement automated mechanisms where feasible to maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available baseline configuration of the manufacturing system.	<u>CM-9</u> <u>SC-24</u> <u>CM-7(5)</u>	
			Automated system support includes for example, documentation, notification, and management of the change control process on the manufacturing system.	<u>CM-2(2)</u> <u>CM-3(1)</u>
			Review system changes to determine whether unauthorized changes have occurred.	<u>CM-5(1)(2)</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
	Category		Low	62443-2-1:2009
			Manage the manufacturing system using a system development life cycle that includes security considerations.	4.3.4.3.3 <u>SA-3</u>
			Include security requirements into the acquisition process of the manufacturing system and its components.	<u>SA-4</u>
			Moderate and High	
		PR.IP-2	Require the developer of the manufacturing system and system components to provide a description of the functional properties of security controls, and design and implementation information for security-relevant system interfaces.	<u>SA-4(1)(2)</u> SA-8
			Apply security engineering principles into the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the manufacturing system.	<u>SA-10</u>
	Information Protection		Implement configuration management and change control during the development of the manufacturing system and its components, and include flaw tracking and resolution, and security testing.	
PROTECT	Processes and Procedures		Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.2
	(PR.IP)		Implement configuration change control for the manufacturing system and its components.	4.3.4.3.2 62443-3-3:2013 SR
	· · · ·		Conduct security impact analyses in connection with change control reviews.	7.6
			Moderate	<u>CM-3</u>
			Test, validate, and document changes to the manufacturing system before implementing the changes on the operational system.	<u>CM-4</u>
		PR.IP-3	Review and authorize proposed configuration-controlled changes prior to implementing them on the manufacturing system.	<u>CM-3(2)</u>
			High	
			Implement automated mechanisms where feasible to support the change control process.	<u>CM-3(1)</u>
			Conduct security impact analysis in a separate test environment before implementation into an operational environment for planned changes to the manufacturing system.	<u>CM-4(1)</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.9
			Conduct and maintain backups for manufacturing system data.	4.3.4.3.9 62443-3-3:2013 SR
			Manufacturing system data includes for example software, configurations and settings, documentation, system configuration data including computer configuration backups, application configuration backups, operational control limits, control bands and set points for pre-incident operation for all ICS programmable equipment	7.3, 7.4 <u>CP-9</u> <u>CP-4</u>
			Moderate	
		PR.IP-4	Verify the reliability and integrity of backups.	<u>CP-9(1)</u>
			Coordinate backup testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.	CP-4(1)
			Establish a separate alternate storage site for system backups and ensure the same security safeguards are employed.	<u>CP-6</u>
			High	
			Include into contingency plan testing the conducting of restorations from backup data.	<u>CP-9(2)</u>
	Information Protection		Store critical manufacturing system backup information separately.	<u>CP-9(3)</u>
PROTECT	Processes and		Low and Moderate	62443-2-1:2009
	Procedures (PR.IP)		Define, implement, and enforce policy and regulations regarding emergency and safety systems, fire protection systems, and environment controls for the manufacturing system.	4.3.3.3.1 <u>PE-Family</u>
		PR.IP-5 sprinkler system	Fire suppression mechanisms should take the manufacturing environment into account (e.g., water sprinkler systems could be hazardous in specific environments).	[10,12,13,14,15,18] <u>PE-13(3)</u>
			High	
			Implement fire detection devices that activate and notify key personnel automatically in the event of a fire.	<u>PE-13(1)(2)</u>
			Low and Moderate	62443-2-1:4.3.3.3.1
			Ensure that manufacturing system data is destroyed according to policy.	62443-3-3:2013 SR 4.2
			High	MP-6
		PR.IP-6	Ensure that media sanitization actions are approved, tracked, documented, and verified. Test sanitation equipment and procedures.	
			Apply nondestructive sanitization techniques to portable storage devices connecting to the manufacturing system.	<u>MP-6(1)(2)(3)</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low Incorporate improvements derived from the monitoring, measurements, assessments, and lessons	62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.1, 4.4.3.2,
			learned into protection process revisions.	4.4.3.3, 4.4.3.4, <u>PM-6</u>
			Ensure that the security plan for the manufacturing system facilitates the review, testing, and continual improvement of the security protection processes.	<u>CA-2</u> <u>CA-7</u> <u>SI-4</u> PL-2, PM-14
		PR.IP-7	Moderate and High	<u>rl-2</u> , <u>rm-14</u>
			Implement independent teams to assess the protection process.	
			Independent teams, for example, may include internal or external impartial personnel.	
