

**Draft NIST Special Publication 800-133**  
**Revision 2**

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# **Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation**

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Elaine Barker  
Allen Roginsky  
Richard Davis

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C O M P U T E R   S E C U R I T Y

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**NIST**  
National Institute of  
Standards and Technology  
U.S. Department of Commerce

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**Revision 2**

# **Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation**

Elaine Barker  
Allen Roginsky  
*Computer Security Division  
Information Technology Laboratory*

Richard Davis  
*National Security Agency*

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U.S. Department of Commerce  
*Wilbur L. Ross, Jr. Secretary*

National Institute of Standards and Technology  
*Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology*

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National Institute of Standards and Technology  
Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory  
100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930  
Email: [SP-800-133\\_Comments@nist.gov](mailto:SP-800-133_Comments@nist.gov)

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### Abstract

Cryptography is often used in an information technology security environment to protect data that is sensitive, has a high value, or is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure or undetected modification during transmission or while in storage. Cryptography relies upon two basic components: an algorithm (or cryptographic methodology) and a cryptographic key. This Recommendation discusses the generation of the keys to be managed and used by the **approved** cryptographic algorithms.

### Keywords

asymmetric key; key agreement; key derivation; key generation; key wrapping; key replacement; key transport; private key; public key; symmetric key.

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**Table of Contents**

1 Introduction ..... 1

2 Definitions, Acronyms and Symbols ..... 2

    2.1 Definitions ..... 2

    2.2 Acronyms ..... 9

    2.3 Symbols and Terms ..... 10

3 General Discussion ..... 11

    3.1 Keys to Be Generated ..... 11

    3.2 Where Keys are Generated ..... 11

    3.3 Supporting a Security Strength ..... 11

4 Using the Output of a Random Bit Generator ..... 13

5 Generation of Key Pairs for Asymmetric-Key Algorithms ..... 15

    5.1 Key Pairs for Digital Signature Schemes ..... 15

    5.2 Key Pairs for Key Establishment ..... 15

    5.3 Distributing the Key Pairs ..... 16

    5.4 Key Pair Replacement ..... 16

6 Generation of Keys for Symmetric-Key Algorithms ..... 18

    6.1 The “Direct Generation” of Symmetric Keys ..... 18

    6.2 Derivation of Symmetric Keys ..... 19

        6.2.1 Symmetric Keys Generated Using Key-Agreement Schemes ..... 20

        6.2.2 Symmetric Keys Derived from a Pre-existing Key ..... 20

        6.2.3 Symmetric Keys Derived from Passwords ..... 21

    6.3 Symmetric Keys Produced by Combining (Multiple) Keys and Other Data ..... 21

    6.4 Distributing Symmetric Keys ..... 23

    6.5 Replacement of Symmetric Keys ..... 23

References ..... 25

Appendix A: Revisions ..... 28

## 1 Introduction

2 Cryptography is often used in an information technology security environment to protect data that  
3 is sensitive, has a high value, or is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure or undetected  
4 modification during transmission, storage, or use. Cryptography relies upon two basic  
5 components: an algorithm (or cryptographic methodology) and, often, a cryptographic key. The  
6 algorithm is a mathematical function, and the key is a parameter used by that function.

7 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed a wide variety of  
8 Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and NIST Special Publications (SPs) to specify  
9 and approve cryptographic algorithms for use by the Federal Government. In addition, guidance  
10 has been provided on the management of the cryptographic keys to be used with these **approved**  
11 cryptographic algorithms.

12 This Recommendation (i.e., SP 800-133) discusses the generation of the keys to be used with the  
13 **approved** cryptographic algorithms. The keys are either 1) generated using mathematical  
14 processing on the output of **approved** Random Bit Generators (RBGs) and possibly other  
15 parameters or 2) generated based on keys that are generated in this fashion.

16 **2 Definitions, Acronyms, and Symbols**17 **2.1 Definitions**

<b>Approved</b>	FIPS-approved and/or NIST-recommended.
Asymmetric key	A cryptographic key used with an asymmetric-key (public-key) algorithm. The key may be a private key or a public key.
Asymmetric-key algorithm	A cryptographic algorithm that uses two related keys: a public key and a private key. The two keys have the property that determining the private key from the public key is computationally infeasible; also known as a public-key algorithm.
Bit string	An ordered sequence of 0 and 1 bits.
Ciphertext	Data in its encrypted form.
Compromise	The unauthorized disclosure, modification, or use of sensitive data (e.g., keying material and other security-related information).
Cryptographic algorithm	A well-defined computational procedure that takes variable inputs (often including a cryptographic key) and produces an output.
Cryptographic boundary	An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds of a cryptographic module and contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a cryptographic module. See <a href="#">FIPS 140</a> . <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> FIPS 140, *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*.



Cryptographic key (key)	<p>A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that determines its operation in such a way that an entity with knowledge of the correct key can reproduce or reverse the operation, while an entity without knowledge of the key cannot. Examples of cryptographic operations requiring the use of cryptographic keys include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data,</li> <li>2. The transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data,</li> <li>3. The computation of a digital signature from data,</li> <li>4. The verification of a digital signature,</li> <li>5. The computation of a message authentication code (MAC) from data,</li> <li>6. The verification of a MAC from data and a received MAC,</li> <li>7. The computation of a shared secret that is used to derive keying material, and</li> <li>8. The derivation of additional keying material from a key-derivation key (e.g., a pre-shared key).</li> </ol>
Cryptographic module	The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements security functions (including cryptographic algorithms and key-generation methods) and is contained within a cryptographic module boundary. See <a href="#">FIPS 140</a> .
Cryptoperiod	The timespan during which a specific key is authorized for use or in which the keys for a given system or application may remain in effect.
Data integrity	A property possessed by data items that have not been altered in an unauthorized manner since they were created, transmitted, or stored.
Decryption	The process of changing ciphertext into plaintext using a cryptographic algorithm and key.
Digital signature	The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that, when properly implemented, provides origin authentication, assurance of data integrity, and supports signatory non-repudiation.
Encryption	The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext using a cryptographic algorithm and key.
Entity	An individual (person), organization, device, or process; used interchangeably with “party.”

Entity authentication	The process of providing assurance about the identity of an entity interacting with a system (e.g., to access a resource); sometimes called identity authentication.
Entropy	A measure of the disorder, randomness, or variability in a closed system; see <a href="#">SP 800-90B</a> . <sup>2</sup>
Key	See cryptographic key.
Key agreement	A (pair-wise) key-establishment procedure in which the resultant secret keying material is a function of information contributed by both participants so that neither party can predetermine the value of the secret keying material independently of the contributions of the other party; contrast with key transport.
Key-agreement primitive	A primitive algorithm used in a key-agreement scheme specified in <a href="#">SP 800-56A</a> <sup>3</sup> or <a href="#">SP 800-56B</a> . <sup>4</sup>
Key derivation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A process by which one or more keys are derived from a shared secret and other information during a key-agreement transaction.</li> <li>2. A process that derives new keying material from a key (i.e., a key-derivation key) that is currently available.</li> </ol>
Key-derivation function	As used in this Recommendation, either a one-step key-derivation method or a key-derivation function based on a pseudorandom function as specified in <a href="#">SP 800-108</a> .
Key-derivation key	A key used as an input to a key-derivation method to derive other keys; see <a href="#">SP 800-108</a> . <sup>5</sup>
Key-derivation method	A key-derivation function or other <b>approved</b> procedure for deriving keying material.
Key-derivation procedure	As used in this Recommendation, a two-step key-derivation method consisting of randomness extraction followed by key expansion.
Key establishment	A procedure that results in secret keying material that is shared among different parties.

