Withdrawn Draft

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104 105

106	Reports on Computer Systems Technology
107	
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109	Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical
110	leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test
111	methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance
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115	Federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL's research,
116	guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities
117	with industry, government, and academic organizations.
118 119	Abstract
119	ADSIIdCI
120	Mabile devices were initially reasonal consumer communication devices but they are new
121	Mobile devices were initially personal consumer communication devices but they are now permanent fixtures in enterprises and are used to access modern networks and systems to process
122	sensitive data. This publication assists organizations in managing and securing these devices by
123	describing available technologies and strategies. Security concerns inherent to the usage of
124	mobile devices are explored alongside mitigations and countermeasures. Recommendations are
125	provided for deployment, use and disposal of devices throughout the mobile-device lifecycle.
120	The scope of this publication includes mobile devices, centralized device management and
127	endpoint protection technologies, while including both organization-provided and personally
128	owned deployment scenarios.
12)	owned deployment scenarios.
130	Keywords
131	•
132	enterprise mobility management (EMM); mobile; mobile device management (MDM); mobile
133	security; smartphones; tablets.
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166 on its behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the

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168 the transferee, and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of

169 future transfers with the goal of binding each successor-in-interest.

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173 Executive Summary

174 Modern mobile devices, which are essentially general-purpose computing platforms capable of 175 performing tasks far beyond the voice and text capabilities of legacy mobile devices, are 176 widespread within modern enterprise networks. Mobility has transformed how enterprises deliver information technology (IT) services and ensure mission impact. Targeted toward 177 178 consumers for on-demand personal access to communications, information, and services, these 179 devices are not configured by default for business use. As mobile devices perform everyday 180 enterprise tasks, they regularly process, modify, and store sensitive data. While organizations 181 understand that using mobile devices and mobile applications for anytime, anywhere access can 182 increase employee productivity, enhance decision making and situational awareness, they may 183 also consider that these devices bring unique threats to the enterprise. 184 185 While consumers and enterprise organizations have increased their adoption and use of mobile 186 technologies, the mobile threat landscape has also shifted. This includes an increase in mobile 187 malware and vulnerabilities that span the device (e.g., operating system, firmware, the baseband

188 processor used to access cellular networks), mobile apps, networks, and management

189 infrastructure. The diversity and complexity of the mobile ecosystem and the rapid pace of

190 change offers challenges to selection, integration, and management of mobile technologies into

an enterprise IT environment. To reduce risk to sensitive data and systems, federal enterprises

need to institute the appropriate policies and infrastructure to manage and secure mobile devices,

- 193 applications, content, and access.
- 194

195 Mobile devices often need additional protections as a result of their portability, small size, and

196 common use outside of an organization's network, which generally places them at higher

197 exposure to threats than other endpoint devices. Laptops are excluded from the scope of this

- 198 publication. Although some laptop/desktop management technologies are converging with
- mobile device management technologies, the security capabilities currently available for laptops
- are different than those available for smartphones, tablets, and other mobile device types.
- Further, mobile devices contain features not generally available in laptops (e.g., multiple wireless
- network interfaces, Global Positioning System, numerous sensors, and built-in mobile apps).
- 203 Devices with minimal computing capability, such as the most basic cell phones and general
- Internet of Things (IoT) devices are also out of scope because they typically do not have a fullfledged operating system (OS), and limited functionality and limited security options are
- fledged operating system (OS), and limited functionality and limited security options are available.
- 200
- Organizations should implement the following guidelines to improve the security of their mobiledevices.

Organizations should conduct a threat analysis for mobile devices and any information systems accessed from mobile devices.

- 212 Before designing and deploying mobile device solutions, organizations should conduct a threat
- assessment for managing and using mobile devices and mobile apps to access and process
- sensitive data. Threat modeling involves identifying resources of interest and the feasible threats,
- 215 vulnerabilities, and security controls related to these resources, quantifying the likelihood of
- 216 successful attacks and their impacts, and then synthesizing this information to determine where

- 217 security controls need to be improved or added to mitigate the threats. General security
- 218 recommendations for any IT technology are provided in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53,
- 219 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations [1]. Specific
- 220 controls for securing mobile devices are presented in an appendix of this publication.
- 221
- 222 Threat models such as NIST's Mobile Threat Catalogue [5] and its associated NIST Interagency
- 223 Report (NISTIR) 8144, Assessing Threats to Mobile Devices & Infrastructure [6] used in
- 224 conjunction with a threat modeling process such as draft NIST SP 800-154, Guide to Data-
- 225 *Centric System Threat Modeling* [48] can help organizations identify security requirements and
- 226 design mobile device solutions to incorporate the necessary controls to meet the security
- 227 requirements. See also the Department of Homeland Security's Congressional report, Study on
- 228 Mobile Device Security [23], for additional threat information on mobile device security for
- 229 federal agencies.

230 Organizations should employ Enterprise Mobility Management, Mobile Threat Defense, 231 and other applicable enterprise mobile security technologies.

- 232 The reliance on mobile devices to access and process enterprise information requires a
- 233 comprehensive solution for mitigating threats to the organization's information and systems from
- 234 use of mobile devices. Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) systems are a suite of products
- 235 used to deploy, configure and actively manage mobile devices in an enterprise environment.
- 236 They are central to an enterprise mobile security solution and can be used to control the use of
- 237 both organization-issued and personally-owned mobile devices by enterprise users. In addition to
- 238 managing the configuration of mobile devices, these technologies offer other features, such as
- 239 controlling access to enterprise computing resources.
- 240
- 241 By integrating EMM with enterprise backend services such as authentication, an organization
- 242 can enable more granular management of mobile device access to mission-critical enterprise 243 resources. System administrators can set policy-based configurations for mobile devices to
- 244 constrain access to sensitive resources, depending on mobile device conditions (e.g., device
- 245
- connecting from a public WiFi network, jailbroken or rooted device, user-managed device 246 running a corporate application). EMM systems should be integrated with Mobile Threat
- 247 Defense (MTD) systems to protect the mobile endpoint. MTD systems can detect the presence of
- 248 malicious apps or operating system (OS) software, known vulnerabilities in software or
- 249 configurations, and connections to blacklisted websites/servers or networks. The integration of
- 250 MTD with EMM enables administrators or defense systems to remediate detected vulnerabilities
- 251 or quarantine applications or devices.
- 252
- 253 EMM systems can also be extended to provide Mobile Application Vetting (MAV) capabilities
- 254 using tools that perform enterprise-level security analysis of managed apps and their libraries
- 255 prior to deployment and throughout the lifecycle of the apps. Vulnerabilities or malicious code
- 256 discovered prior to deployment can be referred to the developer, or the app may be disallowed
- 257 for use on the organization's devices or within the enterprise mobile appstore. If vulnerabilities
- or malicious code are discovered after an app has been deployed or updated, the administrator is 258
- 259 informed and offered the option to deploy various EMM remediation actions.

Organizations should leverage the Enterprise Mobile Device Deployment Lifecycle where applicable.

- 262 Organizations may wish to consider a number of key steps in the deployment process of the
- 263 Enterprise Mobile Device Deployment Lifecyle before putting mobile devices in the hands of
- users or allowing users to access enterprise resources via a mobile device. The lifecycle contains
- 265 guidance on selecting a deployment model (e.g., enterprise use only, organization-managed with
- 266 personal use allowed, or bring your own device), device and EMM selection, conducting a risk
- assessment, and device and EMM configurations. Each step of the lifecycle discusses numerous
- security considerations—such as ensuring an accurate inventory of devices, selecting devices
- supported by the vendor for OS and app updates and patches, securely configuring devices,
- selecting an EMM and applying security policies to the device, verifying configuration each time
- the user attempts to access the network, and integrating EMM into existing identification,
- authentication and remote access infrastructure.

Organizations should implement and test a pilot of their mobile device solution before putting the solution into production.

- 275 Any new mobile device solution should be tested before use. This includes in a laboratory or test
- environment and subsequently with a small group of users. Aspects of the solution that should be
- 277 evaluated for each type of mobile device include connectivity, protection, authentication,
- 278 application functionality, solution management, logging and performance. The enterprise should
- 279 carefully consider whether the proposed solution meets the predetermined functional and
- technical requirements, alongside helping to meet stated policy and security objectives.

Organizations should fully secure each organization-issued mobile device before allowing a user to access the organization's systems or information.

- For newly deployed mobile devices, organizations should enroll and configure the device in an EMM solution. Baseline profiles are available in industry, but the precise profile to be deployed
- 284 EMM solution. Baseline profiles are available in industry, but the precise profile to be deployed 285 should be tailored based on an organization's needs and risk assessment. Commercial programs
- are available to simplify device enrollment and enforce security and configuration policies prior
- to provisioning; in-house programs can be leveraged to accomplish this task as well. This
- ensures a basic level of trust in the device before first use. For already-deployed, organization-
- issued mobile devices with an unknown security profile (e.g., unmanaged device), organizations
- should fully secure them to a known good state (for example, through deployment and use of
- 291 EMM technologies using the latest mobile OS). Supplemental security controls, such as MTD,
- 292 MAV, and Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies, should be deployed per results of mobile
- 293 device risk assessment.

294 Organizations should keep mobile operating systems and apps updated.

- As with any technology, vulnerabilities in mobile devices or OSs are discovered quite
- 296 often—particularly with broadly deployed devices or OSs. Attackers seeking to gain access to
- sensitive personal or business information will exploit vulnerabilities in the mobile OS, device
- firmware, or app. OS and firmware vendors produce security updates to fix the vulnerabilities,
- and app developers often produce mobile app patches and updates to fix known vulnerabilities.
- 300 Organizations can use EMM and mobile app management solutions to maintain an inventory of
- 301 their mobile devices, OSs, and deployed apps, enabling them to identify vulnerable mobile

- 302 devices. Organizations may have a vulnerability management system in place that allows them to
- 303 continuously check for these patches and updates and immediately apply them to the mobile 304 devices within their enterprise.
- 305

306 Organizations should regularly maintain mobile device security.

307

308 Organizations should perform periodic assessments to confirm that their mobile device policies,

- 309 processes and procedures are being followed. Assessment activities may be passive, such as
- reviewing device and management infrastructure (e.g., EMM) logs, or active, such as performing
- 311 vulnerability scans or penetration testing of the mobile management infrastructure. Operational 312 processes to maintain device security include checking for upgrades and patches and acquiring,
- 312 processes to maintain device security include checking for upgrades and patches and acquiring, 313 testing and deploying them; ensuring each mobile device infrastructure component has its clock
- synced to a common time source; verifying that device and infrastructure audit logs are collected
- and sent to the enterprise's security logging system; reconfiguring access control features as
- 316 needed; and detecting and documenting anomalies within the mobile device infrastructure,
- 317 including unauthorized configuration or policy changes to mobile devices. Additional
- 318 maintenance processes include keeping an active inventory of each mobile device, its user and its
- 319 apps; revoking access to or deleting installed apps that have subsequently been assessed as too
- 320 risky to use; and scrubbing sensitive data from mobile devices before reissuing them to new
- 321 users.
- 322

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414 **1.** Introduction

415 Mobile devices are no longer new to the workplace. Modern mobile devices are essentially general-416 purpose computing platforms capable of performing tasks far beyond the voice and text capabilities of 417 legacy mobile devices. Smartphones and tablets process enterprise information and are regularly included 418 in the design phase of modern network architectures. Multiple mature mobile operating systems are 419 available in the marketplace and have a variety of functionality to secure these devices in the workplace. 420 New mobile technologies for the enterprise are still being introduced. Full parity does not yet exist when 421 comparing the management technology available for traditional desktop environments and those afforded 422 to security professionals to secure their mobile devices – although they are constantly evolving and 423 maturing. 424

425 **1.1 Purpose**

426 The purpose of this publication is to assist organizations with managing and securing mobile devices.

- 427 This publication provides recommendations for selecting, implementing, and managing devices
- 428 throughout their lifecycle via centralized management technologies. Additionally, security concerns
- 429 inherent to mobile devices are explored alongside mitigation strategies. This approach includes protecting
- 430 enterprise information such as email, contacts and calendar, which are some of the most commonly used
- 431 applications in the workplace. This can be expanded to include protection of enterprise-developed and
- third-party applications, and the sensitive enterprise data they store and process. Recommendations also
- 433 are provided for deployment, use, and disposal of devices throughout the mobile device lifecycle. This 434 publication can be used to inform risk assessments, build threat models, enumerate the attack surface of
- 434 publication can be used to inform risk assessments, build threat models, enumerate the attack surface of 435 the mobile infrastructure, and identify mitigations for mobile deployments.