			Impartiality implies that assessors are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest regarding the development, operation, or management of the manufacturing system under assessment or to the determination of security control effectiveness.	<u>CA-2(1)</u> , <u>CA-7(1)</u>
	PROTECT Information Protection Processes and Procedures	tection sses and DD ID 8	Low, Moderate and High	
PROTECT			Collaborate and share information about manufacturing system related security incidents and mitigation measures with designated sharing partners.	<u>AC-21</u>
	(PR.IP)		Implement automated mechanisms where feasible to assist in information collaboration.	<u>AC-21(1)</u>
			Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.5.3,
		PR.IP-9	Develop and maintain response and recovery plans that identify essential functions and associated contingency requirements, as well as providing a roadmap for implementing incident response. Plans should incorporate recovery objectives, restoration priorities, metrics, contingency roles, personnel assignments and contact information. Address maintaining essential functions despite system disruption, and the eventual restoration of the manufacturing system.	4.5.2.5.3, <u>CP-2</u> <u>IR-8</u>
			Define incident types, resources and management support needed to effectively maintain and mature the incident response and contingency capabilities.	
			Moderate and High	
			Coordinate contingency plan development with stakeholders responsible for related plans.	<u>CP-2(1)</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low	I62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.5.7
			Review response and recovery plans to determine the effectiveness of the plans, and the readiness to execute the plans.	62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.3
			Moderate and High	<u>CP-4</u> , <u>PM-14</u>
		PR.IP-10	Test response and recovery plans to determine the effectiveness of the plans, and the readiness to execute the plans.	
			Coordinate testing of response and recovery plans with relevant stakeholders.	
	Information		Related plans include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber Incident Response Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans.	<u>CP-4(1)</u> <u>IR-3(2)</u>
PROTECT	CT Protection		Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.2.1
	Procedures (PR.IP)	PR.IP-11	Develop and maintain a personnel security program for the manufacturing system. Personnel security program should include policy, position risk designations, personnel screening, terminations and transfers, access agreements, third-party roles and responsibilities, and personnel sanctions.	<u>PS- Family</u>
		Low Establish and maintain a process that allows continuous review of vulnerabilities and defines strategies to mitigate them. PR.IP-12 Moderate Restrict access to privileged vulnerability data.		
				<u>RA-3, SI-2</u>
			Moderate	
			Restrict access to privileged vulnerability data.	<u>RA-5(5)</u>
			High	RA-5(4)
			Identify where manufacturing system vulnerabilities may be exposed to adversaries.	<u>IVA-3(4)</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
PROTECT	Maintenance (PR.MA)	PR.MA-1	Low Schedule, perform, document and review records of maintenance and repairs on manufacturing system components. Establish a process for maintenance personnel authorization, and escort non-authorized maintenance personnel. Verify impacted security controls following maintenance or repairs. Moderate Enforce approval requirements, control, and monitoring of maintenance tools for use on the manufacturing system. Maintenance tools can include, for example, hardware/software diagnostic test equipment, hardware/software packet sniffers and laptops. Perform preventative maintenance at defined intervals. Inspect maintenance tools brought into the facility. Scan maintenance tools and portable storage devices for malicious code before they are used on the manufacturing system. High Implement automated mechanisms where feasible to schedule, conduct, and document maintenance and repairs; and to produce records of maintenance activity. Prevent the unauthorized removal of maintenance equipment containing manufacturing system information.	Kerefeite 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.7 MA-2 MA-5 MA-2 MA-3 MA-6 MA-3(1) MA-3(2)
		PR.MA-2	Low and Moderate Enforce approval requirements, control, and monitoring, of remote maintenance activities. Implement strong authenticators, record keeping, and session termination for remote maintenance. High Require that diagnostic services pertaining to remote maintenance be performed from a system that implements a security capability comparable to the capability implemented on the manufacturing system.	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.5 <u>MA-4</u> <u>MA-4(3)</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.9,
			Generate audit records containing information that establishes what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the source of the event, the outcome of the event, and the identity of any individuals or manufacturing components associated with the event. Generate time stamps from an internal system clock that is mapped to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).	62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, <u>AU-3</u>
			Moderate	<u>AU-5</u>
		PR.PT-1	Ensure that audit processing failures on the manufacturing system generate alerts and trigger defined responses.	<u>AU-8</u>
		PK.P1-1	Review and update audit events.	ATT 5
			Implement automated mechanisms to integrate audit review, analysis, and reporting.	<u>AU-5</u> <u>AU-2(3)</u>
			Compare and synchronize the internal system clocks to an authoritative time source. Authoritative time sources include for example, an internal NTP server, radio clock, atomic clock, GPS time source.	
			High	<u>AU-6(1)</u> AU-7(1)
			Integrate analysis of audit records with physical access monitoring.	<u>AU-6(6)</u>
PROTECT			Conduct time correlation of audit records.	<u>AU-12(1)</u> <u>AU-12(3)</u>
	(PK.P1)		Enable authorized individuals to extend audit capabilities when required by events.	