<sup>2</sup> SP 800-90B, *Recommendation for the Validation of Entropy Sources for Random Bit Generation*.

<sup>3</sup> SP 800-56A, *Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography*.

<sup>4</sup> SP 800-56B, *Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography*.

<sup>5</sup> SP 800-108, *Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions*.

Key expansion	The second step in the key-derivation procedure in which a key-derivation key is used to derive secret keying material having the desired length(s). The first step in the procedure is randomness extraction.
Key extraction	See Randomness extraction.
Key-generating module	A cryptographic module in which a given key is generated.
Key generation	The process of generating keys for cryptography.
Key pair	A private key and its corresponding public key; a key pair is used with an asymmetric-key (public-key) algorithm.
Key-pair owner	In asymmetric-key cryptography, the entity that is authorized to use the private key associated with a public key, whether that entity generated the key pair itself or a trusted party generated the key pair for the entity.
Key transport	A key-establishment procedure whereby one party (the sender) selects a value for the secret keying material and then securely distributes that value to another party (the receiver).
Key wrapping	A method of encrypting and decrypting keys and (possibly) associated data using symmetric-key cryptography; both confidentiality and integrity protection are provided; see <a href="#">SP 800-38F</a> . <sup>6</sup>
Key-wrapping key	A key used as an input to a key-wrapping method; see SP 800-38F.
MAC key	A symmetric key used as input to a security function to produce a message authentication code (MAC).
Message Authentication Code (MAC)	A cryptographic checksum on data that uses an <b>approved</b> security function and a symmetric key to detect both accidental and intentional modifications of data.
Min-entropy	The min-entropy (in bits) of a random variable $X$ is the largest value $m$ having the property that each observation of $X$ provides at least $m$ bits of information (i.e., the min-entropy of $X$ is the greatest lower bound for the information content of potential observations of $X$ ). The min-entropy of a random variable is a lower bound on its entropy. The precise formulation for min-entropy is $-\log_2(\max p_i)$ for a discrete distribution having probabilities $p_1, \dots, p_k$ . Min-entropy is often used as a worst-case measure of the unpredictability of a random variable.

<sup>6</sup> SP 800-38F, *Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping*.

Module	See Cryptographic module.
Nonce	A time-varying value that has (at most) an acceptably small chance of repeating. For example, the nonce may be a random value that is generated anew for each use, a timestamp, a sequence number, or some combination of these.
Origin authentication	A process that provides assurance of the origin of information (e.g., by providing assurance of the originator's identity).
Owner	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. For an asymmetric key pair consisting of a private key and a public key, the owner is the entity that is authorized to use the private key associated with the public key, whether that entity generated the key pair itself or a trusted party generated the key pair for the entity.</li> <li>2. For a symmetric key (i.e., a secret key), the entity or entities that are authorized to share and use the key.</li> </ol>
Party	See Entity.
Password	A string of characters (letters, numbers, and other symbols) that are used to authenticate an identity or to verify access authorization. A passphrase is a special case of a password that is a sequence of words or other text. In this Recommendation, the use of the term "password" includes this special case.
Permutation	An ordered (re)arrangement of the elements of a (finite) set; a function that is both a one-to-one and onto mapping of a set to itself.
Plaintext data	In this Recommendation, data that will be encrypted by an encryption algorithm or obtained from ciphertext using a decryption algorithm.
Pre-shared key	A secret key that has been established between the parties who are authorized to use it by means of some secure method (e.g., using a secure manual-distribution process or automated key-establishment scheme).
Primitive algorithm	A low-level cryptographic algorithm (e.g., an RSA encryption operation) used as a basic building block for higher-level cryptographic algorithms or schemes (e.g., RSA key transport).

Private key	<p>A cryptographic key used with an asymmetric-key (public-key) cryptographic algorithm that is not made public and is uniquely associated with an entity that is authorized to use it. In an asymmetric-key cryptosystem, the private key is associated with a public key. Depending on the algorithm that employs the private key, it may be used to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Compute the corresponding public key,</li> <li>2. Compute a digital signature that may be verified using the corresponding public key,</li> <li>3. Decrypt data that was encrypted using the corresponding public key, or</li> <li>4. Compute a key-derivation key, which may then be used as an input to a key-derivation process.</li> </ol>
Public key	<p>A cryptographic key used with an asymmetric-key (public-key) cryptographic algorithm that may be made public and is associated with a private key and an entity that is authorized to use that private key. Depending on the algorithm that employs the public key, it may be used to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Verify a digital signature that is signed by the corresponding private key,</li> <li>2. Encrypt data that can be decrypted by the corresponding private key, or</li> <li>3. Compute a piece of shared data (i.e., data that is known only by two or more specific entities).</li> </ol>
Public-key algorithm	See Asymmetric-key algorithm.
Random Bit Generator (RBG)	A device or algorithm that outputs bits that are computationally indistinguishable from bits that are independent and unbiased.
Randomness extraction	The first step in the two-step key-derivation procedure during which a key-derivation key is produced. The second step in the procedure is key expansion.
Recommendation	A term used to refer to this specific document (i.e., SP 800-133): the “R” is always capitalized.
Rekey	A procedure in which a new cryptographic key is generated in a manner that is independent of the (old) cryptographic key that it will replace.

Salt	As used in this Recommendation, a byte string (which may be secret or non-secret) that is used as a MAC key.
Secret key	A cryptographic key used by one or more (authorized) entities in a symmetric-key cryptographic algorithm; the key is not made public.
Secure channel	A path for transferring data between two entities or components that ensures confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection as well as mutual authentication between the entities or components. The secure channel may be provided using cryptographic, physical, or procedural methods or a combination thereof.
Security function	Cryptographic algorithms, together with modes of operation (if appropriate); for example, block ciphers, digital signature algorithms, asymmetric key-establishment algorithms, message authentication codes, hash functions, or random bit generators; see <a href="#">FIPS 140</a> .
Security strength	A number associated with the amount of work (that is, the number of basic operations of some sort) required to break a cryptographic algorithm or system. Security strength is often expressed in bits. If the security strength is $S$ bits, then it is expected that (roughly) $2^S$ basic operations are required to break the algorithm or system.
<b>Shall</b>	This term is used to indicate a requirement of a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) or a requirement that must be fulfilled to claim conformance to this Recommendation; note that <b>shall</b> may be coupled with <b>not</b> to become <b>shall not</b> .
Shared secret	A secret value that has been computed during an execution of a key-establishment scheme between two parties, is known by both participants, and is used as input to a key-derivation method to produce keying material.
Support a security strength	A term applied to a method (e.g., an RBG or a key with its associated cryptographic algorithm) that is capable of providing (at a minimum) the security strength required or desired for protecting data.  A security strength of $s$ bits is said to be supported by a particular choice of keying material, algorithm, primitive, auxiliary function, parameters (etc.) for use in the implementation of a cryptographic mechanism if that choice will not prevent the resulting implementation from attaining a security strength of at least $s$ bits.
Symmetric key	See Secret key.