436 **1.2 Scope**

437 This publication is scoped to managing modern mobile devices in the enterprise. Mobile devices

- 438 primarily include smartphones and tablets, but also include other devices running a modern mobile
- 439 operating system (OS). Laptops are specifically excluded from the scope of this publication as the
- security controls available today for laptops are quite different than those available for smartphones,
- tablets and other mobile-device types. Mobile devices with minimal computing capability are excluded,
- including feature phones, wearables and other devices included under the Internet of Things (IoT)
- 443 umbrella. This document does not discuss the mechanisms needed to evaluate the security of mobile
- 444 applications [2] or those needed to securely deploy and maintain a cellular network [3]. Unique feature
- sets available in specialized areas (e.g., construction, public safety, medical) are not analyzed ordiscussed.

447 **1.3 Audience**

448 This document is intended for information security officers, information security engineers, security

449 analysts, system administrators, chief information officers (CIOs), and chief information security officers

- 450 (CISOs). Other organization personnel may find this document helpful, such as security managers,
- 451 engineers, analysts, administrators and others who are responsible for planning, implementing and
- 452 maintaining the security of mobile devices. It assumes that readers have a basic understanding of mobile
- 453 device technologies, networking, and enterprise security principles.

454 **1.4 Document Structure**

455 The remainder of this document is organized into the following sections and appendices:

456	•	Section 2 provides an overview of mobile devices, focused on what makes them different from
457		other computing devices, particularly in terms of security.
458	•	Section 3 discusses threats to enterprise use of mobile devices.
459	•	Section 4 presents an overview of mobile security technologies and discusses mitigations and
460		countermeasures to the threats listed in Section 3.
461	٠	Section 5 discusses security throughout the mobile device lifecycle. Examples of topics addressed
462		in this section include mobile device security policy creation, design and implementation
463		considerations, and operational processes that are particularly helpful for security.
464	•	The References section contains a list of references cited in this document.
465		
466	The do	cument also contains the following appendices with supporting material:
467		
468	•	Appendix A defines selected acronyms and abbreviations used in this publication.
469	•	Appendix B lists the major controls from NIST Special Publication 800-53, Security and Privacy
470	•	Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations and the subcategories from the
471		NIST Cybersecurity Framework that affect enterprise mobile device security.
472	1.5	Document Conventions
473	The fo	llowing conventions are used throughout this document:
474	•	Smartphone and appstore are both written as a single word,
475	•	The term app is used in place of mobile application, and
470	-	The term app is used in place of moone appreadon, and

WiFi is written without the hyphen. 476

477

Overview of Mobile Devices 479 2.

480 This section defines what a modern mobile device is, outlines characteristics of mobile devices, and 481 discusses their underlying architecture. Understanding the full composition of a mobile device is useful in

482 defining the threats facing these information systems. This section also provides an overview of the built-

483 in security capabilities such as isolation, communication and authentication mechanisms.

484 2.1 Mobile Device Definition

485 Mobile devices are essentially general-purpose computing platforms. They are not restricted to

486 performing one operation and can instead be used in many different domains—including medical, 487 industrial and entertainment. NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Revision 4 [1] defines a mobile 488 device as:

489

490 A portable computing device that: (i) has a small form factor such that it can easily be carried by a single

491 individual; (ii) is designed to operate without a physical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit or receive

492 information); (iii) possesses local, non-removable or removable data storage; and (iv) includes a self-493

contained power source. Mobile devices may also include voice communication capabilities, on-board 494 sensors that allow the devices to capture information, and/or built-in features for synchronizing local

495 data with remote locations.

496

497 This definition emphasizes portability, wireless communication, local storage and long battery life-all of

498 which exist in modern smartphones and tablets. It's common for these systems to have an always-on

499 cellular connection, but this feature is not shared by all mobile devices. In fact, many tablets lack a

500 cellular modem, yet still run a mobile OS. It also is not a requirement that mobile devices run applications

501 or *apps*, although this capability is commonplace. Applications are used to expand a mobile device's 502 basic functionality.

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504 2.2 **Mobile Device Characteristics**

505 Commercially available mobile devices lack a unified set of features. Each feature and characteristic has 506 the potential to introduce new threats to security and privacy, so it is important to establish a baseline 507 understanding of the set of characteristics that are common to mobile devices. The following list explores 508 the baseline characteristics of a mobile device for the purposes of this publication:

- 509 Operating system: A mobile device comes with a rich OS that can be used in a variety of ways. • 510 This is the primary distinction between mobile devices and IoT devices, which typically do not 511 have a full-fledged OS and have limited functionality.
- 512 Small form factor: The size of a mobile device allows for easy portability. •
- 513 Self-contained power source: Mobile devices traditionally house a self-contained power source. • 514
 - Some mobile devices are capable of swapping out their battery power source for another.
 - Physical port: A physical connection can be used to sync/transfer data or to charge the device. • Some phones have wireless charging capabilities.
- 517 Wireless network interface: Mobile devices have at least one wireless network interface for data • 518 communications, often offering connectivity to the internet or other data networks.
- 519 Data storage: Mobile devices contain local, built-in and non-removable data storage. •
- 520 Apps: A mobile device ships with native apps to handle common operations. Beyond native apps, 521 most mobile devices also support third-party apps, which usually add functionality and 522 significantly expand a device's utility.

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Management capability: Mobile devices include a consistent way to manage the device via MDM
 Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) or proprietary mechanisms.

525 The following details other common characteristics of mobile devices. These features do not define the 526 scope of devices included in the publication, but rather indicate features that are particularly important in 527 terms of security. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list:

- Network services: A mobile device may come with additional networking capabilities such as
 Bluetooth, near-field communications (NFC), and cellular data and voice (e.g., 4G LTE or 5G).
- Camera: Mobile devices may use one or more digital cameras that are capable of capturing photos
 and video recordings. Cameras also accept biometric input to unlock a device or can interpret non human readable data formats (e.g., Quick Response [QR] code).
 - Sensors: Sensors within a mobile device capture data to perform an operation such as authentication or measurement. Examples are: gyroscope, accelerometer, magnetometer, fingerprint reader, pedometer, infrared, barometer, photometer, and thermometer.
 - Speaker and/or microphone: A mobile device usually has a speaker that provides an audio output ability and/or a microphone that provides audio input ability.
- Removable media: Removable media allows for additional data and memory storage on a mobile
 device, normally provided through a secure digital (SD) card. Removable media also serves as a
 way to transport data from one mobile device to another device.
- Data synchronization: Mobile devices have built-in features for synchronizing local data with a
 different storage location (desktop or laptop computer, organization servers, telecommunications
 provider servers, other third-party servers, etc.)
 - Hardware-backed security module: A mobile device uses a hardware module or some portion of a hardware chip to perform cryptographic functions and store sensitive cryptographic keys and secrets.

548 **2.3 Mobile Device Components**


549 Multiple organizations work in concert to provide the hardware, firmware, software, and other technology 550 that make up a mobile device. For smartphones and tablets with cellular capabilities, a separation exists 551 between the hardware and firmware used to access cellular networks, and the hardware and firmware used 552 to operate the general-purpose mobile OS. Users and administrators generally interact with the general-553 purpose mobile OS that utilizes the application processor. The hardware and firmware used to access the 554 cellular network, often referred to as the *telephony subsystem*, typically runs a completely separate real-555 time operating system (RTOS). This telephony subsystem utilizes a completely separate System on a 556 Chip (SoC) called the *baseband processor*. This often means that a cellular-enabled smartphone is 557 concurrently running multiple OSs.

- 558 Other features of the telephony subsystem include the universal integrated circuit card (UICC),
- 559 international mobile equipment identifier (IMEI), and the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI).
- 560 The UICC, also known as the subscriber identity module (SIM) card, stores cryptographic information
- and personal data and is used to enable access to the cellular network. The IMEI is an identifier specific to a mobile device and is used to uniquely identify a device to the cellular network. The IMSI is used to
- 562 a mobile device and is used to unquery identify a device to the central network. The hvist is used to 563 uniquely identify a subscriber or user on the network. More information on these features can be found in
- 564 NIST SP 800-187, *Guide to LTE Security* [3].
- 565 A set of lower-level systems exist in the form of firmware to initialize the device and load the mobile OS
- 566 into memory, which includes the bootloader. This initialization firmware may also verify other device
- 567 initialization code, including device drivers. All of this activity occurs before a user can interact with the

- 568 device. If the initialization code is modified or tampered with, the device may not properly boot or may
- 569 function in a simplified mode. Many modern mobile devices contain an isolated execution environment,
- 570 which is used specifically for security-critical functions [6]. For example, these environments may be
- 571 used for sensitive cryptographic operations—e.g., to verify integrity—or to support Digital Rights
- 572 Management (DRM). These environments typically have access to some amount of secure storage that is
- 573 only accessible within that environment.

574 The mobile OS enables a rich set of functionality by supporting the use of mobile apps written by third-

- 575 party developers. Accordingly, it is common for mobile apps to be sandboxed (or securely separated) in
- 576 some manner to prevent unexpected unwanted interaction between the system, its apps and those apps'
- 577 respective data. This includes separating user data stored by different apps from interacting with each
- 578 other. Mobile apps may be written in a native language running close to the hardware, in interpreted 579 languages or in high-level web languages. The degree of functionality of mobile applications is highly
- 580 dependent upon the application programming interfaces (APIs) exposed by the mobile OS and the
- 581 frameworks used by the developer. Functionality is also dependent on the level of permissions granted to
- 582 allow the mobile app to leverage mobile device features, such as the camera or microphone.
- 583 This section has described the various technologies which work together to make a mobile device
- 584 function. Figure 1 illustrates a mental model of the previously discussed layers of a mobile device:



585


586

Figure 1 - Mobile Device Components

587 2.4 Mobile Communication Mechanisms

588 Mobile devices support a variety of wireless communication protocols such as cellular, WiFi, Bluetooth, 589 global positioning system (GPS) and NFC. Wired physical connections also are commonplace via a 590 power and synchronization cable using micro USB, USB-C and others. Figure 2 depicts some of the 591 communication mechanisms offered by mobile devices.

592



595

Figure 2 - Mobile Communications Technology

596 WiFi is a wireless local area network (WLAN) technology and is generally available on most mobile 597 devices. WiFi devices often connect via centralized wireless access point (AP) but can also work in a

598 device-to-device, *ad-hoc* mode. Bluetooth is a short-range wireless communication technology primarily

599 used to establish wireless personal area networks (WPANs). Bluetooth technology is common in 600

consumer mobile devices and can be used to communicate with headsets, wearables, keyboards, mice and 601 other IoT devices. Another form of short-range wireless communication is NFC, which typically is

602 optimized for distances of less than four inches but may be vulnerable at greater distances. NFC is based

603 on the radio frequency identification (RFID) set of standards. Mobile payment technology commonly

604 relies on NFC, which has led to a large increase of use in recent years.

605

606 A global navigational satellite system (GNSS) provides worldwide, geo-spatial positioning via GPS. GPS

607 uses line of sight communication with a satellite constellation in orbit to help a handset determine its 608 location. These systems run independently of cellular networks. The U.S. Federal Government operates a

609

GPS constellation, although mobile devices may use other constellations (e.g., Global Navigation 610 Satellite System [GLONASS], Galileo). The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) mandates

- 611 that cellular devices must have GPS built-in for public safety and emergency medical reasons. It should
- 612 be noted the GPS system is not the only way to identify a mobile device's location. Other techniques
- 613 include cellular positioning, WiFi-assisted positioning, and geolocation of IP addresses.
- 614

615 **3.** Threats to the Mobile Enterprise

616 Mobile devices support a series of security objectives, but these can differ based on the organization.

617 These mobile security objectives can be accomplished via a combination of security features built into,

618 installed onto, or managed externally to mobile devices. Achieving an organization's security objectives 619 often requires devices to be secured against a variety of threats. General security recommendations for

any IT technology are provided in NIST SP 800-53, *Recommended Security Controls for Federal*

621 *Information Systems and Organizations* [1]. Specific recommendations for securing mobile devices are

622 presented in Section 4.3 of this publication and are intended to complement the controls specified in SP

623 800-53. See Appendix C of this document for a summary of SP 800-53 controls tailored to mobile

624 enterprise security.