			Low	62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.3
			Implement safeguards to restrict the use of portable storage devices.	
		PR.PT-2	Moderate and High	<u>MP-2</u>
			Protect and control portable storage devices containing manufacturing system data while in transit and in storage. Scan all portable storage devices for malicious code before they are used on the manufacturing system	<u>MP-4</u> <u>MP-7</u>
			Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.5.1,
			Configure the manufacturing system to provide only essential capabilities.	62443-3-3:2013 SR
			Moderate and High	1.1, SR <u>AC-3</u>
		PR.PT-3	Disable defined functions, ports, protocols, and services within the manufacturing system deemed to be unnecessary.	<u>CM-7(1</u>)
			Implement technical safeguards to enforce a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to only allow the execution of authorized software programs.	<u>CM-7(5)</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
			Low	62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR
	PD PT 4		Monitor and control communications at the external boundary and at key internal boundaries within the manufacturing system.	<u>SC-7</u>
			Moderate and High	
			Control the flow of information within the manufacturing system and between interconnected systems.	
		PR.PT-4	Information flow may be supported, for example, by labeling or coloring physical connectors as an aid to manual hookup. Inspection of message content may enforce information flow policy. For example, a message containing a command to an actuator may not be permitted to flow between the	<u>AC-4</u>
			control network and any other network. Physical addresses (e.g., a serial port) may be implicitly or explicitly associated with labels or attributes (e.g., hardware I/O address). Manual methods are typically static. Label or attribute policy mechanisms may be implemented in hardware, firmware, and software that controls or has device access, such as device drivers and communications controllers.	<u>SC-7(3</u>)
	Protective		Limit external connections to the system.	
PROTECT	Technology (PR.PT)		Manage the interface for external telecommunication services by establishing a traffic flow policy, protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the information being transmitted, reviewing and documenting each exception to the traffic flow policy.	<u>SC-7(4)</u>
		PR.PT-5	Low	
			None	
			Moderate	
			Implement IT resiliency mechanisms to support normal and adverse manufacturing situations.	PL-8
			High	
			Implement OT resiliency mechanisms to support normal and adverse manufacturing situations.	PL-8
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.3
		DE.AE-1	Ensure that a baseline of network operations and expected data flows for the manufacturing system is developed, documented, and maintained to detect events.	<u>CM-2</u>
DETECT	Anomalias and		Low	62443-2-1:2009
	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)		Review and analyze detected events within the manufacturing system to understand attack targets and methods.	4.3.4.5.6, 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, 2.9
		DE.AE-2	Moderate and High	<u>AU-6</u> , <u>IR-4</u>
			Implement automated mechanisms where feasible to review and analyze detected events within the manufacturing system.	<u>AU-6(1)</u> <u>IR-4(1)</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
Function	Category	DE.AE-3	Low and Moderate Ensure that event data is compiled and correlated across the manufacturing system using various sources such as event reports, audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, and user/administrator reports. High Integrate analysis of events where feasible with the analysis of vulnerability scanning information; performance data; manufacturing system monitoring, and facility monitoring to further enhance the ability to identify inappropriate or unusual activity.	AU-6(5)(6) AU-12(1)
DETECT	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)	, manes and	Low Determine negative impacts to manufacturing operations, assets, and individuals resulting from detected events, and correlate with risk assessment outcomes.	<u>RA-3</u>
			Moderate Implement automated mechanisms to support impact analysis. High	<u>IR-4(1)</u> <u>SI-4(2)</u>
			Correlate detected event information and responses to achieve perspective on event impact across the organization.	<u>IR-4(4)</u>
			Low Define incident alert thresholds for the manufacturing system. Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.10 <u>IR-4, IR-5, AU-2</u> ,
		DL/IL-5	Implement automated mechanisms where feasible to assist in the identification of security alert thresholds.	<u>AU-3, IR-8</u> <u>IR-4(1)</u> <u>IR-5(1)</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
	Category		Low	62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.2
			Conduct ongoing security status monitoring of the manufacturing system network to detect defined cybersecurity events and indicators of potential cybersecurity events.	6.2 <u>CA-7d</u> AC-2g,
			Detect unauthorized local, network, and remote connections, and identify unauthorized use of the manufacturing system.	<u>SI-4b</u>
			Generate audit records for defined cybersecurity events.	<u>AU-12c</u>
		DE.CM-1	Monitor network communications at the external boundary of the system and at key internal boundaries within the system.	<u>SC-7, SI-4(4)</u>
			Heighten system monitoring activity whenever there is an indication of increased risk.	<u>SI-4e</u>
			Moderate	
	Security		Implement automated mechanisms to support detection of cybersecurity events.	<u>AC-2 (1)(2)(3)(4</u>), <u>SI-4(2)</u>
DETECT	Continuous Monitoring		Generate system alerts when indications of compromise or potential compromise occur.	<u>SI-4(5)</u>
	(DE.CM)	8	High	
			Monitor for and report atypical usage of the manufacturing system.	<u>AC-2(12)</u>
			Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.8
			Conduct ongoing security status monitoring of the manufacturing system facility to detect physical security incidents.	4.5.5.5.8 <u>CA-7d</u> , <u>PE-6</u> , <u>PE-3</u>
		DE.CM-2	Moderate and High	
		DE.CWI-2	Implement independent teams to monitor the security of the physical environment.	<u>CA-7(1)</u>
			Monitor physical intrusion alarms and surveillance equipment.	$\frac{\text{PE-6(1)}}{\text{PE-2(1)}}$ $\frac{\text{PE-6(4)}}{\text{PE-2(1)}}$
			Monitor physical access to the manufacturing system and devices in addition to the facility.	<u>PE-3(1)</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.2
		DE.CM-3	Conduct security status monitoring of personnel activity associated with the manufacturing system.	