Symmetric-key algorithm	A cryptographic algorithm that uses the same secret key for its operation and (if applicable) for reversing the effects of the operation (e.g., an HMAC key for keyed hashing or an AES key for encryption and decryption); also known as a secret-key algorithm.
Target data	The data that is to be protected (e.g., a key or other sensitive data).
Trusted Party	A party that is trusted by its clients to generate cryptographic keys.

## 18 2.2 Acronyms

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard; see <a href="#">FIPS 197</a> <sup>7</sup>
CMAC	Cipher-based MAC; see <a href="#">SP 800-38B</a> <sup>8</sup>
CTR	Counter mode for a block cipher algorithm; see <a href="#">SP 800-38A</a> <sup>9</sup>
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm; see <a href="#">FIPS 186</a> <sup>10</sup>
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm; see FIPS 186
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code; see <a href="#">FIPS 198</a> <sup>11</sup>
KDF	Key-Derivation Function
KDM	Key-Deviation Method
KMAC	KECCAK Message Authentication Code; see <a href="#">SP 800-185</a> <sup>12</sup>
MAC	Message Authentication Code
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
RBG	Random Bit Generator
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SP	Special Publication

<sup>7</sup> FIPS 197, *Advanced Encryption Standard*.

<sup>8</sup> SP 800-38B, *Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication*.

<sup>9</sup> SP 800-38A, *Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation – Methods and Techniques*.

<sup>10</sup> FIPS 186, *Digital Signature Algorithm (DSS)*.

<sup>11</sup> FIPS 198, *Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)*.

<sup>12</sup> SP 800-185, *SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash*.

19 **2.3 Symbols and Terms**

Symbol	Meaning
$\oplus$	Bit-wise exclusive-or; a mathematical operation that is defined as: $0 \oplus 0 = 0,$ $0 \oplus 1 = 1,$ $1 \oplus 0 = 1,$ and $1 \oplus 1 = 0.$
$\parallel$	Concatenation
$B$	The bit string to be determined
$bLen$	The length of the bit string $B$ in bits
$H(x)$	A cryptographic hash function with $x$ as an input
$K$	The key to be determined
$kLen$	The length of $K$ in bits
$\max(x_1, \dots, x_n)$	The maximum of the $x_i$ values
$\min(x, y)$	The minimum of $x$ and $y$ ; $\min(x, y) = x$ if $x < y$ , and $\min(x, y) = y$ otherwise
$ss\_K$	The security strength that can be supported by the key $K$
$ss\_M_i$	The security strength that can be supported by the combination of the methods used to generate a key $K_i$ , and the methods used to protect it after generation (e.g., during key-transport and/or storage)
$T(x, l)$	Truncation of the bit string $x$ to the leftmost $l$ bits of $x$ , where $l \leq$ the length of $x$ in bits



## 3 General Discussion

### 3.1 Keys to Be Generated

This Recommendation addresses the generation of the cryptographic keys used in cryptography. Key generation includes the generation of a key using the output of a random bit generator (RBG), the derivation of a key from another key, the derivation of a key from a password, and key agreement performed by two entities using an **approved** key-agreement scheme. All keys **shall** be based directly or indirectly on the output of an **approved** RBG. For the purposes of this Recommendation, keys that are derived during a key-agreement transaction (see [SP 800-56A](#) and [SP 800-56B](#)), derived from another key using a key derivation function (see [SP 800-108](#)), or derived from a password for storage applications (see [SP 800-132](#)<sup>13</sup> and [Section 6.5](#)) are considered to be indirectly generated from an RBG since an ancestor key<sup>14</sup> or random value (e.g., the random value used to generate a key-agreement key pair) was obtained directly from the output of an **approved** RBG.

Two classes of cryptographic algorithms that require cryptographic keys have been **approved** for use by the Federal Government: asymmetric-key algorithms and symmetric-key algorithms. The generation of keys for these algorithm classes is discussed in [Sections 5](#) and [6](#), respectively.

### 3.2 Where Keys are Generated

Cryptographic keys **shall** be generated within [FIPS 140](#)-validated cryptographic modules. For explanatory purposes, consider the cryptographic module in which a key is generated to be the key-generating module. Any random value required by the key-generating module **shall** be generated within that module; that is, the RBG (or portion of the RBG<sup>15</sup>) that generates the random value **shall** be implemented within the FIPS 140 cryptographic module that generates the key. The generated keys **shall** be transported (when transportation is necessary) using secure channels and **shall** be used by their associated cryptographic algorithm within FIPS 140-validated cryptographic modules.

### 3.3 Supporting a Security Strength

A method (e.g., an RBG or a key and its associated cryptographic algorithm) *supports a given security strength* if the security strength provided by that method is equal to or greater than the security strength required for protecting the target data; the actual security strength provided can be higher than required.

*Security strength supported by an RBG:* A well-designed RBG supports a given security strength only if the amount of entropy (i.e., the randomness) available in the RBG is equal to or greater than that security strength. The support of a given security strength also requires a commensurate security strength for the confidentiality protection afforded to the entropy bits entered into the RBG (and other parameters determining the RBG's state); when used for the generation of keys and other

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<sup>13</sup> SP 800-132, *Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, Part 1: Storage Applications*.

<sup>14</sup> Ancestor key: A key that is used in the generation of another key. For example, an ancestor key for a key generated by a key derivation function would be the key-derivation key used by that key derivation function.

<sup>15</sup> The RBG itself might be distributed (e.g., the entropy source may not co-reside with the algorithm that generates the (pseudo) random output).

55 secret values, a commensurate security strength is also required for the confidentiality and integrity  
56 protection that will be provided to the RBG output. For information regarding the security strength  
57 that can be supported by **approved** RBGs, see [SP 800-90A](#).<sup>16</sup>

58 *Security strength supported by an algorithm:* Discussions of cryptographic algorithms and the  
59 security strengths they can support given certain choices of parameters and/or key lengths are  
60 provided in [SP 800-57, Part 1](#).<sup>17</sup> The security strength of a cryptographic algorithm that uses keys  
61 of a certain size (i.e., the key's length) is assessed under the assumption that those keys are  
62 generated using an **approved** process that outputs keys of the requisite size and type while  
63 providing an appropriate amount of min-entropy. It is assumed that this key-generation process is  
64 capable of supporting security strengths that are equal to or greater than the security strength  
65 assessed for the cryptographic algorithm. (Both the min-entropy and the security strength are  
66 measured in bits.)