637

625 Before designing and deploying mobile device solutions, organizations should develop threat models for

all facets of mobile device usage. Threat modeling involves identifying resources of interest and the

627 feasible threats, vulnerabilities and security controls related to these resources; quantifying the likelihood

and impacts of successful attacks; and analyzing this information to determine where security controls

629 should be improved or added. Threat modeling helps organizations identify security requirements and

design the mobile device solution that incorporates the controls needed to meet the security requirements.

631 The NIST *Mobile Threat Catalogue* [5], a threat modeling process such as draft NIST SP 800-154, *Guide*

to Data-Centric System Threat Modeling [48], and the DHS Study on Mobile Device Security [23] can be

633 used as a foundation for beginning threat modeling activities. The threats listed in the following sections

are mapped to the corresponding threats from the NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue document.

635 **3.1** Threats to Enterprise Use of Mobile Devices

636 The following threats are related to the general use of mobile devices.

638 **3.1.1** Exploitation of Underlying Vulnerabilities in Devices

639 Software development is a complex discipline that creates the instruction set that powers mobile devices 640 and apps. In the case of typical software, errors and vulnerabilities exist at an estimated frequency of ~25 641 errors per 1000 lines of code [33]. There are many definitions for vulnerabilities, but this report leverages 642 the following definition [1]: "Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal 643 controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source." Software 644 vulnerabilities will exist at all levels of the mobile device stack. Due to the nature of how mobile devices 645 are developed and manufactured, multiple distinct organizations will contribute software and firmware to 646 the same device. The contributing organizations may or may not have robust software development 647 practices and processes in place. A vulnerability in the code from any of these vendors could potentially 648 compromise the device [25]. An example exploitation is using vulnerabilities in the voice assistance or 649 quick access features to bypass the lockscreen and gain unauthorized access to a mobile device.

650 NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference: STA-0 – STA-11

651 **3.1.2 Device Loss and Theft**

652 Mobile devices are used in a variety of locations outside an organization's control (e.g., building, office)

such as employee dwellings, coffee shops, hotels and taxis. Some organizations have strict rules around

mobile devices that state that they are only allowed to be used within an organization's perimeters. Yet

many organizations have multiple sites, so mobile devices are transported from building to building. The

656 portability of mobile devices makes them more likely to be lost or stolen than traditional desktop systems,

and the sensitive data on these devices adds an increased risk of compromise to the organization.

658 NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference: PHY-0

659 **3.1.3** Accessing Enterprise Resources via a Misconfigured Device

660 Similar to most other information systems, mobile devices can be misconfigured. The mobile OS contains 661 many security and privacy-relevant configuration options such as the use of a passcode, device 662 encryption, user tracking, and VPN. Unfortunately, not all security- and privacy-relevant settings are 663 located within the security options area of the mobile OS interface. Apps installed on the device also can 664 be configured, sometimes within the administrative area of the device, but also within the app itself. 665 Relevant configurations include authentication to the app, tracking users and the proper use of encryption. 666 Connecting an improperly configured device to an enterprise resource such as a networked drive could 667 lead to information exposure to entities monitoring the network or those improperly accessing the device 668 directly.

669 *NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference:* STA-8

670 3.1.4 Credential Theft via Phishing

671 Enterprise employees receive emails and text messages to their mobile devices on a daily basis.

672 Sometimes the authenticity of emails and texts can be difficult to determine. Often attackers attempt to

steal or request an employee's user credentials through an email or text message. An employee may be

tricked into believing the message is from a trusted source and provide their credentials or allow an

attacker unauthorized access to their mobile device by clicking a hyperlink within the email or text

- 676 message. These are examples of phishing on mobile devices.
- 677 NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference: AUT-9

678 **3.1.5** Installation of Unauthorized Certificates

Digital certificates are software cryptographic tokens used for authentication and signing software, among other things. These certificates can be distributed to devices through a variety of channels, including web browsers, physical connections (e.g., USB cable) and profiles similar to EMM profiles. Once a certificate is provided to a mobile device's certificate store, it can be used for authentication, and it also can be used for making trust-based decisions about apps by showing warnings to users. The presence of a malicious certificate could trick a user's device into trusting a phishing site or installing a fake phishing or Trojan application such as a banking app.

686 *NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference*: ECO-23

687 **3.1.6 Use of Untrusted Mobile Devices**

688 Many mobile devices—particularly those that are personally owned —are not inherently trustworthy.

689 There also is the frequent jailbreaking and rooting of devices, which bypasses built-in restrictions on

690 security, OS use, and other functions. Organizations should assume all mobile devices are untrusted 691 unless the organization has properly secured them and continuously monitors their security while the

692 devices are used to access enterprise apps or data. Untrusted devices are the riskiest mobile devices and

693 oftentimes have access to sensitive enterprise information, and are also the easiest to compromise.

694 *NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference*: STA-1

695 **3.1.7 Wireless Eavesdropping**

696 Because mobile devices primarily use non-enterprise networks for internet access, organizations typically

697 will have no control over the security of the external communications networks the devices access.

698 Communications media may include wireless systems such as Bluetooth, WiFi and cellular networks.

699 Bluetooth devices often are used to transmit audio information (e.g., voice traffic, music) as well as 700 notifications and health information from wearable devices [31]. WiFi and cellular can be used to transmi

- notifications and health information from wearable devices [31]. WiFi and cellular can be used to transmit multiple types of traffic, including voice and data. All these network protocols and media are susceptible
- 702 to eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks that can intercept and modify communications
- 703 between a device and an enterprise system [26].
- 704 *NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference:* CEL-0, CEL-6, CEL-18, LPN-2, LPN-16

705 **3.1.8 Mobile Malware**

706 Mobile devices are designed to make it easy for users to find, acquire, and install third-party apps offered

707 by appstores. This accessibility poses significant security risks, especially for mobile device platforms

and appstores that do not place security restrictions or other limitations on third-party app publishing.

709 Organizations should base their mobile device security policy on the assumption that all unknown third-

710 party apps downloaded by its employees to enterprise-accessible mobile devices are untrusted. Any

application installed onto a mobile device can act as a portal for the developer to compromise the device

- and access sensitive enterprise information.
- 713 NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference: APP-16, APP-26, APP-43, CEL-33, STA-15

714 **3.1.9** Information Loss Due to Insecure Lockscreen Configuration

715 The lockscreen is the first barrier an unauthorized user must pass to gain access to information stored on a

716 mobile device. The lockscreen can be configured with a numeric password or pattern to restrict access to

the device. If poorly protected with a simple password, the lockscreen may be breached through a brute-

force attack. An unauthorized user with access to a mobile device can access all sensitive information, modify the information and pretend to be the device's owner to gain further access to enterprise data.

⁷¹⁹ modify the information and pretend to be the device's owner to gain further access to enterprise data.

720 The lockscreen can also be configured to display quick access to notifications related to missed calls or

- messages, app alerts, emails received, etc. Information shown on the lockscreen, such as emails, may
- display sensitive enterprise information. These lockscreen notifications may provide an unauthorized user
- 723 with information without the need to unlock the mobile device.
- 724 *NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference:* AUT-1

725 3.1.10 User Privacy Violations

726 The collection and monitoring of user or employee data can greatly undermine an individual's personal

privacy. Many mobile devices and apps collect and monitor user data such as location, contacts, browsing
 history, and general system information. A common use of this information is for marketing purposes to

direct specific advertisements to the user. Mobile applications are not the only systems that collect user

729 information, as most of the business systems (e.g., EMM, MTD) used for mobility may also have this

room information, as most of the business systems (e.g., EMIN, MTD) used for mobility may also have this capability, meaning that an employer may collect sensitive information about an employee. Under the

731 Privacy Act of 1974, this type of data collection is allowed as long as the business publicly notifies users

of any data it has collected, including PII and other user information [38]. The collection of data without

- the user's consent hinders confidentiality and is a privacy violation because the collected data may be
- ran used in an unwanted manner without the user's knowledge.

One common privacy violation is user location tracking. Location services are commonly used by applications such as social media, navigation and weather apps, as well as web browsers. In terms of organization security and personal privacy, mobile devices with location services enabled are at increased risk of targeted attacks because it is easier for potential attackers to determine where the user and the mobile device are located and to correlate that information with other sources about who the user associates with and the kinds of activities he or she performs in a particular location. Although access to

- 742 location services can have positive cybersecurity impacts by enabling location-based policies and device
- configurations, this should require user consent accompanied by a thorough understanding of what type of
- 744 personal information an enterprise has access to.
- 745 *NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference:* APP-24, APP-36, EMM-7

746 **3.1.11 Data Loss via Synchronization**

747 Mobile devices may interact with other systems to perform data exchange, synchronization, and storage.

748 This can include both local or remote device syncing. Local synchronization generally involves

connecting a mobile device to a desktop or laptop computer wirelessly or via a cable. It can also involve

tethering such as using one mobile device to provide network access for another mobile device.¹

751 Remote system synchronization often involves automatic backups of data to a cloud-based storage

system. When all of these components are under the organization's control, risk is generally acceptable.

753 But often one or more of these components are external to the enterprise. Examples include connecting a

personally owned mobile device to an organization-issued laptop, connecting an organization-issued

mobile device to a personally owned laptop, connecting an organization-issued mobile device to a remote

756 photo backup service, and connecting a mobile device to an untrusted charging station. In all of these

757 scenarios, the organization's data is at risk of being stored in an unsecured location outside the

- organization's control. In these scenarios, transmission of malware from one device to another also is a
- 759 possibility.
- 760 *NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference:* EMM-9, STA-6

761 **3.1.12 Shadow IT Usage**

762 Organizations that implement a fully managed mobile device policy should be cognizant of the risks

associated with Shadow IT. The term "Shadow IT" typically denotes staff members' work-related use of

764 IT-related hardware, software or cloud services without the knowledge of the IT organization. The

canonical example of Shadow IT is a department that performs mission-critical work using an

independently purchased server running software that is not approved, managed or even known by the

- ⁷⁶⁷ larger IT organization. IT staff may not learn of the existence of this system until it fails or is breached,
- 768 jeopardizing the critical mission.
- 769 Staff members often resort to use of Shadow IT systems when enterprise-provided systems and processes
- are seen as cumbersome or impeding work, or when the enterprise fails to provide necessary systems. In
- the mobile systems environment, staff members may be motivated to use personal devices to circumvent
- restrictive mobile device policies implemented by full enterprise management of enterprise-provided

¹ Organizations should have policies regarding the use of tethering. If an organization permits tethering, it should ensure the network connections involving tethering are strongly protected (e.g., communications encryption). If an organization prohibits tethering, it should configure mobile devices to prevent tethering.

- mobile devices. Staff members may send work-related emails or documents to their personal email
- accounts to better enable access during travel, or they may take pictures of whiteboard drawings with the
- camera on their personal devices. Staff members may also be motivated to use Shadow IT when
 enterprise administration practices appear to invade their privacy (e.g., warnings that enterprise system
- administrators are permitted to monitor all communication from an enterprise-owned mobile phone).
- 778 Shadow IT systems do not comply with organizational requirements for enterprise control or
- documentation and may or may not violate security or reliability policies. In a few cases, a benefit arising
- 780 from Shadow IT is that some of the technologies, software, or systems become part of the future
- 781 enterprise due to their benefit in boosting productivity. Organizations should be aware of the potential
- threats from Shadow IT for which there is no single, complete solution (e.g., EMM technologies do not
- 783 completely address it), and should treat Shadow IT seriously.
- 784 NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference: N/A

785 **3.2** Threats to Device Management Systems

The following threats are related to the use of EMM and other systems used to manage and secure mobiledevices. More information describing EMMs can be found later in the document (Section 4.2.1).

788

789 **3.2.1** Exploitation of Vulnerabilities within the Underlying EMM Platform

EMM infrastructure and subsequent components run on top of commodity hardware, firmware and
software—all of which are susceptible to publicly known software and hardware flaws. Although
extensive customization of systems occurs, commodity hardware and well-known OSs should be
identified and understood. This guidance implies these systems be properly configured leveraging the
security configuration guides found in the NIST Checklists repository and regularly patched to remediate
known vulnerabilities such as those listed in the National Vulnerability Database [39].