			Enforce software usage and installation restrictions.	<u>CA-7d</u> <u>CM-10</u> , <u>CM-11</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
	Category		Low	62443-2-1:2009
			Deploy malicious code protection mechanisms throughout the manufacturing system where safe and feasible to detect and eradicate malicious code.	4.3.4.3.8 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.2
		DE.CM-4	Update malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are available in accordance with the configuration management policy and procedures for the manufacturing system.	<u>SI-3</u>
			Moderate and High	
			Manage for false positives during malicious code detection and eradication.	$\frac{SI-3d}{SI-3(2)}$
			Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms where safe and feasible.	
			Low	62443-3-3:2013 SR
			None	2.4
			Moderate and High	
			Define acceptable and detect unacceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies.	SC 18
	Security	Security continuousmobile code technologies for use with the manufacturing system.Continuous IonitoringThe use of mobile code technologies is determined after careful consideration and after verification		<u>SC-18</u>
			Enforce usage restrictions and establish implementation guidance for acceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies for use with the manufacturing system.	
DETECT	Monitoring (DE.CM)		The use of mobile code technologies is determined after careful consideration and after verification that it does not adversely impact the operational performance of the manufacturing system.	
			Low Moderate and High	
			Conduct ongoing security status monitoring of external service provider activity on the manufacturing system.	<u>CA-7d</u>
		DE.CM-6	Detect defined cybersecurity events and indicators of potential cybersecurity events from external service providers.	<u>SI-4</u>
			Monitor compliance of external providers with personnel security policies and procedures, and contract security requirements.	<u>PS-7,</u> <u>SA-4, SA-9, MA-5</u>
			Low	
		DE.CM-7	Conduct ongoing security status monitoring on the manufacturing system for unauthorized personnel, connections, devices, access points, and software.	<u>CA-7d</u>
			Monitor for system inventory discrepancies.	<u>CM-8</u>
			Moderate and High	
			Deploy monitoring devices strategically within the manufacturing system to collect essential information to detect specific events of interest.	<u>SI-4</u>
			Monitor for unauthorized configuration changes to the manufacturing system.	<u>CM-3</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
	Security Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM)	DE.CM-8	Low, Moderate and High Conduct vulnerability scans on the manufacturing system where safe and feasible. Include analysis, remediation, and information sharing in the vulnerability scanning process. Implement control system-specific vulnerability scanning tools and techniques where safe and feasible. Active vulnerability scanning, which introduces network traffic, is used with care on manufacturing systems to ensure that system functions are not adversely impacted by the scanning process.	62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.1 <u>RA-5</u>
	Detection Processes (DE.DP)	DE.DP-1	Low, Moderate and High Define roles and responsibilities for detection activities on the manufacturing system and ensure accountability.	62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.1 <u>CA-2, CA-7,</u> PM-14
		DE.DP-2	Low, Moderate and High Conduct detection activities in accordance with applicable federal and state laws, industry regulations and standards, policies, and other applicable requirements.	62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.2 <u>CA-2</u>
DETECT		DE.DP-3	Low, Moderate and High Validate that event detection processes are operating as intended.	62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.2 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.3 <u>PM-14</u>
		DE.DP-4	Low Communicate event detection information to defined personnel. Event detection information includes for example, alerts on atypical account usage, unauthorized remote access, wireless connectivity, mobile device connection, altered configuration settings, contrasting system component inventory, use of maintenance tools and nonlocal maintenance, physical access, temperature and humidity, equipment delivery and removal, communications at the information system boundaries, use of mobile code, use of VoIP, and malware disclosure. Moderate and High Implement automated mechanisms and system generated alerts to support event detection communication.	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.9 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1 <u>AU-6</u> <u>SI-4</u> <u>AU-6(1)</u> <u>SI-4(5)</u>

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
	Detection Processes (DE.DP)	DE.DP-5	Low	62443-2-1:2009
			Incorporate improvements derived from the monitoring, measurements, assessments, and lessons learned into detection process revisions.	4.4.3.4 <u>CA-2, CA-7, SI-4</u>
			Ensure the security plan for the manufacturing system provides for the review, testing, and continual improvement of the security detection processes.	