67 *Security strength supported by a key:* The security strength that can be supported by a key depends  
68 on: 1) the algorithm with which it is used, 2) the size of the key (see [SP 800-57, Part 1](#)), 3) the  
69 process that generated the key (e.g., the security strength supported by the RBG that was used to  
70 generate the key), and 4) how the key was handled (e.g., the security strength available in the  
71 method used to transport the key). The use of such terms as “security strength supported by a key”  
72 or “key supports a security strength” assumes that these factors have been taken into consideration.  
73 For example, if an **approved** RBG that supports a security strength of 128 bits has been used to  
74 generate a 128-bit key, and if (immediately after generation) the key is used with AES-128 to  
75 encrypt target data, then the key may be said to support a security strength of 128 bits in that  
76 encryption operation (for as long as the key is kept secret). However, if the 128-bit AES key is  
77 generated using an RBG that supports a security strength of only 112 bits, then the key can only  
78 support a security strength of 112 bits even though its length is still 128 bits (i.e., the security  
79 strength of the key has been determined by the process used for its generation).

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<sup>16</sup> SP 800-90A, *Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators*.

<sup>17</sup> SP 800-57, Part 1, *Recommendation for Key Management: General*.

## 4 Using the Output of a Random Bit Generator

Random bit strings required for the generation of cryptographic keys **shall** be obtained from the output of an **approved** random bit generator (RBG); **approved** RBGs are specified in [SP 800-90](#).<sup>18</sup> The RBG **shall** be instantiated at a security strength that supports the security strength required to protect the target data (i.e., the data that will be protected by the generated keys).

The output of an **approved** RBG can be used as specified in this section to obtain, for example, either a symmetric key or the random value needed to generate an asymmetric key pair.

Asymmetric key pairs require the use of an **approved** algorithm for their generation. Examples are those included in [FIPS 186](#) for generating DSA, ECDSA, and RSA keys. The generation of asymmetric key pairs from a random value is discussed in [Section 5](#).

Methods for the generation of symmetric keys are discussed in [Section 6](#).

When random bit strings are required for the generation of cryptographic keys, they are obtained as follows:

Let  $B$  be the random bit string to be acquired, for example, to use as a symmetric key ( $K$ ), as input to an asymmetric-key-generation algorithm, or as part of the seed material for an RBG. Let  $bLen$  be its desired length in bits.  $B$  **shall** be a bit string that is formed as follows:

$$B = U \oplus V, \quad (1)$$

where

- $U$  is a bit string of  $bLen$  bits that is obtained as the output of an **approved** RBG that is capable of supporting the security strength required by the algorithm and/or application using  $B$  (e.g., to protect the target data),
- $V$  is a bit string of  $bLen$  bits, and
- The value of  $V$  is determined in a manner that is independent of the value of  $U$  (and vice versa).

The algorithm and/or application with which  $B$  will be used and the security strength that  $B$  is intended to support will determine the required bit length of  $B$ :  $bLen$  **shall** meet the relying application or algorithm's length requirement for a value of the bit string  $B$  to be used as intended in support of the targeted security strength. For example, if  $B$  is to be used as an AES key, then  $bLen$  **shall** be an **approved** AES key length that supports the required security strength for protecting the target data. As another example, according to [FIPS 186](#), if  $B$  is to be used as a seed in the specified process of generating provably prime factors of an RSA modulus  $n$ , then  $bLen$  **shall** be twice the security strength associated with (the bit length of)  $n$ .

Since there are no restrictions on the selection of  $V$  (other than its length and independence from  $U$ ), a conservative approach necessitates an assumption that the process used to select  $U$  provides most (if not all) of the required entropy, which – when measured in bits – cannot exceed the length of  $U$  (i.e.,  $bLen$ ). Therefore, the **approved** RBG from which  $U$  is obtained **shall** be capable of

<sup>18</sup> SP 800-90, *Recommendation for Random Number Generation*, consisting of SP 800-90A, SP 800-90B, and SP 800-90C.

116 providing the requisite entropy for  $B$  during the generation of  $U$  (i.e., at least  $bLen$  bits of entropy  
117 are provided during the seeding of the RBG).

118 The independence requirement on  $U$  and  $V$  is interpreted in a computational and statistical sense:  
119 the computation of  $U$  does not depend on  $V$ , and the computation of  $V$  does not depend on  $U$ .  
120 Knowledge of the value of  $V$  (but not  $B$ ) must provide no advantage to a party intent on gaining  
121 insight into an (as-yet-unknown) value of  $U$ . The value of  $V$  may be selected using a process that  
122 provides little entropy (indeed,  $V$  may be assigned a fixed, public value). Nevertheless, in cases  
123 where the value of  $V$  is intended to be kept secret, knowledge of the value of  $U$  (but not  $B$ ) must  
124 yield no additional information concerning the value selected for  $V$ . Given that  $U$  is the output of  
125 an **approved** RBG, the following are examples of independently selected  $V$  values:

- 126 1.  $V$  is a constant (selected independently of the value of  $U$ ). The value of  $V$  may be dependent  
127 on the use of  $B$  (e.g., if  $B$  is used as a key-derivation key, then  $V$  may be some value  $M$ , but  
128 if  $B$  is used as a key-wrapping key, then  $V$  may be some value  $N$ ). Note that if  $V$  is a string  
129 of binary zeroes, then  $B = U$  (i.e., the output of an **approved** RBG).
- 130 2.  $V$  is a key obtained using an **approved** key-derivation method from a key-derivation key  
131 and other input that is independent of  $U$ ; see [SP 800-108](#).
- 132 3.  $V$  is a key that was independently generated in another cryptographic module.  $V$  was  
133 protected using an **approved** key-wrapping algorithm or transported using an **approved**  
134 key-transport scheme during subsequent transport. Upon receipt, the protection on  $V$  is  
135 removed within the key-generating module that generated  $U$  before combining  $V$  with  $U$ .
- 136 4.  $V$  is produced by hashing another bit string ( $V'$ ) using an **approved** hash function and (if  
137 necessary) truncating the result to the appropriate length before combining it with  $U$ . That  
138 is,  $V = T(H(V'), bLen)$  where  $T(x, bLen)$  denotes the truncation of bit string  $x$  to its  $bLen$   
139 leftmost bits. The bit string  $V'$  may be selected using methods 1, 2, or 3 above.

## 140 **5 Generation of Key Pairs for Asymmetric-Key Algorithms**

141 Asymmetric-key algorithms (also known as public-key algorithms) require the use of asymmetric  
142 key pairs consisting of a private key and a corresponding public key. A key pair can be used for  
143 the generation and verification of digital signatures (see [Section 5.1](#)) or for key establishment (see  
144 [Section 5.2](#)). Each public/private key pair is associated with only one entity; this entity is known  
145 as the key-pair owner. Key pairs **shall** be generated by:

- 146 • The key-pair owner, or
- 147 • A Trusted Party that provides the key pair to the owner in a secure manner. The Trusted  
148 Party must be trusted by all parties that use the public key.

149 After key-pair generation, the key pair is retained and used by its owner. If the key pair was  
150 generated by a Trusted Party, both the owner and any relying party must trust that party not to use  
151 the private key of the key pair. The public key may be known by or provided to whomever needs  
152 to use it when interacting with the owner (see [Section 5.3](#)).

### 153 **5.1 Key Pairs for Digital Signature Schemes**

154 Digital signatures are generated on data to provide origin authentication, entity authentication,  
155 assurance of data integrity, or support for signatory non-repudiation. Digital signatures are  
156 generated by a signer using a private key and verified by a receiver using a public key. The  
157 generation of key pairs for digital signature applications is addressed in [FIPS 186](#) for the DSA,  
158 RSA, and ECDSA digital signature algorithms.