- 796
- 797 NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference: EMM-1, EMM-2
- 798

799 **3.2.2 EMM Administrator Credential Theft**

800 Credential theft is a primary issue for employees, but the credentials of system administrators working the 801 EMM console can also be compromised. If attackers can log into the EMM as an administrator, there 802 could be a loss of sensitive information. For instance, EMMs store a variety of sensitive information 803 about employees at all levels of an organization. Examples include email addresses, phone numbers, user 804 names, assigned resources, levels of access, and potential metadata from voice and text communication. 805 Additionally, EMM administrator credentials allow an attacker to misconfigure and put mobile devices 806 into an insecure state by modifying the policies enforced on the devices. Finally, an attacker may also be 807 able to perform a denial of service (DoS) attack on an enterprise by removing enterprise access for all 808 mobile devices by erasing their records from the EMM.

- 809
- 810 NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference: EMM-2
- 811

812 **3.2.3** Insider Threat

813 An insider threat originates from an individual—for example, a current or former employee—who uses

- 814 authorized access to an organization's system to violate the organization's security policy. As an essential
- tool for secure mobile system administration, an EMM system may be a "double-edged sword." To wit, it
- 816 may be used both as a mechanism for protecting an enterprise from insider threats (e.g., to implement

- 817 practices focused on password and account management, access controls, system change controls and app
- 818 usage policies) as well as an attack vector for a malicious insider. A malicious insider with access to an
- 819 EMM system could weaken permissions to enable data leaks, enroll unauthorized devices or outsiders, or
- 820 whitelist malicious apps, among other inappropriate actions. The use of EMM systems and other mobile 821 device administration tools should be monitored carefully to detect possible malicious insider activities.
- 821 822
- 823 NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference: EMM-2

824 **3.2.4** Installation of Malicious Developer & EMM Profiles

- 825 Installation of EMM profiles enables an enterprise to control privileged operations provided by mobile 826 OSs. There are multiple ways mobile device users can be enrolled into the EMM and profiles distributed. 827 One of the most common is installing an EMM application—sometimes referred to as an MDM agent— 828 directly onto the mobile device. When this setup is completed, end-users can enter information unique to 829 their organization and authenticate to the EMM server. At this point, an EMM profile is presented to the 830 user. This profile contains specific permissions and other resources approved by administrators.
- 831
- 832 EMM profiles can be conveyed to a user from a variety of avenues such as email, text and drive-by
- 833 downloads. If a user accidentally accepts a malicious profile delivered via one of these methods,
- 834 privileged access could be provided to an attacker. Using this access, an attacker can leverage all
- 835 management APIs to access enterprise data on the device and possibly even information stored on
- 836 backend infrastructure run by the organization.
- 837 NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue Reference: EMM-3, STA-7
- 838

839 **Overview of Mobile Security Technologies** 4.

840 Mobile security technologies have evolved over the past decade to become full-featured security 841 management suites. New capabilities and features are being added to increase the control administrators 842 have for their enterprise devices. Some of these capabilities are built into the device, whereas others are 843 services provided by external systems residing on more traditional webservers. Device-side security 844 capabilities are introduced in Section 4.1, and are followed by a description of enterprise management 845 technologies in Section 4.2. Recommendations on how to mitigate the threats described in Section 3 846 through policy, user education, use of security management technologies, and industry best practices are 847 presented in Section 4.3.

848

849 4.1 **Device-Side Management & Security Technologies**

850 The following sections detail common on-device technologies used to enable management and enhance enterprise security. Note that not all mobile devices share the same functions and security capabilities.

851

852

853 Hardware-Backed Processing & Storage 4.1.1

854 Many mobile devices contain dedicated hardware components to protect cryptographic keys, passwords,

855 digital certificates, biometric templates and other sensitive information. These hardware components are

856 also frequently used to support the encryption of user data on the mobile devices. Some mobile devices

857 offer dedicated components to perform sensitive operations such as making security decisions (e.g.,

858 granting access to a privileged API) or performing cryptographic operations on data. On some platforms,

859 secure data storage and sensitive operations are combined into a single SoC. An example of this for Apple

860 devices is the secure enclave [21], while an Android example is the Trusted Execution Environment 861 (TEE) leveraging ARM TrustZone technology [22].

862

863 Although these components may exist on devices, they may not be used by default. Both the OS and/or 864 apps must properly leverage the right APIs to fully utilize the security functions that are provided by the 865 platform. On some platforms, APIs may not be exposed to all developers. Within other platforms, small applications can be developed to run specifically within these restricted security environments.

866

867

868 Finally, devices may use other security modules or elements dedicated to specific tasks. These 869 modules/elements are often meant to provide a secure implementation of a specific task. One example is

870 Apple Pay, which uses a *Secure Element*. The Secure Element is a chip specifically designed to handle

871 certain transactions and encrypt payment information stored on the element.

872

873 4.1.2 Data Isolation Mechanisms

874 Some mobile devices provide data isolation mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to user and

875 device data. Examples of data isolation mechanisms include encryption and application sandboxing.

876 Isolating data using encryption separates the data based on authorized access. This mechanism means

877 only users possessing the appropriate cryptographic key can access the encrypted data on the device.

878 Modern mobile devices generally encrypt user data, but data may be encrypted with a key that is managed by the OS, and not the user, developer or enterprise.

879 880

881 Sandboxing on a mobile device can be implemented in multiple ways. An app sandbox is implemented by

882 the mobile OSs, which generally keeps apps from interacting with each other. Exceptions are made based

- 883 on well-defined methods explicitly accepted by the user, done by sometimes asking a user if they grant a
- 884 permission for an application to do a task. Additional sandboxes may exist at or below the user-level that

provide an additional layer of data segmentation. While these may be built into the OS, some Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) have decided to develop and ship their own (e.g., Samsung KNOX).

887

888 4.1.3 Platform Management APIs

889 The major mobile OS platforms offer a set of APIs and supporting protocols that can be used by third-

890 party management tools [27][28]. Management APIs offer access to capabilities that are not offered to 891 normal developers such as controlling app behavior, configuring device and security settings, and

normal developers such as controlling app behavior, configuring device and security settings, and
 querying sensitive device information. Access to these APIs may be restricted to a subset of particular

developers vetted by the platform owners. Additionally, access to these APIs must be agreed to by either

- a device's end-user or a member of an organization's IT staff.
- 895

896 The management capabilities offered by the platform owners also are supplemented by external

897 infrastructure, which is discussed further in Section 4.2.1. In some management situations IT

administrators are able to directly manage the devices, while in other settings IT administrators send

899 commands to the platform owner's infrastructure, which is subsequently relayed onward to the device.

900 Both of these scenarios can be accommodated within the same management panel and be made invisible

- 901 to the user.
- 902

903 **4.1.4 VPN Support**

Mobile platforms natively support virtual private networks (VPNs) that can be leveraged by developers via APIs. VPNs primarily provide confidentiality protection by encrypting user data. There are three types of VPNs: OS-level VPNs, app level-VPNs, and web-based VPNs. OS-level VPNs can be configured via management platforms and sometimes can be put into an "always-on" state. OS-level VPNs may be more power-efficient and can encrypt a large amount of user traffic. Protocols that may be used include Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) and Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP). Unlike OS-level VPNs, app-level

910 VPNs can be configured in multiple ways. They can leverage system VPN APIs to protect user data or

911 they may simply protect a single app's data. More complicated setups can deploy VPNs per mobile app,

912 often known as a *per-app VPN*. Finally, web-based VPNs are easy for a user to take advantage of, often

913 by simply agreeing to a web page's policy. Web-based VPNs use Transport Layer Security (TLS) and

914 may not leverage the same additional protections used by other types of VPNs.

915

916 **4.1.5 Authentication Mechanisms**

Mobile devices offer a variety of sensors that can enable standard and biometric-based authentication. Use of biometric authentication on a mobile device may be used in combination with or in substitution of passwords or PINs. Mobile hardware typically does not contain or store raw biometric data. Instead the biometric data is transformed (e.g., tokenized) and may be stored securely, minimizing its susceptibility to reverse engineering. Biometric data typically is encrypted, stored on the device and protected with a key available only to a dedicated security environment. Sensors leveraged for biometric authentication include the following:

924

• Fingerprint sensor for fingerprint-based authentication,

- Dedicated cameras and other sensors to assist in facial recognition,
- Gyroscope, accelerometer, or pedometer for gait-based authentication, and
- Microphone for voice recognition.

- 929 Individual sensors of the same type can be of varying quality and ultimately more or less secure than a
- 930 similar component. Some sensors are not directly exposed to developers and access decisions are made in
- 931 proprietary security environments. Although these sensors are most often used for local user
- 932 authentication, they also can be used for remote authentication. Another mechanism that can be used for 933 remote authentication is a derived personal identity verification (PIV) credential. This is where a mobile
- device leverages certificate-based authentication through a token that is associated with a PIV credential.
- Additional information can be found in NIST SP 800-63-3, *Digital Identity Guidelines* [4] and NIST SP
- 936 800-157, Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification [41].
- 937

938 **4.2 Enterprise Mobile Security Technologies**

- 939 Technology to manage smartphones and tablets can be used to control organization-issued and personally
- 940 owned devices. This technology can take many forms such as a management tool for device
- 941 configuration, an application management tool, or a mobile threat defense (MTD) tool. MTD is a category
- 942 of technology that defends devices from a variety of threats posed to the devices themselves and any
- 943 connected networks. Other products such as mobile identity management, mobile content management
- and mobile data management also exist, but are not covered in this publication. This section provides an
- 945 overview of the current state and use of these technologies, focusing on their components and security
- 946 capabilities. These technologies form the foundation for the recommended technical threat mitigations
- and countermeasures in Section 4.3.

948 **4.2.1 Enterprise Mobility Management**

- 949 EMM is a solution used to deploy, configure and actively manage mobile devices in an enterprise
- 950 environment. An EMM suite may encompass mobile device management (MDM), mobile application
- 951 management (MAM) and other management technologies. These management systems are developed by
- a variety of organizations, including mobile device manufacturers, mobile OS developers, and
- 953 independent third-party development organizations. EMMs rely on the MDM APIs and protocols
- described in Section 4.1.3 and employ technologies to monitor mobile devices, track a device's location,
- 955 deploy device policies, and configure device-side security technologies (e.g., secure containers).
- 956 The rest of this subsection contains a list of security capabilities that may be provided by EMMs or any of
- 957 their supporting systems. Most organizations will not need all of the security capabilities listed in this
- 958 subsection. Organizations deploying mobile devices should consider the merits of each security
- 959 capability, determine which services are needed for their environment, and then design and acquire one or
- 960 more solutions that collectively provide the necessary services for their needs. Additional guidance for
- 961 implementing these technologies can be found in Section 5.

962 **4.2.1.1 General Policy Enforcement**

- EMM technology can enforce enterprise security policies on a mobile device, which can configure or
 restrict the use of mobile functionality and security capabilities. EMM technology can automatically
 monitor, detect and report when policy violations occur and automatically take action when possible and
 appropriate. General policy restrictions or configuration options for mobile device security include the
 following:
- Manage wireless network interfaces (e.g., WiFi, Bluetooth, NFC),
- Restrict user and app access to hardware (e.g., digital camera and removable storage) and device features (e.g., copy and paste),
- Detect changes to the approved security configuration baseline, and

Limit or prevent access to enterprise services based on the mobile device's OS version (including whether the device has been rooted/jailbroken), vendor/brand, model, or mobile device management software client version (if applicable).

975 **4.2.1.2 User and Device Authentication**

- 976 User and device authentication can be defined and enforced using EMM technology. Some basic options977 and considerations include the following:
- Require a password or other authenticator to unlock the device (e.g., passcode, fingerprint, face),
- Require a password/passcode and/or other authentication mechanism (e.g., token-based authentication, network-based device authentication, domain authentication, digital certificate) before accessing the organization's resources. This includes basic parameters for password strength and a limit on the number of retries permitted without negative consequences (e.g., locking out the account, wiping the device),
- Have the device automatically lock itself after it is idle for a period of time (e.g., 45 seconds, 5 minutes),
- 986
 Under the direction of an administrator, remotely lock the device if it is suspected the device is lost or was left in an unlocked state in an unsecured location, and
- Wipe the device after a certain number of incorrect authentication attempts or after a
 predetermined time interval without it checking into the EMM. Note that the ability to recover via an EMM after it has been wiped is limited.