DETECT			Moderate	
			Implement independent teams to assess the detection process.	<u>PL-2</u> , <u>PM-14</u>
			High	
			Conduct specialized assessments including in-depth monitoring, vulnerability scanning, malicious user testing, insider threat assessment, performance/load testing, and verification and validation testing on the manufacturing system.	<u>CA-2(1), CA-7(1)</u> <u>CA-2(7)</u>
	Response		Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009
	Planning (RS.RP)	RS.RP-1	Execute the response plan during or after a cybersecurity event on the manufacturing system.	4.3.4.5.1 <u>IR-8</u> , <u>IR-4</u>
	Communications (RS.CO)	RS.CO-1	Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.2
			Ensure personnel understand objectives, restoration priorities, task sequences and assignment responsibilities for event response.	<u>CP-2</u> , <u>CP-3</u> , <u>IR-8</u>
		RS.CO-2	Low	62443-2-1:2009
			Implement prompt reporting to appropriate stakeholders for cybersecurity events on the manufacturing system.	4.3.4.5.5 <u>IR-6</u> ,
			Ensure that cybersecurity events on the manufacturing system are reported consistent with the response plan.	<u>AU-6</u>
RESPOND			Moderate and High	
			Implement automated mechanisms to assist in the reporting of cybersecurity events.	<u>IR-6(1)</u>
		RS.CO-3	Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009
			Share cybersecurity incident information with relevant stakeholders per the response plan.	4.3.4.5.2 <u>CA-2d</u> , <u>CA-7g</u> , <u>CP-2f</u>
		RS.CO-4	Low	62443-2-1:2009
			Coordinate cybersecurity incident response actions with all relevant stakeholders.	4.3.4.5.5
			Stakeholders for incident response include for example, mission/business owners, manufacturing system owners, integrators, vendors, human resources offices, physical and personnel security offices, legal departments, operations personnel, and procurement offices.	<u>CP-2</u> , <u>CP-2(1</u>), <u>IR-4</u>
			Moderate and High	<u>IR-4(1)</u>
			Implement automated mechanisms to support stakeholder coordination.]

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
	Communications (RS.CO)	RS.CO-5	Low, Moderate and High	
			Share cybersecurity event information voluntarily, as appropriate, with industry security groups to achieve broader cybersecurity situational awareness.	<u>PM-15</u> , <u>SI-5</u>
			For example, the DHS National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) [6] serves as a centralized location where operational elements involved in cybersecurity and communications reliance are coordinated and integrated. The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) [7] collaborates with international and private sector Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) to share control systems-related cybersecurity incidents and mitigation measures.	
			Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6
			Investigate cybersecurity-related notifications generated from detection systems.	62443-3-3:2013 SR
		RS.AN-1	Moderate and High	6.1
	Analysis (RS.AN)		Implement automated mechanisms to assist in the investigation and analysis of cybersecurity-related notifications.	<u>IR-4, CA-7, AU-6</u> <u>IR-5(1), SI-4(2)</u>
RESPOND		RS.AN-2	Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6
			Understand the full implication of the cybersecurity incident based on thorough investigation and analysis results.	<u>IR-4(4)</u>
			Correlate detected event information and incident responses with risk assessment outcomes to achieve perspective on incident impact across the organization.	