159 Values of  $B$ , computed as shown in [Section 4](#), **shall** be used to provide the random bit strings used  
160 in key-pair generation, as specified in [FIPS 186](#). The maximum security strength that can be  
161 supported by the resulting key pairs depends on a variety of size and parameter choices. Guidance  
162 on the size/parameter choices appropriate for supporting various security strengths can be found  
163 in [SP 800-57, Part 1](#).

164 For example, [SP 800-57, Part 1](#) states that an ECDSA key pair generated using an appropriate  
165 elliptic curve and a base point whose order is a 224-bit to 255-bit prime number can support (at  
166 most) a security strength of 112 bits. [FIPS 186](#) specifies that for such ECDSA key pairs, the  
167 random value used to determine a private key must be obtained using an RBG that supports a  
168 security strength of 112 bits. Using the method in [Section 4](#), a random value  $B$  that is to be used  
169 for the generation of the private key is determined by  $U$  (a value of a specified bit length obtained  
170 from an RBG that supports a security strength of at least 112 bits) and  $V$  (which could be zero).  
171 The value of  $B$  is then used to determine the private key from which the public ECDSA key is  
172 obtained, as specified in [FIPS 186](#).

### 173 **5.2 Key Pairs for Key Establishment**

174 Key establishment includes both key agreement and key transport. Key agreement is a method of  
175 key establishment in which the resultant secret keying material is a function of information  
176 contributed by all participants in the key-establishment process (usually only two participants) so  
177 that no party can predetermine the value of the keying material independent of any other party's  
178 contribution. For key-transport, one party (the sender) selects a value for the secret keying material  
179 and then securely distributes that value to one or more other parties (the receiver(s)).

180 **Approved** methods for generating the asymmetric key pairs used by **approved** key-establishment  
181 schemes between two parties are specified in [SP 800-56A](#) (for schemes that use finite-field or  
182 elliptic-curve cryptography) and [SP 800-56B](#) (for schemes that use integer-factorization  
183 cryptography, such as RSA).

184 Values of  $B$ , computed as shown in [Section 4](#), **shall** be used to provide the random values<sup>19</sup> needed  
185 to generate key pairs for the finite field or elliptic curve schemes in [SP 800-56A](#) or to generate key  
186 pairs for the integer-factorization schemes specified in [SP 800-56B](#). The maximum security  
187 strength that can be supported by the **approved** key-establishment schemes and the key sizes used  
188 by these schemes is provided in [SP 800-57, Part 1](#).

### 189 **5.3 Distributing the Key Pairs**

190 A general discussion of the distribution of asymmetric key pairs is provided in [SP 800-57, Part 1](#).  
191 Key pairs may either be static or ephemeral. Static key pairs are intended to be used multiple times;  
192 ephemeral keys are usually used only once.

193 The private key of a key pair **shall** be kept secret. It **shall** either be generated 1) within the key-  
194 pair owner's cryptographic module (i.e., the key-pair owner's key-generating module) or 2) within  
195 the cryptographic module of an entity trusted by the key-pair owner and any relying party not to  
196 misuse the private key or reveal it to other entities (i.e., the key pair is generated within the key-  
197 generating module of a Trusted Party and securely transferred to the key-pair owner's  
198 cryptographic module).

199 If a private key is ever output from a cryptographic module, the key **shall** be output and transferred  
200 in a form and manner that provides appropriate assurance<sup>20</sup> of its confidentiality and integrity (e.g.,  
201 using manual methods and multi-party control procedures or automated key-transport methods).  
202 The protection **shall** provide appropriate assurance that only the key-pair owner and/or the party  
203 that generated the key pair will be able to determine the value of the plaintext private key (e.g., the  
204 confidentiality and integrity protection for the private key uses a cryptographic mechanism that is  
205 at least as strong as the (maximum) security strength that must be supported by the asymmetric-  
206 key algorithm that will use the private key).

207 The public key of a key pair may be made public. However, it **shall** be distributed and verified in  
208 a manner that assures its integrity and association with the key-pair owner (e.g., in the case of a  
209 static public key, this may be accomplished using an X.509 certificate that provides a level of  
210 cryptographic protection that is at least as strong as the security strength associated with the key  
211 pair).

### 212 **5.4 Key Pair Replacement**

213 Key pairs need to be replaced if the private key is compromised. Key pairs also need to be replaced  
214 occasionally to limit the amount of information that is protected by the key pair in case of a  
215 compromise of the private key (see Section 5.3 of [SP 800-57, Part 1](#)). Section 5.3.4 of SP 800-57,

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<sup>19</sup> Note that in Section 4, if  $V$  is all zeroes, then  $B$  (the random value) is the output of an RBG.

<sup>20</sup> The term "provide appropriate assurance" is used to allow various methods for the input and output of cryptographic keys to/from cryptographic modules that may be implemented at different security levels (see [FIPS 140](#) and Section 7.7 of the [FIPS 140 IG](#)).

- 216 Part 1 discusses the usage period for each key of the key pair for both digital signature and key-  
217 establishment key pairs.
- 218 When asymmetric key pairs need to be replaced, they **shall** be generated and distributed as  
219 specified in Sections [5.1](#), [5.2](#), or [5.3](#), as appropriate.



## 220 **6 Generation of Keys for Symmetric-Key Algorithms**

221 Symmetric-key algorithms use the same (secret) key to both apply cryptographic protection to  
222 information<sup>21</sup> and to remove or verify the protection.<sup>22</sup> Keys used with symmetric-key algorithms  
223 must be known by only the entities authorized to apply, remove, or verify the protection and are  
224 commonly known as secret keys. A secret key is often known by multiple entities that are said to  
225 share or own the secret key, although it is not uncommon for a key to be generated, owned, and  
226 used by a single entity (e.g., for secure storage). A secret key **shall** be generated by:

- 227 • One or more of the entities that will share the key, or
- 228 • A Trusted Party that provides the key to the intended sharing entities in a secure manner.  
229 The Trusted Party must be trusted (by all entities that will share the key) not to disclose  
230 the key to unauthorized parties or otherwise misuse the key (see [SP 800-71](#)<sup>23</sup>).

231 A symmetric key  $K$  could be used, for example, to:

- 232 • Encrypt and decrypt data in an appropriate mode (e.g., using AES in the CTR mode, as  
233 specified in [FIPS 197](#) and [SP 800-38A](#)),
- 234 • Generate Message Authentication Codes (e.g., using AES in the CMAC mode, as  
235 specified in [FIPS 197](#) and [SP 800-38B](#); HMAC, as specified in [FIPS 198](#); or KMAC, as  
236 specified in [SP 800-185](#)), or
- 237 • Derive additional keys using a key-derivation function specified in [SP 800-108](#), where  $K$   
238 is the pre-shared (i.e., pre-existing) key that is used as the key-derivation key (e.g.,  $K$  could  
239 be a value of  $B$  generated as specified in [Section 4](#)).