991 **4.2.1.3 Data Communication and Storage**

Protections for data communications and on-device data storage can be defined and enforced using EMM
 technology. Considerations for these data protections include the following:

- Strongly encrypt data communications between the mobile device and the organization. This
 encryption is most often accomplished in the form of a VPN (see Section 4.1.4), although it can
 be established through other uses of secure protocols and encryption,
- 997
 Strongly encrypt stored data on both built-in storage and removable media storage. Removable media also can be "bound" to particular devices so encrypted information only can be decrypted when the removable media is attached to that specific device, thereby mitigating the risk of offline attacks on the media,
 - Wipe the device before reissuing it to another user, retiring the device, etc., and
- Remotely wipe the device to scrub its stored data if it is suspected that the device has been lost,
 stolen or otherwise fallen into untrusted hands and is at risk of its data being recovered by an
 untrusted party.

1005 **4.2.2 Mobile Application Management**

1001

1006 Some EMM systems include MAM functionality, enabling fine-grained control over different apps on a 1007 single managed device, although MAM also may be offered as a distinct third-party solution. MAM 1008 systems are designed to enable enterprise control over mobile apps that access enterprise services and/or 1009 data. These apps include privately developed apps and publicly available apps. Unlike MDMs, MAM 1010 systems do not require the device owner to enroll the entire device under enterprise management, nor 1011 must the owner accept installation of an enterprise profile on the device. This distinction is critical for 1012 apps designed, for example, to support business-to-business (B2B) transactions (e.g., an app provided to 1013 suppliers to enable access to an enterprise orders database). In such cases, the mobile user is not an

1014 employee of the enterprise that offers the app.

1015 Apps used on mobile devices may be managed using EMM technology. Depending on how the device is 1016 managed and enrolled into an EMM solution, the following restrictions may be applied:

- 1017 Restrict which appstores may be used (e.g., limit access to official appstores),
- 1018 Restrict which apps may be installed through whitelisting allowed apps (preferable) or • 1019 blacklisting prohibited apps. Whitelisting and blacklisting capabilities are highly platform-1020 dependent and may not be available on all MAM systems,
- 1021 Restrict the permissions (e.g., camera access, location access) assigned to each app. 1022 App-wrapping technology (described further in Section 4.2.6) may be used and is highly platform 1023 dependent and may also limit app functionality,
- 1024 Safeguard mechanisms to install, update and remove apps on a mobile device. Keep a current • 1025 inventory of all apps installed on each device. This capability is highly platform dependent and 1026 may not be available on all systems,
- 1027 Restrict the use of OS and app-synchronization and sharing services (e.g., local device • 1028 synchronization, remote synchronization services and websites),
- 1029 Distribute apps from a dedicated enterprise mobile appstore provided through the EMM • 1030 technology, and
- 1031 Distribute the organization's apps from a dedicated mobile appstore. •

1032 MAM solutions often enable an enterprise to integrate an in-house enterprise app catalog with a mobile 1033 device vendor's appstore (e.g., Apple's AppStore, Google Play) to allow mobile users to easily install an 1034 enterprise app. Enterprise system administrators may be able to deploy apps or push out over-the-air 1035 updates to mobile users; they may also be able to restrict app functionalities without affecting the entire 1036 device, an approach that is preferred by BYOD users. Capabilities for specification and enforcement of 1037 security and privacy policies is a key function of MAM systems, often including user- or role-based 1038 policies for access to specific apps and integration with remote wipe for employees departing the 1039 organization or changing roles. Encryption or containerization may be used to separate execution 1040 environments of apps or their communication with enterprise services. Finally, MAM systems may enable 1041 enterprise system administrators to monitor app behavior, configuration compliance or presence of 1042 unauthorized apps on a user device.

1043 4.2.3 Mobile Threat Defense

1044 MTD systems are designed to detect the presence of malicious apps, network-based attacks, improper

- 1045 configurations and known vulnerabilities in mobile apps or the mobile OS itself. Although MTD is
- 1046 becoming the preferred term, the terms mobile threat protection (MTP) and endpoint protection also are
- 1047 colloquially used. These systems often run an agent on the device—typically a mobile app—and may also
- 1048 initiate analysis and learning on external cloud-based platforms. MTD systems provide real-time, 1049 continuous monitoring, assessing apps after deployment to a mobile device as well as during runtime. In
- 1050 an enterprise context, an MTD system may be integrated with an EMM to enable user or administrator 1051
- notification or automated response to remediate detected vulnerabilities or quarantine apps or devices.
- 1052 An MTD can detect and protect the mobile device, apps and end-user against attacks via the wireless
- 1053 network. This defense covers MitM attacks that could intercept or eavesdrop on communications. MTD
- 1054 systems also may detect attacks against an app or OS software. For example, MTD systems may observe
- 1055 side-loaded apps—apps loaded from sources other than the standard mobile device vendor's appstore 1056 (e.g., Apple's Appstore, Google Play). Side-loaded apps may be special-purpose, enterprise-loaded, or
- 1057 whitelisted apps specified by the enterprise. MTD systems monitor the on-the-fly behavior of mobile apps
- 1058 within the current mobile environment, such as when the app navigates to known malicious URLs or
- 1059 phishing sites. For example, MTD systems may detect communication with a blacklisted service or an
- 1060 app's failure to encrypt communication with an enterprise's backend service. Unexpected interactions

- among apps or use of data on the user device (e.g., the app accesses a device owner's "contacts" or
- 1062 "location") also may alert an MTD system to potentially malicious or risky behavior.

1063 **4.2.4 Mobile App Vetting**

1064 The goal of app vetting is to detect software or configuration flaws that may create vulnerabilities or 1065 violate enterprise security or privacy policies. An app vetting system is used by enterprise system 1066 administrators before an app is deployed to a user's mobile device, unlike an MTD system. Mobile apps 1067 may be developed by mobile device manufacturers (e.g., Apple's apps for iOS), the mobile OS vendor 1068 (e.g., Google Maps for Android), third-party providers or in-house enterprise developers. App developers 1069 and OS developers, as well as enterprise administrators may make mistakes when designing or building 1070 an app. They may also intentionally insert malicious functionality that may impact the security or privacy 1071 of the mobile user or the enterprise.

- 1072 App vetting involves a sequence of activities that typically are accomplished via automated test and
- analysis tools, which may interact with external vetting services. App vetting systems may analyze app
- 1074 source code, app binaries, or general app behavior. App vetting systems can expose several security-
- 1075 critical issues, such as problems with the use of cryptography, collection and handling of sensitive
- 1076 corporate or user data, or software dependencies on untrustworthy cloud services. Common problems
- 1077 with app use of cryptography include the use of weak or broken cryptographic algorithms, small key sizes
 - 1078 or failure to cryptographically protect communications or stored data.
 - 1079 Vetting systems may also detect that an app will collect sensitive enterprise data or PII of the mobile user.
 - 1080 Apps may be designed to use the device's camera or microphone or collect and share (or sell) sensitive
 - 1081 information, including user location information, contact details, sensor data, photos and messages with
 - 1082 backend services provided by untrustworthy third parties. Mobile app vetting systems may be able to
 - expose such issues at several phases of the app lifecycle: during development by communicating issues and recommended mitigations to app developers; following development and prior to deployment by
 - and recommended mitigations to app developers; following development and prior to deployment by identifying vulnerabilities to app security analysts or enterprise system administrators; and post
 - 1085 Identifying vulnerabilities to app security analysts or enterprise system administrators; and post 1086 deployment through integration with an EMM by notifying enterprise system administrators of
 - 1087 vulnerabilities in installed apps [2].

1088 **4.2.5 Virtual Mobile Infrastructure**

1089 Virtual mobile infrastructure (VMI) provides an alternative, or accompaniment, to EMM technology. 1090 Similar to Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI), which hosts a virtual desktop image for applications and 1091 data, VMI uses backend infrastructure to host a virtual mobile device and mobile apps. A user then 1092 accesses their virtual device via an app (i.e., thin client) on their phone, and the thin client provides access 1093 to a virtual OS. This approach may be viewed as "sidestepping" data confidentiality concerns by storing 1094 sensitive information within external infrastructure versus on the mobile device itself. Since all enterprise 1095 information would only be available on the cloud-hosted infrastructure, enterprise data would likely be 1096 unavailable if there is no network connectivity. Depending upon how the VMI system is structured, VMI 1097 may or may not be deployed onto a device already provisioned into an EMM. VMI typically does not 1098 allow for device-wide controls and configurations. The deployment and use of this technology is not 1099 within the scope of this document.

1100

1101 **4.2.6** Application Wrapping

- 1102 App wrapping is a security mechanism that modifies a ready-to-run mobile executable to prevent
- 1103 functionality defined by a mobile administrator. This approach is often seen as an alternative to the usage
- 1104 of a secure container. Wrapping allows for policies to be enforced onto third-party applications that the

enterprise does not own. App wrapping typically requires administrative access to the mobile device, and wrapped apps are installed onto the device without being uploaded to—or vetted by—a platform's native appstore. This process of nonstandard installation also is known as sideloading and if done incorrectly could make a mobile device extremely vulnerable to attack. To mitigate against these potential attacks, the sideloading functionality should be disabled when not used for installing the wrapped apps. The use of app wrapping can be seen as beneficial from a usability standpoint, as users simply use apps like normal. From an IT administrator standpoint, deploying updates can be problematic and error prone.

1111 From an Fradin 1112

1113 4.2.7 Secure Containers

1114 Secure containers are mobile apps that provide software-based data isolation designed to segment 1115 enterprise applications and information from personal apps and data. Containers may present multiple 1116 user interfaces, one of the most common being a mobile application that acts as a portal to a suite of 1117 business productivity apps, such as email, contacts and calendar. IT administrators can manage policy sets 1118 on containers, but this process may require the use of a software development kit (SDK) integrated into an 1119 app. There are multiple secure container architectures, with the two major ones colloquially referred to as 1120 app-based and OS-based. App-based containers may not be wholly dissimilar from any other apps on a 1121 mobile device, with the exception of leveraging the management APIs provided by the OS developer. For 1122 instance, on most modern mobile platforms any information stored within an app's directory on a device 1123 will be encrypted by default. A more extensible implementation of an app-level container allows an 1124 enterprise to manage the cryptographic key protecting the container. OS-based containers provide 1125 additional segmentation and data isolation when compared to app-based containers. They also provide a 1126 consistent FIPS 140-validated environment across different platforms independent of the local

1127 cryptographic functions, and these containers are often preferable from a security standpoint.

1128

1129 4.3 Recommended Mitigations and Countermeasures

1130 This section identifies mitigations to the threats identified in Section 3. Table 1 depicts the threats and 1131 associates them alongside potential mitigations and countermeasures. Not all threats have a corresponding 1132 mitigation listed. Unaddressed threats indicate open research areas and opportunities for new technologies 1133 and products. Each listed mitigation addresses at least one threat listed in Section 3. Applying the 1134 following mitigations to a personal device of an employee may not be easily accomplished if the user is 1135 required to configure their device without the assistance of an IT administrator. For example, it is 1136 commonplace for an EMM to create a profile that must be accepted by a user to put these mitigations in 1137 place, but an average user may be unable to acquire and properly configure the product.