			Moderate and High	
			Implement automated mechanisms to support incident impact analysis.	<u>IR-4(1)</u> , <u>SI-4(2)</u>
		RS.AN-3	Low	62443-3-3:SR 2.8, 2.9, 2.10
			Conduct forensic analysis on collected cybersecurity event information to determine root cause.	,
			Moderate and High	<u>IR-4</u>
			Provide on-demand audit review, analysis, and reporting for after-the-fact investigations of cybersecurity incidents.	<u>AU-7(1)</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6
		RS.AN-4	Categorize cybersecurity incidents according to level of severity and impact consistent with the response plan.	<u>RA-3, PM-9, IR-4</u>

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Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
	Analysis (RS.AN)	RS.AN-5	Low and Moderate	
			Implement vulnerability management processes and procedures to incorporate processing, analyzing, and remediating vulnerabilities identified from internal and external sources	SI-5, PM-15
			High	SI-5(1)
			Implement automated mechanisms to disseminate and track remediation efforts for vulnerability information captured from internal and external sources to key stakeholders	31-3(1)
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6
		RS.MI-1	Contain cybersecurity incidents to minimize impact on the manufacturing system.	4.5.4.5.0 62443-3-3:2013 SR 5.1, SR IR-4, IR-4(1)
		RS.MI-2	Low	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6,
	Mitigation (RS.MI)		Mitigate cybersecurity incidents occurring on the manufacturing system.	4.5.4.5.0, <u>IR-4</u>
			Moderate and High	
			Implement automated mechanisms to support the cybersecurity incident mitigation process.	<u>IR-4(1)</u>
RESPOND		RS.MI-3	Low, Moderate and High	
			Ensure that vulnerabilities identified while responding to a cybersecurity incident are mitigated or documented as accepted risks.	<u>RA-5, RA-3</u>
	Improvements (RS.IM)		Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.10
		RS.IM-1	Incorporate lessons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response procedures, training, and testing, and implement the resulting changes accordingly.	<u>IR-4</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	
		RS.IM-2	Update the response plans to address changes to the organization, manufacturing system, attack vectors, or environment of operation and problems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing.	<u>CP-2</u>
			Updates may include, for example, responses to disruptions or failures, and predetermined procedures.	
			Enable a process for the response plan to evolve to reflect new threats, improved technology, and lessons learned.	

Function	Category	Subcategory	Manufacturing Profile	Reference
		RC.RP-1	Low and Moderate	
			Execute the recovery plan during or after a cybersecurity incident on the manufacturing system.	<u>IR-8, CP-10</u>
	Recovery Planning (RC.RP)		Restore the manufacturing system within a predefined time-period from configuration-controlled and integrity-protected information representing a known, operational state for the components.	<u>CP-10(4)</u>
			High	
			Continue essential manufacturing functions and services with little or no loss of operational continuity and sustain continuity until full system restoration.	<u>CP-2(5)</u>
			Low, Moderate and High	62443-2-1 4.4.3.4
		RC.IM-1	Incorporate lessons learned from ongoing recovery activities into system recovery procedures, training, and testing, and implement the resulting changes accordingly.	<u>IR-4</u>
	Improvements		Low, Moderate and High	
	(RC.IM)	RC.IM-2	Update the recovery plan to address changes to the organization, manufacturing system, or environment of operation and problems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing.	<u>CP-2, IR-8</u>
			Ensure that updates are integrated into the recovery plans.	
			Low	
RECOVER	Communications (RC.CO)	RC.CO-1	Centralize and coordinate information distribution, and manage the public facing representation of the organization. Public relations management may include, for example, managing media interactions, coordinating and logging all requests for interviews, handling and 'triaging' phone calls and e-mail requests, matching media requests with appropriate and available internal experts who are ready to be interviewed, screening all of information provided to the media, ensuring personnel are familiar with public relations and privacy policies.	COBIT 5 EDM03.02
			Moderate	
			Assign a Public Relations Officer.	
			High	
			Pre-define media contacts.	
			Implement external assets to manage public relations.	
		RC.CO-2	Low, Moderate and High	
			Implement a crisis response strategy to protect against negative impact and repair organizational reputation. Crisis response strategies include, for example, actions to shape attributions of the crisis, change perceptions of the organization in crisis, and reduce the negative effect generated by the crisis.	COBIT 5 EDM03.02
			Low, Moderate and High	CD 2 ID 4
		RC.CO-3	Communicate recovery activities to all relevant stakeholders, and executive and management teams.	<u>CP-2 IR-4</u>

557 558

559	Referen	ices
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574 575 576	[5]	The International Society of Automation (2020) <i>ISA99, Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security.</i> Available at <u>https://www.isa.org/isa99/</u> [ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards on Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) Security.]
577 578 579	[6]	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2020) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). Available at https://www.cisa.gov/national-cybersecurity-communications-integration-center
580 581 582	[7]	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2020) <i>Industrial Control Systems</i> . Available at <u>https://www.us-cert.gov/ics</u> [Formerly the site for the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT).]