240 [Section 6.1](#) discusses the generation of symmetric keys that are obtained from the output of an  
241 RBG. [Section 6.2](#) discusses the derivation of symmetric keys. [Section 6.3](#) specifies **approved**  
242 techniques for combining a symmetric key with other symmetric keys and/or additional data.

243 At some point, a symmetric key needs to be replaced for a number of possible reasons (e.g., its  
244 cryptoperiod has been exceeded, or it has been compromised; see [SP 800-57 Part 1](#)). [Section 6.4](#)  
245 discusses key replacement.

### 246 **6.1 The “Direct Generation” of Symmetric Keys**

247 Symmetric keys that are to be directly generated from the output of an RBG **shall** be generated as  
248 specified in [Section 4](#), where  $B$  is used as the desired key  $K$ . The length of the key to be generated  
249 depends on the length requirement of the application or algorithm with which the key is used and  
250 the security strength to be supported. See [SP 800-57, Part 1](#) for discussions on key lengths and the  
251 (maximum) security strengths supported by symmetric-key algorithms and their keys.

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<sup>21</sup> For example, transform plaintext data into ciphertext data using an encryption operation, or compute a message authentication code (MAC).

<sup>22</sup> For example, remove the protection by transforming the ciphertext data back to the original plaintext data using a decryption operation, or verify the protection by computing a message authentication code and comparing the newly computed MAC with a received MAC.

<sup>23</sup> SP 800-71, *Recommendation for Key Establishment Using Symmetric Block Ciphers*.



## 252 6.2 Derivation of Symmetric Keys

253 Symmetric keys are often obtained from the output of an **approved** key-derivation method  
254 (KDM), which is a cryptographic process specifically designed to transform secret input values  
255 into bit strings that can be parsed into cryptographic keys and/or other secret keying material.

256 **Approved** KDMs have been constructed from more basic cryptographic components, such as an  
257 **approved** hash function, as specified in [FIPS 180](#) or [FIPS 202](#); HMAC (using an **approved** hash  
258 function), as specified in [FIPS 198](#); AES-CMAC, as specified in [FIPS 197](#) and [SP 800-38B](#); or a  
259 KMAC variant, as specified in [SP 800-185](#).

260 Depending on the application and the KDM, the input to a KDM may include, for example, one  
261 or more of the following:

- 262 • A shared secret value produced during the execution of a key-agreement scheme;
- 263 • A cryptographic key (i.e., a key-derivation key (KDK));
- 264 • A password or passphrase;
- 265 • A salt value, which may be secret or non-secret, fixed, or randomly selected;
- 266 • A nonce (including RBG output) that may, for example, indicate the algorithm to be  
267 associated with the key (e.g., AES), the use of the key (e.g., email), or any other  
268 information that may be useful for associating a particular execution of the KDM with the  
269 key(s) to be derived.

270 **Approved** key-derivation methods can be divided into two categories:

- 271 1) The first category consists of one-step key-derivation methods, which are usually called  
272 key-derivation functions (KDFs). General-purpose KDFs are based on pseudorandom  
273 functions (PRFs) that use a KDK (and other input) to generate additional keys (see [SP 800-  
274 108](#)). Some special-purpose KDFs, which are employed only as components of key-  
275 agreement schemes, are used to obtain keying material from the shared secrets produced  
276 during the execution of such schemes (see [SP 800-56C](#) and [SP 800-135](#)); other special-  
277 purpose KDFs are to be used only for password-based protection of stored data and/or the  
278 keys that protect that data (see [SP 800-132](#)).
- 279 2) The second category consists of extraction-then-expansion key-derivation procedures that  
280 involve two steps:
  - 281 a. Randomness extraction to obtain a single cryptographic key-derivation key. The  
282 extraction of a KDK from a shared secret produced during the execution of a key-  
283 agreement scheme is described in [SP 800-56C](#). The HMAC-based extraction of a  
284 symmetric key from the concatenation of pre-existing symmetric keys (and,  
285 perhaps, other data) is described in [Section 6.3](#) (along with other methods of  
286 combining preexisting keys to form a new key). The key resulting from a key-  
287 extraction process can be used as a KDK for key expansion.

- 288           b. Key expansion to derive keying material from 1) the key-derivation key produced  
289           during randomness extraction and 2) other information, as specified in [SP 800-](#)  
290           [56C](#)<sup>24</sup> and [SP 800-108](#).

## 291 **6.2.1 Symmetric Keys Generated Using Key-Agreement Schemes**

292 When an **approved** key-agreement scheme is available within an entity's key-generating module,  
293 a symmetric key may be established with another entity that has the same capability. This process  
294 results in a symmetric key that is shared between the two entities participating in the key-  
295 agreement transaction.

296 [SP 800-56A](#) and [SP 800-56B](#) provide several methods for pairwise key agreement. Asymmetric  
297 key-agreement keys are used with a key-agreement primitive algorithm to generate a shared secret.  
298 The shared secret is provided to a key-derivation method to derive keying material. [SP 800-56C](#)  
299 specifies **approved** key-derivation methods for the key-agreement schemes in SP 800-56A and  
300 SP 800-56B.

301 The maximum security strength that can be supported by a key derived in this manner is dependent  
302 on: 1) the security strength supported by the asymmetric key pairs (as used during key  
303 establishment), 2) the key-derivation method used, 3) the length of the derived key, and 4) the  
304 algorithm with which the derived key will be used. See [SP 800-57, Part 1](#).

## 305 **6.2.2 Symmetric Keys Derived from a Pre-existing Key**

306 Symmetric keys are often derived using a key-derivation function (KDF) and a preexisting key  
307 known as a key-derivation key. For example, the preexisting key may have been:

- 308       • Generated from an **approved** RBG (see [Section 4](#)) and distributed as specified in [Section](#)  
309       [6.4](#);
- 310       • Agreed upon using a key-agreement scheme (see [Section 6.2.1](#));
- 311       • Derived using a KDF and a (different) preexisting key as specified in [SP 800-108](#); or
- 312       • The concatenation of multiple cryptographic keys (and, perhaps, other data) as described  
313       in [Section 6.3](#).

314 **Approved** methods for key derivation are provided in [SP 800-108](#), which specifies **approved**  
315 KDFs for deriving keys from a pre-shared (i.e., preexisting) key-derivation key. The KDFs are  
316 based on HMAC (as specified in [FIPS 198](#)) and CMAC (as specified in [SP 800-38B](#)).

317 If the derived keys need to be distributed to other entities, this may be accomplished as discussed  
318 in [Section 6.4](#).

319 In addition to the symmetric-key algorithm with which a derived key will be used, the security  
320 strength that can be supported by the derived key depends on the security strength supported by  
321 the key-derivation key and the KDF used (see [SP 800-57, Part 1](#) for the maximum security strength

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<sup>24</sup> When the two-step key-derivation method is used by a key-establishment scheme.

322 that can be supported by HMAC and CMAC, and see [SP 800-107<sup>25</sup>](#) for further discussions about  
323 the security strength of HMAC).

### 324 **6.2.3 Symmetric Keys Derived from Passwords**

325 In a number of popular applications, keys are generated from passwords. This is a questionable  
326 practice since passwords are usually selected using methods that provide very little entropy (i.e.,  
327 randomness) and are, therefore, easily guessed. However, **approved** methods for deriving keys  
328 from passwords for storage applications<sup>26</sup> are provided in [SP 800-132](#). For these applications, users  
329 are strongly advised to select passwords using methods that provide a very large amount of  
330 entropy.