1138

Table 1 - Threat Mitigations and Countermeasures

Threats	Mitigations and Countermeasures
Exploitation of Underlying Vulnerabilities in Devices	Security-Focused Device Selection
	OS & Application Isolation
	 Rapid Adoption of Software Updates
	Mobile Threat Defense
Device Loss and Theft	EMM Technologies
	 Mobile Device Security Policies
	Remote/Secure Wipe
	 Notification and Revocation of Enterprise Access for
	Policy Violations
Credential Theft via Phishing	User Education
	Mobile Threat Defense
	Mobile Device Security Policies
	Remote/Secure Wipe

Threats	Mitigations and Countermeasures
Installation of Malicious Developer & EMM Profiles	User EducationApplication Vetting
Accessing Enterprise Resources via a Misconfigured Device	 EMM Technologies Mobile Device Security Policies Notification and Revocation of Enterprise Access for Policy Violations
Installation of Unauthorized Certificates	Mobile Threat Defense
Use of Untrusted Mobile Devices	 Security-Focused Device Selection Notification and Revocation of Enterprise Access for Policy Violations
Wireless Eavesdropping	Use of a VPN
Mobile Malware	 User Education Security-Focused Device Selection Rapid Adoption of Software Updates Application Vetting OS & Application Isolation
Information Loss Due to Insecure Lockscreen	 EMM Technologies Mobile Device Security Policies User Education
User Privacy Violations	User EducationApplication Vetting
Data Loss via Synchronization	 EMM Technologies Mobile Device Security Policies User Education
Shadow IT Usage	Mobile Device Security Policies
Exploitation of Vulnerabilities within the Underlying EMM Platform	Cybersecurity Recommended PracticesUser Education
EMM Administrator Credential Theft	Additional Authentication for System Administrators
Insider Threat	 EMM Technologies Mobile Device Security Policies User Education

1140 **4.3.1 EMM Technologies**

- 1141 EMM and its supporting technologies can mitigate several of the threats defined in Section 3 and
- 1142 prevalent in the mobile ecosystem. EMM can assist in preventing a misconfigured device from
- 1143 connecting to the enterprise by securely configuring device settings prior to granting access to enterprise
- resources. An EMM can also actively deny a device access to enterprise data if it is in an insecure state. If
- an employee loses his or her device or it is stolen, the EMM can wipe the enterprise data on the device.
- 1146 EMMs also can help manage what information is shared on a device lockscreen. Depending on the
- 1147 EMM's capabilities, the list of issues that can be mitigated may be much larger because some EMMs can
- be used to manage and configure other technologies like MTD and VPN applications.
- *Threats Addressed:* Accessing Enterprise Resources via a Misconfigured Device, Device Loss and Theft,
 Information Loss Due to Insecure Lockscreen, Data Loss via Synchronization, Insider Threat

1151 **4.3.2** Cybersecurity Recommended Practices

- 1152 EMM and other mobility management infrastructure rely on COTS systems to perform management
- 1153 functions. These core systems often run on top of general-purpose OSs and commodity hardware. It is
- 1154 important that computer security recommended practices, including network, physical and personnel

1155 security, be applied to these components in the same way they are applied to general information

1156 technology systems throughout industry. Protection mechanisms such as patch management [42],

1157 configuration management [43][40] (e.g., disabling serial ports on field network equipment), identity and 1158

- access management, malware detection, plus intrusion detection and prevention systems can be carefully
- 1159 planned and implemented throughout the enterprise.
- 1160 Threats Addressed: Exploitation of Vulnerabilities within the Underlying EMM Platform

1161 4.3.3 Remote/Secure Wipe

1162 Remote wipe enables enterprise system administrators to delete enterprise data and applications on 1163 enterprise-owned or employee-owned (BYOD) mobile devices. Remote wipe capability is widely 1164 available on mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets supporting Android or iOS. Variants of this 1165 feature also are natively available for OSs and third-party applications that can be installed on these 1166 devices.

1167

1168 To enable remote wipe, a system administrator installs and configures a profile/agent on a device before

1169 enterprise data or applications are available to be used. To later perform a remote wipe, an enterprise

1170 server issues an erase command that is sent over the network to instruct the EMM device agent to delete

1171 data and/or apps on the device. The EMM device agent responds to the server with an acknowledgement

- 1172 that the erasure has been performed or the wipe failed.
- 1173

1174 Remote wipe may be implemented at different levels of granularity, ranging from full-device wipe (e.g., 1175 deleting everything within the system's user partition; typically this level is used for an enterprise-owned 1176 device) to an enterprise wipe (e.g., deleting only those device settings, data and apps previously pushed

1177 out to the user for enterprise use [typically this level is used to delete work data residing on an employee's

1178 personal device]). Native remote wipe capabilities for iOS and Android devices require the device be

1179 powered on (with a sufficient charge) and connected to the network. Some third-party EMM systems can

1180 execute a remote wipe even when the device is not connected to the network.

1181

1182 Organizations should not rely on remote wipe as the sole security control for protecting sensitive data, but 1183 instead consider it to be one layer of a multi-layered approach to protection. By itself, remote wipe is a 1184 fundamentally unreliable security control. For example, an attacker could access information on a device 1185 before it is wiped or an attacker could power off a device to prevent it from receiving a remote wipe

1186

signal.

1187

1188 Threats Addressed: Device Loss and Theft, Credential Theft via Phishing

1189

1190 4.3.4 Security-Focused Device Selection

1191 Out of the box, some devices may have embedded vulnerabilities or malicious software, firmware or

1192 hardware. Malicious actors who have access to the hardware, firmware or software supply chains may be

1193 able to modify device components, source code or executables during the design or manufacturing phases.

1194 For example, an attacker could manipulate software development or integration tools (e.g., compilers,

1195 software test systems, configuration management systems), software support tools (e.g., software update

1196 or upgrade systems), system administration tools (e.g., software installation and release management 1197 systems, patch management systems) or an MDM, MAM, or EMM system. NIST IR 8151, Dramatically

1198 Reducing Software Vulnerabilities [29] defines a framework and provides a broad catalog of supply chain

1199 attack patterns, which cover malicious insertion of hardware, software, firmware and system information. While it is very difficult to avoid a targeted supply chain attack against a single organization or group of individuals, choosing validated devices and software and using a vetted system integrator can help to mitigate the risk of more broadly focused attacks. NIST's Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) "provides validation testing of [Federal Information Processing Standards] FIPS-approved and NIST-recommended cryptographic algorithms and their individual components" [13], while the NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) validates cryptographic module implementations against the Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (FIPS 140-2) [17].

1207 The National Security Agency's (NSA) National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) [7] is

- 1208 responsible for federal government implementation of the internationally recognized Common
- 1209 Criteria. Products certified through the Common Criteria program are evaluated for conformance with
- specific security protection profiles. NIAP's product compliance list identifies evaluated products and may be searched by vendor, technology type, protection profiles and certifying country [8]. NSA's
- 1217 may be searched by vendor, technology type, protection promes and centrying country [6]. NSA's 1212 Commercial Solutions for Classified Program (CSfC) [9][10] also "requires specific, selectable
- 1213 requirements to be included in the Common Criteria evaluation" and provides a list of software or
- hardware systems [34], including MDM and mobile platforms, that meet these more stringent
- 1215 requirements. In addition, CSfC provides a Trusted Integrator List [11], which identifies companies that
- 1216 have met its criteria for trustworthy systems integration capabilities. Organizations are encouraged to use
- 1217 lists of validated products and vetted system integrators to reduce the risk of acquiring devices or software
- 1218 with embedded vulnerabilities. In addition to these practices, devices and software manufacturers can also
- 1219 follow their respective industry recommended practices for secure software development to demonstrate 1220 they are meeting a set of requirements and have integrated them within their software development
- 1220 lifecycle. More information about secure software development can be found in the NIST Cybersecurity
- 1222 White Paper (DRAFT), *Mitigating the Risk of Software Vulnerabilities by Adopting a Secure Software*
- 1223 Development Framework (SSDF) [44].

Threats Addressed: Exploitation of Underlying Vulnerabilities in Devices, Use of Untrusted Mobile
 Devices, Mobile Malware

1226 **4.3.5** Use of a VPN

1227 VPN providers compete to provide different security functions in their products. System administrators 1228 understand what data is encrypted, what algorithms are used and how both ends are authenticating each

- 1228 understand what data is encrypted, what algorithms are used and now both ends are authenticating each 1229 other (if at all) by their selected VPN. VPNs may not encrypt all data, and organizations need to take time
- 1229 other (if at all) by their selected VPN. VPNs may not encrypt an data, and organizations need to take 1230 to fully understand what information is actually being protected. Additionally, the systems and
- 1231 geographic region that enterprise information is sent to are important to understand. Additional
- 1232 information for secure VPN implementation can be found in NIST SP 800-77 rev. 1 (Draft), *Guide to*
- 1233 *IPsec VPNs* [45] and NIST SP 800-113, *Guide to SSL VPNs* [46].
- 1234 An organization should base its mobile device security on the assumption that external networks between
- its mobile devices and its enterprise system, such as ISP and cellular networks, cannot be trusted. Risk
- 1236 from use of untrusted networks can be reduced by using strong encryption technologies such as a VPN to
- 1237 protect the confidentiality and integrity of communications as well as using mutual authentication
- 1238 mechanisms to verify the identities of both endpoints before transmitting data. Another possible
- 1239 mitigation is to prohibit use of unsecured WiFi networks, such as those running known vulnerable
- 1240 protocols.
- 1241 Threats Addressed: Wireless Eavesdropping

1242 **4.3.6 Rapid Adoption of Software Updates**

1243 Developers are constantly improving their technology to provide better functionality, but also to fix 1244 software bugs and other errors. These technological improvements and security fixes are a key reason to 1245 upgrade a device's software or firmware. It is important that a mobile device receives these updates, 1246 otherwise it will remain in a vulnerable state. Typically, these updates are not performed automatically, 1247 unless a device is configured to do so. Software updates are often developed and provided for the user to 1248 manually download and install on their device. Updates should be rapidly deployed, as the longer a 1249 mobile device is vulnerable to exploits, the longer enterprise information and all other information is 1250 vulnerable to compromise.

- 1251 EMMs can notify the user when OS and app updates are available. If the user does not make the
- appropriate updates, the administrator can enforce compliance actions. These actions include blocking or
- 1253 restricting access to enterprise information or the complete removal of enterprise information on the
- 1254 mobile device. If app management is enabled, EMMs can manually update apps and send them to mobile 1255 devices.
- 1256 When patching or updating the OS or an app, enterprise administrators should consider many of the same
- 1257 issues that arise in standard IT environments: the urgency of the update, the likelihood that an update will
- 1257 "break" mission-critical functionality for users, and the ability of the user, the mobile device, and affected
- 1259 systems to roll back failed patches. The urgency of an update is affected by the severity of the potential
- 1260 impact of a vulnerability's exploitation (e.g., critical, important, moderate, low). For example, the
- 1261 Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [19] [20] is a numerical scoring system used to
- 1262 communicate the severity of vulnerabilities. NIST uses the CVSS to score the vulnerabilities found in the
- 1263 NVD. Updates to mobile apps may interact poorly with existing enterprise infrastructure software or
- 1264 application software and cause a mobile app or even the entire device to become unusable.
- 1265 When choosing to take corrective actions and how "strong" such actions should be, the enterprise
- administrator should consider special factors that affect software deployment in the mobile computing
- 1267 environment. If users are traveling, "offline" for extended periods of time or connected only via low-
- 1268 bandwidth networks (e.g., cellular), updating software may be almost infeasible. To address these cases,
- 1269 administrators should develop mitigations in advance for unpatched mobile systems. For example, 1270 reducing permissions to sensitive enterprise assets can allow the mobile devices of traveling users to
- reducing permissions to sensitive enterprise assets can allow the mobile devices of traveling users to reconnect to the enterprise network and download the new software without undue risk to the enterprise.
- 12/1 reconnect to the enterprise network and download the new software without undue risk to the enterprise.
- 1272 Best practices for mobile updates include pushing updates periodically (e.g., weekly) to acclimate users to
- regular patching and prevent apps from becoming excessively outdated. Administrators should identify a
- 1274 group of relatively tolerant users—for example, other system administrators—and push updates to these
- 1275 users before organization-wide patching of mobile devices. By using this approach, problems with
- 1276 updates may be discovered and addressed before they impact a larger number of users who are less
- 1277 tolerant of software problems.
- 1278 Threats Addressed: Exploitation of Underlying Vulnerabilities in Devices, Mobile Malware
- 1279

1280 **4.3.7 OS & Application Isolation**

- 1281 Using a secure container to isolate enterprise data is a commonplace strategy for preventing data
- 1282 compromise. As stated in Section 4.2.7, containers use a variety of underlying technology to separate
- 1283 enterprise and user data. Secure containers often act as an EMM's device-side agent to obtain information
- about a device's health, enforce enterprise policy and notify administrators of nonconformance. They also
- 1285 can be used to provide cryptographic confidentiality protection of data. Acting as the EMM agent, secure

- 1286 containers may work in conjunction with the management APIs to perform their security and management1287 functions.
- 1288 Administrators also can configure policy, receive notifications of policy violations, prevent data
- 1289 exfiltration and manage device health by embedding a security-focused SDK into an app residing on an
- 1290 employee device. Although this approach can be fruitful, it requires a certain level of expertise from the
- 1291 enterprise to develop the SDK. Another approach to isolation includes wrapping applications as
- 1292 mentioned in Section 4.2.6. All of these can work in concert to provide the desired degree of isolation.