583 Appendix A - Acronyms and Abbreviations

584 Selected acronyms and abbreviations used in the Manufacturing Profile are defined below.

585	CAN	Controller Area Network
586	CSF	Cybersecurity Framework
587	FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
588	HMI	Human Machine Interface
589	ICS	Industrial Control System
590	ICS-CERT	Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team
591	IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
592	ISA	The International Society of Automation
593	IT	Information Technology
594	LAN	Local Area Network
595	NCCIC	National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center
596	NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
597	NVD	National Vulnerability Database
598	ΟΤ	Operational Technology
599	PLC	Programmable Logic Controller
600	RF	Radio Frequency
601	RTU	Remote Terminal Unit
602	US-CERT	United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
603	VPN	Virtual Private Network
604		
605		

606	Appendix B - Glossary
607	Selected terms used in the Manufacturing Profile are defined below.
608 609 610 611 612 613	Actuator - A device for moving or controlling a mechanism or system. It is operated by a source of energy, typically electric current, hydraulic fluid pressure, or pneumatic pressure, and converts that energy into motion. An actuator is the mechanism by which a control system acts upon an environment. The control system can be simple (a fixed mechanical or electronic system), software-based (e.g. a printer driver, robot control system), or a human or other agent. [800-82]
614 615 616	Business/Mission Objectives - Broad expression of business goals. Specified target outcome for business operations.
617 618 619	Capacity Planning - Systematic determination of resource requirements for the projected output, over a specific period. [businessdictionary.com]
620 621 622	Category - The subdivision of a Function into groups of cybersecurity outcomes closely tied to programmatic needs and particular activities.
623 624 625	Critical Infrastructure - Essential services and related assets that underpin American society and serve as the backbone of the nation's economy, security, and health. [DHS]
626 627 628 629	Criticality Reviews - A determination of the ranking and priority of manufacturing system components, services, processes, and inputs in order to establish operational thresholds and recovery objectives.
630 631 632 633	Critical Services - The subset of mission essential services required to conduct manufacturing operations. Function or capability that is required to maintain health, safety, the environment and availability for the equipment under control. [62443]
633 634 635 636 637 638	Cyber Risk - Risk of financial loss, operational disruption, or damage, from the failure of the digital technologies employed for informational and/or operational functions introduced to a manufacturing system via electronic means from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the manufacturing system.
639 640 641	Cybersecurity - The process of protecting information by preventing, detecting, and responding to attacks. [CSF]
642 643 644 645	Defense-in-depth - The application of multiple countermeasures in a layered or stepwise manner to achieve security objectives. The methodology involves layering heterogeneous security technologies in the common attack vectors to ensure that attacks missed by one technology are caught by another. [62443 1-1]

648 **Environmental Support** – Any environmental factor for which the organization determines that 649 it needs to continue to provide support in a contingency situation, even if in a degraded state. 650 This could include factors such as power, air conditioning, humidity control, fire protection, 651 lighting, etc. 652 For example, while developing the contingency plan, the organization may determine that it is 653 necessary to continue to ensure the appropriate temperature and humidity during a contingency situation so they would plan for the capacity to support that via supplemental/mobile air 654 655 conditioning units, backup power, etc. and the associated procedures to ensure cutover 656 operations. Such determinations are based on an assessment of risk, system categorization 657 (impact level), and organizational risk tolerance. 658 Event - Any observable occurrence on a manufacturing system. Events can include 659 cybersecurity changes that may have an impact on manufacturing operations (including mission, 660 capabilities, or reputation). [CSF] 661 662 Fail to Known State – Upon a disruption event that causes the system to fail, it fails to a pre-663 determined state. Failure in a known safe state helps to prevent systems from failing to a state 664 that may cause injury to individuals or destruction to property. Preserving manufacturing system 665 state information facilitates system restart and return to the operational mode of organizations 666 with less disruption of mission/business processes. [NVD.NIST] 667 668 Firmware - Software program or set of instructions programmed on the flash ROM of a 669 hardware device. It provides the necessary instructions for how the device communicates with the other computer hardware. [Techterms.com] 670 671 672 Framework - The Cybersecurity Framework developed for defining protection of critical 673 infrastructure. It provides a common language for understanding, managing, and expressing 674 cybersecurity risk both internally and externally. Includes activities to achieve specific 675 cybersecurity outcomes, and references examples of guidance to achieve those outcomes. 676 677 **Function** - Primary unit within the Cybersecurity Framework. Exhibits basic cybersecurity activities at their highest level. 678 679 680 **Incident** - An occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits 681 682 or that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies. [CSF] 683 684 685 Informative References - Specific sections of standards, guidelines, and practices common among critical infrastructure sectors that illustrate a method to achieve the outcomes associated 686 687 with each Subcategory in the Cybersecurity Framework. 688 689