331 When a key is generated from a password, the entropy provided (and thus, the maximum security  
332 strength that can be supported by the generated key) **shall** be considered to be zero unless the  
333 password is generated using an **approved** RBG. In this case, the security strength that can be  
334 supported by the password (*password\_strength*) is no greater than the minimum of the security  
335 strength supported by the RBG (*RBG\_strength*) and the actual number of bits of RBG output  
336 (*RBG\_outlen*) used in the password. That is,  $password\_strength \leq \min(RBG\_strength, RBG\_outlen)$ .  
337

### 338 **6.3 Symmetric Keys Produced by Combining (Multiple) Keys and Other Data**

339 When symmetric keys  $K_1, \dots, K_n$  are generated and/or established independently, they may be  
340 combined within a key-generating module to form a key  $K$ . Other items of data ( $D_1, \dots, D_m$ ) can  
341 also be combined with the  $K_i$  to form  $K$  under the conditions specified below. Note that while the  
342  $K_i$  values are required to be secret, the  $D_i$  values need not be kept secret.

343 The component symmetric keys **shall** be generated and/or established independently (and  
344 subsequently protected as necessary) using **approved** methods<sup>27</sup> that support a security strength  
345 that is equal to or greater than the targeted security strength of the algorithm or application that  
346 will rely on the output key  $K$ . Each component key **shall** be kept secret and **shall not** be used for  
347 any purpose other than the computation of a specific symmetric key  $K$  (i.e., a given component  
348 key **shall not** be used to generate more than one key).

349 The independent generation/establishment of the component keys  $K_1, \dots, K_n$  is interpreted in a  
350 computational and a statistical sense; that is, the computation of any particular  $K_i$  value does not  
351 depend on any one or more of the other  $K_i$  values, and it is not feasible to use knowledge of any  
352 proper subset of the  $K_i$  values to obtain any information about the remaining  $K_i$  values.

353 When their use is permitted,  $D_1, \dots, D_m$  **shall** be generated or obtained using methods that ensure  
354 their independence from the values of the component keys  $K_1, \dots, K_n$ .

355 The required independence of the component keys from these other items of data is also interpreted  
356 in a computational and a statistical sense. This means that the computation of the  $K_i$  values does  
357 not depend on any of the  $D_j$  values, the computation of the  $D_j$  values does not depend on any of

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<sup>25</sup> SP 800-107, *Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms*.

<sup>26</sup> For example, inside a FIPS 140-validated cryptographic module.

<sup>27</sup> See Sections 4, 6.1, and 6.2.

358 the  $K_i$  values, and knowledge of the  $D_j$  values yields no information that can feasibly be used to  
 359 gain insight into the  $K_i$  values. In cases where some (or all) of the  $D_j$  values are secret and the rest  
 360 of the  $D_j$  values (if any) are public, “independence” also means that knowledge of the  $K_i$  values  
 361 and public  $D_j$  values yields no information that can feasibly be used to gain insight into the secret  
 362  $D_j$  values.

363 Let  $K_1, \dots, K_n$  be the  $n$  component keys to be combined to form  $K$ . For each  $K_i$  (where  $i = 1$  to  $n$ ),  
 364 let  $ss\_M_i$  be the maximum security strength that can be supported by the combination of method(s)  
 365 used to generate  $K_i$  and the method(s) used to protect it after generation (e.g., during key transport  
 366 and/or storage). In particular, assume that an adversary capable of exerting an effort on the order  
 367 of  $2^{ss\_M_i}$  “basic operations” of some sort will be able to compromise those methods and obtain the  
 368 value of  $K_i$ .

369 The **approved** methods for combining the component keys and other data are:

370 1. Concatenating two or more keys, i.e.,

$$371 \quad K = K_1 \parallel \dots \parallel K_n.$$

372 Notes:

- 373 a. This method requires  $n \geq 2$ .
- 374 b. The sum of the bit lengths of the  $n$  component keys **shall** be equal to  $kLen$ , the  
 375 required bit length for  $K$ .
- 376 c. The methods used to generate or establish the component keys **shall** be such that  
 377 the sum of the min-entropies provided by those methods is equal to or greater than  
 378 the min-entropy required for the resulting key  $K$ .

379 2. Exclusive-Oring one or more symmetric keys and possibly one or more other items of data,  
 380 i.e.,

$$381 \quad K = K_1 \oplus \dots \oplus K_n \oplus D_1 \oplus \dots \oplus D_m.$$

382 Notes:

- 383 a. The length of each component key ( $K_i$ ) and the length of each  $D_i$  **shall** be equal to  
 384  $kLen$ , the required bit length of  $K$ .

385 This method requires  $m \geq 0$ ,  $n \geq 1$  and  $n + m \geq 2$ .

386 • If  $m = 0$ , then  $D_1 \oplus \dots \oplus D_m$  is an all-zero bit string of bit length  $kLen$ .

387 • If  $m = 1$ , then  $D_1 \oplus \dots \oplus D_m$  is just  $D_1$ .

388 • If  $n = 1$ , then  $K_1 \oplus \dots \oplus K_n$  is just  $K_1$  and  $D_1 \oplus \dots \oplus D_m$  **shall** be a non-zero  
 389 bit string (in particular,  $m$  **shall** be at least 1 in this case).

- 390 b. The methods used to generate or establish the component keys **shall** be such that at  
 391 least one of those methods provides min-entropy equal to or greater than the min-  
 392 entropy required for the resulting key  $K$ .

393 3. A key-extraction process, i.e.,

394 
$$K = T(\text{HMAC-hash}(\text{salt}, K_1 \parallel \dots \parallel K_n \parallel D_1 \parallel \dots \parallel D_m), kLen).$$

395 Notes:

- 396 a. HMAC-*hash* **shall** be an implementation of HMAC (as specified in [FIPS 198](#), using  
397 an **approved** hash function *hash*) with a security strength that meets or exceeds the  
398 targeted security strength of the algorithm or application that will rely on the  
399 resulting key  $K$  (see [SP 800-57, part 1](#)).
- 400 b. The *salt* is a secret or non-secret value used as the HMAC key and must be known  
401 by all entities using this key-extraction process to obtain the same value of  $K$ .
- 402 c. This method requires  $n \geq 1$ . If  $n = 1$ , then  $K_1 \parallel \dots \parallel K_n$  is just  $K_1$ .
- 403 d. This method requires  $m \geq 0$ . If  $m = 0$ , then  $D_1 \parallel \dots \parallel D_m$  is a null string;  
404 if  $m = 1$ , then  $D_1 \parallel \dots \parallel D_m$  is just  $D_1$ .
- 405 e.  $T$  is the truncation function defined in [Section 2.3](#).
- 406 f. The length of the output block of the hash function used with HMAC **shall** be at  
407 least  $kLen$  bits, the required bit length for  $K$ .
- 408 g. The methods used to generate or establish the component keys **shall** be such that  
409 the sum of the min-entropies provided by those methods is equal to or greater than  
410 the min-entropy required for the output  $K$ ; the sum of the min-entropies provided  
411 by those methods **should** be equal to or greater than twice the min-entropy required  
412 for the resulting key  $K$ .
- 413 h. Alternative orderings are permitted when forming the concatenation of keys and  
414 data (including interleaving the keys and data), but the ordering must be known by  
415 all entities computing the value of  $K$ .
- 416 i. The security strength of the key formed from combining multiple keys and data is  
417 subject to the considerations discussed in [Section 3.3](#).