1293 Enterprises may need to employ multiple isolation mechanisms within their mobile deployment. The 1294 exact combination necessary for a particular enterprise is a function of an enterprise's unique security and

- 1295 operational requirements. Implementing all of the isolation mechanisms listed here may not be an
- appropriate response to the threats posed to an enterprise, and may also be too costly to implement. Yet
- enterprises should gain an understanding of what security benefits an isolation mechanism is actually providing, and what features are simply a byproduct of the underlying OS. In addition, organizations
- 1298 providing, and what features are simply a byproduct of the underlying OS. I 1299 should ensure isolation mechanisms are activated and properly configured.
- 1300 *Threats Addressed*: Exploitation of Underlying Vulnerabilities in Devices, Mobile Malware

1301 **4.3.8** Application Vetting

1302 MAV tools can be employed to identify vulnerabilities and malicious code in mobile applications. They 1303 can also integrate with many EMM and MTD systems. When an issue is discovered, an administrator can 1304 be properly informed and automatically deploy various EMM-provided remediation actions. These 1305 include notifying administrators, affected users and departments; automatically removing affected apps; 1306 disallowing access to enterprise resources; or performing other remediation actions available via the 1307 EMM. To achieve this automated operation, the EMM is integrated with MAV tools via APIs that 1308 coordinate the submission of mobile apps-one-off or in bulk-to the MAV service via the EMM 1309 dashboard. These APIs often are implemented using web services. For MAV services, EMM integration 1310 can enable a flexible conduit through which results from multiple MAV vendors can be received and 1311 aggregated at the EMM dashboard or portal without requiring all app vetting reports to conform to a 1312 single format.

Threats Addressed: Installation of Malicious Developer MDM Profiles, Mobile Malware, User Privacy
 Violations

1315 4.3.9 Mobile Threat Defense

1316 MTD can operate as a standalone and isolated system that detects malicious applications and other

- 1317 threats. MTD systems can detect network-based attacks (e.g., MitM that could intercept and redirect or
- 1318 eavesdrop on communications), app-based attacks (e.g., information leakage or malicious, sideloaded
- 1319 apps), platform-based attacks (e.g., rootkits that undermine basic OS functions) and others. When coupled
- 1320 with an integrated EMM, these systems offer multiple remediation approaches following an attack
- 1321 attempt or data breach is detected or a device is compromised. Remediation for network-based attacks
- 1322 include disconnecting the device from the enterprise network, re-establishing a trustworthy connection or
- 1323 blocking attempts to connect to blacklisted networks.
- 1324 For app-based attacks, an integrated EMM and MTD system can remove malicious apps or modify app
- permissions to limit access to sensitive enterprise resources. In cases where an integrated EMM and MTD
- 1326 system detects a potential attack against the mobile platform, it might notify the user to apply an OS patch 1327 or _______in the extreme______remotely wine (i.e.___factory reset) the device__Integrated EMM and MTD systems

- 1328 typically are configured to alert the system administrator and potentially the mobile device user to the
- 1329 detected problem and the remediation approach initiated.
- 1330 Threats Addressed: Credential Theft via Phishing, Installation of Unauthorized Certificates

1331 **4.3.10 User Education**

1332 Security is everyone's responsibility. The user cannot solely depend on the EMM and other third-party

1333 apps to secure their device and enterprise data. User awareness is important because the device user plays

- 1334 a vital role in securing the enterprise's information. Understanding the importance of securing the device
- and how to contribute is important for both the user and the enterprise.
- Providing effective ways to teach users how to protect their mobile device is essential to understandingthe importance of security mechanisms and how to apply them. Following are a few examples of mobile
- 1338 device security on which device users should be trained:
- How to identify phishing attacks,
- How to properly manage authentication credentials,
- The organization's privacy policy and the personal information collected,
- How to identify malicious EMM profiles or other malicious applications, and
- Why it is important to rapidly perform OS and application updates.
- 1344 If the device users are not educated on how to properly secure their mobile device, this oversight could 1345 endanger enterprise and user information. That's why user education is essential for enabling users to do 1346 their part securing their mobile device—for themselves and the enterprise.
- 1347 Mobile device and EMM administrators also require the proper security training in addition to the users.
- 1348 The enterprise may want to identify the Workforce Categories and Specialty Areas from the
- 1349 National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (SP 800-
- 1350 181) [47] that are of interest and applicable to the enterprise's needs. Through identifying the Workforce
- 1351 needs, the enterprise will be able to understand the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities for a mobile
- 1352 device/EMM administrator.
- 1353 Threats Addressed: Credential Theft via Phishing, Installation of Malicious Developer and EMM Profiles,
- 1354 Mobile Malware, Information Loss Due to Insecure Lockscreen, Data Loss via Synchronization,
- 1355 Exploitation of Vulnerabilities within the Underlying EMM Platform, Insider Threat

13564.3.11 Mobile Device Security Policies

- 1357 The development of security policies is vital to establishing a prominent security posture through well-
- defined procedures and governance. The purpose of security policies is to provide a clear course of action
- 1359 for organizations to follow when deploying new technologies and remediating issues or other
- 1360 occurrences. Mobile device security policies can be established by performing a threat modeling exercise
- 1361 or risk assessment to understand the attack landscape and plan according to an organization's specific
- 1362 security needs.
- 1363 Mobile device security policies can define the device configurations required for each mobile device that
- accesses enterprise data. For example, a configuration policy may require user authentication before
- accessing the mobile device or the organization's resources. Further, that policy may define the strength
- 1366 of the authentication mechanism or require multi-factor authentication. These types of policies inform the

- 1367 system administrators of the policies to enforce on the mobile device and can in turn protect against an 1368 attacker gaining unauthorized access to enterprise resources.
- 1369 In the case of remediation, an organization should define policies to guide the necessary actions to
- 1370 perform in the case of an error or attack. An organization may develop a policy that requires a mobile
- 1371 device to be erased/wiped if it is lost or stolen. This policy will prevent anyone from retrieving
- 1372 unauthorized access to sensitive enterprise information. Additionally, if it is found that there is a breach
- 1373 due to implementation of a weak or outdated policy, an organization should have procedures for
- 1374 reviewing and updating policies as needed. Additional information about recommended mobile device
- 1375 security policies can be found in Appendix D.
- 1376 *Threats Addressed*: Device Loss and Theft, Credential Theft via Phishing, Accessing Enterprise
- Resources via a Misconfigured Device, Information Loss Due to Insecure Lockscreen, Shadow IT Usage,
 Insider Threat
- 1270 4.0.40 Notification and Decemention of Enternation

1379 **4.3.12** Notification and Revocation of Enterprise Access

- 1380 Every enterprise and organization should have security policies and rules that influence remediation
- actions when network attacks or breaches occur. These policies and rules also cover mobile devices.
- 1382 Remediation actions may span a spectrum of possibilities ranging from notifying affected individual users
- 1383 or groups of users, to revoking access to enterprise data and services, to wiping the data of the affected
- device(s) or restoring it/them to a default pristine state (e.g., factory reset).
- 1385 Notifying users of an issue is often the most basic and least aggressive remediation option. This is
- 1386 typically done via a push notification to the phone's notification center or potentially an SMS to follow
- 1387 up. Temporary revocation of access to enterprise resources is often seen as the next step if the notification
- does not remediate the issue. This is most easily done via the EMM agent if one is installed on the
- 1389 employee device. The temporary revocation may last a predefined period of time—for example, 24
- hours—and access may be automatically restored or only restored manually by the enterprise's systems
- administrators. Removing applications or wiping the mobile device are some of the more aggressive
- remediation options available to the enterprise. This more drastic action can be performed because an app
- 1393 on their mobile system was compromised or is malicious and is the source of attacks or leaks affecting the
- enterprise. But beware: wiping data not owned by the enterprise can cause legal issues.
- *Threats Addressed*: Device Loss and Theft, Accessing Enterprise Resources via a Misconfigured Device,
 Use of Untrusted Mobile Devices

1397 **4.3.13** Additional Authentication for System Administrators

- 1398 System administrators who use the EMM console have access to sensitive information about the
- 1399 enterprise's mobile devices. Individuals with EMM credentials can grant and revoke access to enterprise
- 1400 resources and collect private information about employees such as device location. Additionally, they
- 1401 may be able to wipe an entire device, not just the enterprise data. For this reason, EMM administrator
- 1402 credentials should conform to standard password strength and complexity rules listed in NIST SP 800-63-
- 1403 3 [4]. If supported by the EMM, multi-factor authentication also should be used. These additional layers
- 1404 of authentication for system administrators can help to thwart EMM credential theft.
- 1405 *Threats Addressed:* EMM Administrator Credential Theft

1406 Enterprise Mobile Device Deployment Lifecycle 5.

1407 There are many factors to consider when deploying mobile devices within an enterprise environment.

1408 These include selecting the correct management technologies and devices, alongside properly providing

1409 them to users. This section defines a process, as seen in Figure 3, for deploying devices and managing

1410 them throughout their operational lifecycle, known as the Enterprise Mobile Device Deployment

- 1411 Lifecycle. Each step of the process is described below along with necessary implementation details.
- 1412 Organizations may wish to document their decision-making process and implementation details into a
- 1413 mobile security policy.
- 1414 Alternative process models and frameworks exist, and enterprises should adopt or combine the ones that
- 1415 suit their needs while satisfying their requirements. One example is the Mobile Computing Decision
- 1416 Making Framework (MCDF), a four-stage framework that is used to determine if a mobile solution is
- 1417 necessary to support an enterprise's overall mission. More information on the MCDF can be found in the
- 1418 CIO Council's Mobile Computing Decision Making Framework [12].
- 1419



- 1420
- 1421
- 1422

1423 **Identify Mobile Requirements** 5.1

1424 In this first stage of this Lifecycle, the organization decision-makers define the mission needs and 1425 requirements for mobile devices, inventory the mobile devices already in use, and identify the mobile

1426 deployment model that fits your organization. This is all in an effort to gather requirements for managing

1427 current and future mobile devices to meet mission needs for functionality, security and privacy. Participation of both IT-focused and business-focused decision-makers is necessary in this stage to ensure
that the needs of the mission will drive the technology choices in later stages.

1430 **5.1.1 Explore Mobile Use Cases**

1431 Many organizations find that mobile devices are essential to enable their staff to meet evolving mission 1432 requirements. Tasks that once might have been accomplished in the office (at a much slower pace) are 1433 now handled "in the field," often while requiring access to enterprise data or apps and through interaction 1434 with colleagues from partner organizations. This need to meet challenging and fast-paced mission 1435 requirements should be weighed against the need to protect sensitive data, address privacy concerns, 1436 financial costs and other issues. Developing use cases specific to an organization's needs for mobile 1437 devices can help to identify and clearly describe requirements. Common elements of use cases include 1438 understanding who your users are, why they need mobile devices, and what apps or device features will

- be necessary for them to meet their organizational objectives.
- 1440 For example, a disaster management organization may send staff members to sites affected by natural
- 1441 disasters, such as tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes, to provide assessments and assistance. Mobile
- 1442 devices are essential to reach back to enterprise data sources and to enable submission of information
- 1443 gathered on site. Staff also should share information with members of the public, local first responders,
- representatives of other local, state and federal organizations, as well as staff from various other non-
- 1445 governmental organizations (NGOs). In this use case example, the strong need for a mobile capability is
- 1446 clear, and backend systems may need to be restructured to enable appropriate security characteristics to
- support these interactions. The characteristics (e.g., durability will be important for rough worksites) and
- 1448 cost of the selected mobile devices should be considered carefully to ensure all staff have the necessary
- equipment and expensive devices are not too fragile for a rough worksite.

1450 5.1.2 Survey Current Inventory

- 1451 When modern mobile devices were first introduced to the enterprise, management platforms were less
- 1452 mature and likely had not been managed in a centralized manner. These sorts of practices may have
- 1453 continued over time. Therefore, an inventory of the mobile systems alongside other information systems
- 1454 within an organization's network can be valuable when deploying a new mobile infrastructure. This can
- 1455 be performed by directly asking employees for the mobile devices they are using and performing network
- scans to understand the devices on a network. These two sources of information combined provide a
- 1457 picture of the devices that are actually being used and need to be protected and/or upgraded.