690 Integrator - A value-added engineering organization that focuses on industrial control and 691 information systems, manufacturing execution systems, and plant automation, that has 692 application knowledge and technical expertise, and provides an integrated solution to an 693 engineering problem. This solution includes final project engineering, documentation, 694 procurement of hardware, development of custom software, installation, testing, and 695 commissioning. [CSIA.com] 696 697 Manufacturing Operations - Activities concerning the facility operation, system processes, 698 materials input/output, maintenance, supply and distribution, health, and safety, emergency 699 response, human resources, security, information technology and other contributing measures to 700 the manufacturing enterprise. 701 702 Network Access - any access a network connection in lieu of local access (i.e., user being 703 physically present at the device). 704 705 Non-local Connection - A connection to the manufacturing system affording the user access to 706 system resources and system functionality while physically not present. 707 708 Non-Technology-Based Input Product – Manufactured component parts or materials used in 709 the organization manufacturing process that do not incorporate information technology and are 710 provided by third-parties. 711 712 **Overlay** - A fully specified set of security controls, control enhancements, and supplemental 713 guidance derived from tailoring a security baseline to fit the user's specific environment and 714 mission. [800-53] 715 716 **Operational technology** - Hardware and software that detects or causes a change through the 717 direct monitoring and/or control of physical devices, processes and events in the enterprise. 718 [Gartner.com] 719 720 Programmable Logic Controller - A solid-state control system that has a user-programmable 721 memory for storing instructions for the purpose of implementing specific functions such as I/O control, logic, timing, counting, three mode (PID) control, communication, arithmetic, and data 722 723 and file processing. [800-82] 724 725 Port - The entry or exit point from a computer for connecting communications or peripheral 726 devices. [800-82] 727 728 Profile - A representation of the outcomes that a particular system or organization has selected 729 from the Framework Categories and Subcategories. [CSF] 730 Target Profile - the desired outcome or 'to be' state of cybersecurity implementation -731 Current Profile - the 'as is' state of system cybersecurity 732 733 Protocol - A set of rules (i.e., formats and procedures) to implement and control some type of 734 association (e.g., communication) between systems. [800-82] 735

736 **Remote Access** - Access by users (or information systems) communicating external to an information 737 system security perimeter. Network access is any access a network connection in lieu of 738 local access (i.e., user being physically present at the device). [800-53] 739 740 **Resilience Requirements** - The business-driven availability and reliability characteristics for the 741 manufacturing system that specify recovery tolerances from disruptions and major incidents. 742 743 Risk Assessment - The process of identifying risks to agency operations (including mission, 744 functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, or individuals by determining the probability of 745 occurrence, the resulting impact, and additional security controls that would mitigate this impact. Part of risk management, synonymous with risk analysis. Incorporates threat and vulnerability 746 747 analyses. [800-82] 748 749 Risk Tolerance - The level of risk that the Manufacturer is willing to accept in pursuit of 750 strategic goals and objectives. [800-53] 751 752 Router - A computer that is a gateway between two networks at OSI layer 3 and that relays and 753 directs data packets through that inter-network. The most common form of router operates on IP 754 packets. [800-82] 755 756 Security Control - The management, operational, and technical controls (i.e., safeguards or 757 countermeasures) prescribed for a system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 758 of the system, its components, processes, and data. [800-82] 759 760 Subcategory - The subdivision of a Category into specific outcomes of technical and/or management activities. Examples of Subcategories include "External information systems are 761 762 catalogued," "Data-at-rest is protected," and "Notifications from detection systems are 763 investigated." [CSF] 764 765 Supporting Services - Providers of external system services to the manufacturer through a 766 variety of consumer-producer relationships including but not limited to: joint ventures; business 767 partnerships; outsourcing arrangements (i.e., through contracts, interagency agreements, lines of 768 business arrangements); licensing agreements; and/or supply chain exchanges. Supporting 769 services include, for example, Telecommunications, engineering services, power, water, 770 software, tech support, and security. [800-53] 771 772 Switch - A device that channels incoming data from any of multiple input ports to the specific 773 output port that will take the data toward its intended destination. [Whatis.com] 774 775 System Categorization - The characterization of a manufacturing system, its components, and 776 operations, based on an assessment of the potential impact that a loss of availability, integrity, or 777 confidentiality would have on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. 778 [FIPS 199]

- 779 **Technology-Based Input Product** Manufactured components used in the organization
- 780 manufacturing process incorporating information technology and provided by third-parties (e.g.
- 781 PLC, Sensors, Data Collection Systems, Workstations, Servers, etc).
- 782 Third-Party Relationships relationships with external entities. External entities may include,
- for example, service providers, vendors, supply-side partners, demand-side partners, alliances,
- consortiums, and investors, and may include both contractual and non-contractual parties.
- 785 [DHS]
- 786 Third-party Providers Service providers, integrators, vendors, telecommunications, and
- infrastructure support that are external to the organization that operates the manufacturingsystem.
- 788 789
- 790 Thresholds Values used to establish concrete decision points and operational control limits to
- trigger management action and response escalation.