#### 418 **6.4 Distributing Symmetric Keys**

419 The symmetric key generated within a key-generating module often needs to be shared with one  
420 or more other entities that have their own cryptographic modules. The key may be distributed  
421 manually or using an **approved** key-transport or symmetric key-wrapping method (see [SP 800-  
422 56B](#), [SP 800-38F](#), and [SP 800-71](#)). See [SP 800-57, Part 1](#) for further discussion. The method used  
423 for key transport or key wrapping **shall** support the desired security strength needed to protect the  
424 target data (i.e., the data to be protected by the application or algorithm relying on the symmetric  
425 key). The requirements for the output of a key from a cryptographic module are discussed in [FIPS  
426 140](#).

#### 427 **6.5 Replacement of Symmetric Keys**

428 Sometimes, a symmetric key may need to be replaced. This may be due to a compromise of the  
429 key or the end of the key's cryptoperiod (see [SP 800-57, Part 1](#)). Replacement **shall** be  
430 accomplished through a rekeying process. Rekeying is the replacement of a key with a new key  
431 that is generated independent of the value of the old key (i.e., knowledge of the old key provides

432 no knowledge of the value of the replaced key and vice versa).

433 When a compromised key is replaced, the new key **shall** be generated in a manner that provides  
434 assurance of its independence from the compromised key. The new key may be generated using  
435 any appropriate method in [Section 6](#) with the following restrictions:

436 1. The method used **shall** provide assurance that there is no feasibly detectable relationship  
437 between the new key and the compromised key. To that end, the new key **shall not** be  
438 derived or updated using the compromised key.

439 2. If the compromised key was generated in a manner that depended (in whole or in part) on  
440 a password (see Sections [6.2.3](#)), then that password **shall** be changed prior to the generation  
441 of any new key; in particular, the new key(s) **shall** be generated in a manner that is  
442 independent of the old password value.

443 If an uncompromised symmetric key is to be replaced, it **shall** be replaced using any method in  
444 [Section 6](#) that supports the required amount of security strength. However, if the key to be replaced  
445 was generated in a manner that depended (in whole or in part) on a password (see Sections [6.2.3](#)),  
446 that password **shall** be changed prior to the generation of the new key.

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## 564 **Appendix A: Revisions**

565 A revision was made in 2019 with the following changes:

- 566 1. General: The Authority section (old Section 2) has been moved into the boilerplate (see  
567 page iii). This resulted in a renumbering of the sections in the document.
- 568 2. Footnotes have been added to define each document when first mentioned.
- 569 3. Section 2.1: Changes made to *cryptographic boundary*, *entropy*, *key-pair owner*, *key*  
570 *transport*, *key wrapping*, *rekey*, *shared secret* and *target data*.  
571 Added: *entity authentication*, *KMAC*.  
572 Removed: *full-entropy*, *key update*, and *non-repudiation*.
- 573 4. Section 2.2: Added *KMAC* and *DSA*.  
574 Removed: *DLC* and *IFC*.
- 575 5. Section 3.3, para. 2, last line: Changed the reference to SP 800-90A instead of SP 800-90.  
576 Last para.: The example has been expanded.
- 577 6. Section 4, para. 1, line 3: Removed the references to FIPS 186-2, X9.31, and X9.62 since  
578 the use of these RBGs is no longer allowed (see SP 800-131A).
- 579 7. Section 5: Rewrote the text and inserted guidance on handling a key pair after generation.
- 580 8. Section 5.1, para. 1, lines 1-2: Inserted entity authentication.
- 581 9. Section 5.3: Rewrote the text.  
582 Para. 3, lines 3-4: Inserted a parenthetical example.
- 583 10. Section 5.4: Added a new section on key replacement.
- 584 11. Section 6, bullet 2: Inserted a reference to SP 800-71.  
585 Bullet 4: Added KMAC, as specified in SP 800-185. Also added text introducing the  
586 remainder of Section 6.
- 587 12. Section 6.2, line 4: Inserted a reference to SP 800-71 and removed a reference to SP 800-  
588 56A.
- 589 13. Section 6.3: Removed the figure and some of the associated text.  
590 Last paragraph: Removed the last four lines.
- 591 14. Section 6.6: Enlarged the subscripts for easier reading.
- 592 15. Section 6.7: The first paragraph was rewritten.
- 593 16. Appendix A: Updated the References.

594 Revision 2 was made in 2020:

- 595 1. Section 2.1: Added definitions for key-derivation function, key-derivation method, key-  
596 derivation procedure, key expansion, key extraction, key-wrapping key, MAC key,

- 597 message authentication code, nonce, randomness extraction, Recommendation, salt and  
598 security function.
- 599 Modified: Cryptographic key and support a security strength.
- 600 2. Section 2.3: Added  $B$ ,  $bLen$ ,  $K$ ,  $kLen$ , the max function, and  $ss\_M_i$ . Modified the truncation  
601 function.
- 602 3. Section 3.2: : “FIPS 140-**approved**” was changed to “FIPS 140-validate” (twice).
- 603 4. Section 3.3, last line: “reduced because of” has been changed to “determined by.”
- 604 5. Section 4: Modified formula (1) to include additional uses for the resulting bit string, now  
605 referring to it as  $B$  rather  $K$ . Modified many of the paragraphs for additional clarity.
- 606 6. Section 5.1: Revised paragraphs 2 and 3 for further clarity and accuracy.
- 607 7. Section 6: Added a 4<sup>th</sup> bullet about deriving a key during key agreement using a two-step  
608 procedure.
- 609 8. Section 6.1: Revised the first paragraph.
- 610 9. Section 6.2: Combined Sections 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 of the previous version to address key  
611 derivation. Old Section 6.3 is now Section 6.2.1; old Section 6.4 is now Section 6.2.2; and  
612 old Section 6.5 is now Section 6.2.3.
- 613 Section 6.2 is now an introductory section for key derivation that includes a list of inputs  
614 that could be used for key derivation and a discussion of key-derivation methods.
- 615 10. New Section 6.3 (old Section 6.6) on combining multiple keys:
- 616 a. The notation for the other data items has been changed from  $V_i$  to  $D_i$  to avoid a conflict  
617 with the use of  $V_i$  in Section 3.4.
- 618 b. Additional discussion on combining key components has been added.
- 619 c. Methods 2 and 3 from the previous version have been combined into the new Method  
620 2.
- 621 d. A new method using HMAC has been added as (a new) Method 3.
- 622 e. Guidance for using each method has been further clarified.
- 623 11. New Section 6.4: Moved from the old Section 6.2.
- 624 12. References are now an independent section instead of an Appendix.
- 625 13. References: FIPS 202 has been added.
- 626 14. Appendix B was renamed as Appendix A.