1458 Unidentified mobile devices may leave holes in the enterprise's infrastructure. These devices may not 1459 acquire the necessary security configuration, which leaves the mobile user and the enterprise unprotected 1460 from vulnerabilities and exploits. Malware or unauthorized access to the enterprise's network through the 1461 unidentified mobile device can leave the enterprise blind to attacks due to the lack of awareness of all 1462 mobile devices within their infrastructure. Identifying current inventory may be performed through an 1463 inventory management methodology. NIST and DHS produced NISTIR 8011, Automation Support for 1464 Security Control Assessments Volume 2: Hardware Asset Management [34], which provides operational 1465 guidance for automating and assessing the FISMA security controls with regards to hardware asset 1466 management.

1467 5.1.3 Choose Deployment Model

Today, organizational leaders may choose from a variety of deployment models for the mobile devices to
be used within the enterprise. A deployment model captures alternative options for device ownership, as
well as policy and technological controls that manage device behavior. The spectrum of options ranges

1471 from devices issued by (i.e., purchased or leased by) and fully managed by the enterprise to devices

1472 owned by individuals with little or no enterprise management of device interaction with enterprise

- 1473 systems. The following sections describe three of the most commonly used categories of options in the
- 1474 spectrum. NIST SP 800-114 Rev. 1, User's Guide to Telework and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)
- 1475 Security identifies some similar categories in the context of devices used for teleworking [35].

1476 5.1.3.1 Strict Enterprise Usage

1477 Strictly enterprise-enabled mobile devices and the information on those devices are issued by the

- 1478 organization. Users should be made aware that all data on the device are owned by the organization.
- 1479 Within the federal government, this deployment model is sometimes known as Government Furnished
- 1480 Equipment (GFE). This section covers enterprise-enabled mobile devices that are provided to employees
- 1481 for (strictly) enterprise use only. GFE devices strictly limit personal use; employees typically own and
- 1482 carry a separate personal device.
- 1483 Enterprise-enabled mobile devices provide significant security benefits. Organizational leaders may
- 1484 consider the supply chain of candidate devices before selecting devices for purchase, and IT system
- 1485 administrators may develop device hardening plans before the products arrive. At deployment time, the IT
- 1486 staff may configure restrictive policy settings to significantly alter the functionality of the device such as
- 1487 removing text messaging functionality, restricting WiFi and Bluetooth access, and ensuring that
- 1488 communication takes place over a VPN. In the enterprise-enabled model of device deployment, tradeoffs 1489 between security and functional usability can be made entirely at the discretion of organizational leaders.
- 1490 An example for an only enterprise-enabled deployment includes a GFE that is provisioned to the end user
- 1491 as a fully managed or supervised device. Mobile security technologies include enrollment of the device
- 1492 into an MDM with the use of mobile threat defense for endpoint protection, and access to enterprise
- 1493 resources through web-based interfaces or mobile applications. A whitelisting approach is implemented
- 1494 for enterprise-enabled deployments; all mobile apps on the device will be examined through a mobile app
- 1495 vetting service before the apps are provisioned to the device or allowed to be downloaded from the 1496
- managed enterprise appstore [2]. Access to the official public appstores or unofficial appstores is
- 1497 restricted in this deployment model.
- 1498 Device ownership status: Organization

1499 5.1.3.2 Corporate Owned Personally Enabled (COPE)

- 1500 COPE devices are issued by the enterprise to employees. The COPE model is less restrictive on employee
- 1501 personal use. While the enterprise owns (or leases) the device and enforces usage restrictions, these 1502
- restrictions are more lenient, allowing employees some personal use of the device. For example, an
- 1503 employee may be permitted to download certain apps or receive personal text messages on the COPE
- 1504 device. Although a COPE device is personally enabled, the device and information on the device belongs
- 1505 to the enterprise. Employees should be informed about enterprise restrictions and have appropriate 1506 expectations of software and device configurations that affect functionality and privacy.
- 1507
- 1508 An example of the COPE deployment model includes a managed GFE device. This may include a fully
- 1509 supervised device or a separate enrollment to manage the device by downloading an EMM application
- 1510 from the official appstore. A blacklisting approach is implemented for many COPE deployments. All
- 1511 mobile apps on the device should go through a mobile app vetting service; apps downloaded to the device
- 1512 are vetted during or after installation by the app vetting service and checked and maintained against an
- 1513 application blacklist. For COPE, personal applications are allowed on the GFE device and the end user is
- 1514 able to access the official public appstores.

1515 Device ownership status: Organization

1516 **5.1.3.3 BYOD and Choose Your Own Device (CYOD)**

1517 The BYOD deployment model allows employees to use their personally owned mobile devices to access 1518 enterprise data and services. The employee may, for example, access both personal email and sensitive 1519 enterprise email via the same application. The BYOD model raises concerns regarding leakage of 1520 sensitive enterprise information via the device to untrustworthy third-party backend systems that 1521 communicate with various apps on the device. To protect the confidentiality and integrity of enterprise 1522 data and systems as well as the privacy of the device user/owner, IT staff may use a tool such as an EMM 1523 to enforce DLP by applying restrictions such as disabling the copy/paste feature when in enterprise 1524 applications. Also, an enterprise may use MTD technology to ensure the device is protected from mobile 1525 threats and attempts to compromise the device.

- 1526 A Choose Your Own Device (CYOD) device is purchased by an employee for personal use. In the CYOD
- model, the enterprise provides employees a list of devices (e.g., the Commercial Solutions for Classified
- 1528 Component list) that are acceptable for interaction with enterprise networks and software. If the
- employee's personal device is on the approved list, and the employee installs software required by the enterprise, then the employee may use that device to access the enterprise's data and services. Employee
- enterprise, then the employee may use that device to access the enterprise's data and services. Employees with personal devices that are not on the approved list must often carry a second (enterprise-enabled)
- 1531 with personal devices that are not on the approved list must often carry a second (enterprise-enabled) 1532 device for work-related activities, so choosing from the approved list allows a user to avoid carrying an
- 1532 additional device.
 - 1534 Another concern with BYOD and CYOD devices is lack of supply-chain management. The enterprise has
 - 1535 little-to-no knowledge of the device's origination or if it has been modified. A BYOD/CYOD device may
 - be rooted or jailbroken with installed untrusted apps. The device may be infected with malware without
 - the user's knowledge. The lack of a baseline leaves the enterprise at a disadvantage when it allows a user
 - 1538 to access enterprise data via their device.
 - 1539 For the organization, CYOD offers the opportunity to limit the hardware supply chain risk and to control
 - 1540 access to enterprise data and backend systems through enterprise protection software (e.g., an EMM or
 - 1541 MTD agent). The advantage of CYOD over BYOD is that employees are informed in advance of the
 - devices which are capable of running the necessary enterprise protection software and, thus, will be permitted to access enterprise resources. When IT staff members decline to allow a BYOD device
 - because it is unable to run an enterprise EMM agent, then BYOD equals CYOD, but with the appearance
- 1545 of IT management inconsistency and capricious application of unstated policies.
- 1546 Device ownership status: Employee

1547 **5.1.4 Select Devices**

1548 Organizational mission and constraints such as cost and deployment models are considered in the 1549 selection of mobile devices [18]. That is why an approach for assessing an organization's mission needs

- 1550 for mobile solutions is needed. It recommends that "for each candidate mission, the organization must
- determine who needs mobile access, to what data, why and where." For example, many organizations find
- 1552 that providing access to email through mobile devices allows a majority of employees to work more
- 1553 efficiently by enabling communication on time-critical issues. However, mobile access to specialized data
- and apps may be essential to only a few key employees. Understanding the impact of mobile devices on
- mission needs can help an organization to focus its selection process by narrowing it to a small set of
- 1556 candidate devices that satisfy the organization's requirements.

1557 Costs and security concerns related to mobile devices impact the purchasing decisions of many

- 1558 organizations. Costs can be minimized by limiting deployment of devices only to users who need them to
- 1559 support an organization's mission and by selecting devices with only the necessary capabilities (e.g.,
- choosing a previous model rather than the "latest model"). For security, it is important to select devicemodels that are current enough to be well supported by the manufacturer and can accommodate OS and
- application updates and patches.

1563 **5.1.5 Determine EMM Capabilities**

1564 Identifying the EMM capabilities required to work effectively within an enterprise is an important activity 1565 to perform before acquiring an EMM. This step requires organizational leaders to use the information 1566 gathered in the previous sections to define the capability requirements for their EMM solution. For 1567 example, the EMM must support the devices selected to meet the mission needs and, potentially, existing 1568 devices in the current inventory. Other commonly required EMM capabilities are options for integrating 1569 the EMM infrastructure into the enterprise's infrastructure. These options include "on prem" operations 1570 (i.e., running on servers hosted on premises, within the enterprise datacenter), support for a Software as a 1571 Service (SaaS) model, or product certifications/accreditations and third-party service integrations. Section 1572 4.2 discusses many other important capabilities for EMMs and other enterprise technologies designed to 1573 support mobile computing for the enterprise. The list of required EMM capabilities will support the well-1574 reasoned selection of an EMM for the enterprise, ensuring that it provides the necessary functional and 1575 security capabilities.

1576

1577 5.2 Perform Risk Assessment

Risk assessments are a foundational component of cybersecurity. The risk-assessment process can be used
to identify, estimate and prioritize risk to organizational operations and assets, staff and other
organizations that result from the operation and use of information systems. Risk assessments should be
performed periodically, as the threat landscape is constantly changing and the systems to be protected are
evolving. Section 5.6 addresses the topic of periodic security audits, which assess the effectiveness of

- 1583 controls for protecting the enterprise. Periodic risk assessments should inform security audits.
- 1584 Risk assessments can be conducted at the organization level, mission level, and information-system level.
- 1585 This guidance recommends that mobile devices, mobile apps and any systems used to manage the mobile
- 1586 system be included as part of the risk-assessment process. The risk assessment may have mobile devices
- 1587 included under a larger risk assessment umbrella, or may be conducted against a specific mobile device
- deployment. A variety of risk assessment methodologies exist, such as mobile-agnostic guidance (NIST SP 800-30 Revision 1, *Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments*), and mobile-specific guidance (Mobile
- 1590 Computer Decision Framework) [14]. Another example of mobile-specific guidance also exists for
- 1591 performing risk assessments such as NISTIR 8144 (DRAFT), Assessing Threats to Mobile Devices &
- 1592 *Infrastructure: The Mobile Threat Catalogue* [5][6] used in conjunction with a threat modeling process
- such as draft NIST SP 800-154, *Guide to Data-Centric System Threat Modeling* [48], and the MITRE
- 1594 Mobile ATT&CK Framework [15]. Organizations that fail to conduct risk assessments may inadvertently
- select and apply incorrect security controls or spend precious resources addressing risks that are unlikely
- 1596 to occur. Enterprises are encouraged to revisit their identified requirements once a risk assessment has 1597 been performed in order to update the list of requirements based on information identified within the risk
- 1598 assessment.

1599 **5.3** Implement Enterprise Mobility Strategy

Resource availability, mission needs, and various other organization constraints will guide decisions on mobile deployment options, devices, and EMM systems. Some organizations must have full control of all components in the enterprise environment, so all mobile equipment must be purchased by the organization and managed by enterprise system administrators through an EMM. Other organizations allow employees to bring their own devices (possibly from an approved list) and may manage a few enterprise applications through a MAM system. By focusing on the enterprise requirements, decision

1606 makers can narrow the range of appropriate deployment options.

1607 5.3.1 Select & Install Mobile Technology

1608 The list of mobile technology requirements previously identified should be compared against those of the

1609 EMMs under consideration. There may not be a perfect match with a complete overlap of requirements

and capabilities, especially when EMM selection must be made from a predetermined list owned by an

1611 external organization. Once an EMM selection is made, the EMM should be appropriately implemented

1612 inside of the enterprise network boundary. This includes proper product configuration, which is another

- 1613 important step in securing enterprise mobile infrastructure. A misconfigured EMM can lead to data leaks
- 1614 of confidential and proprietary enterprise information which may include self-developed internal mobile
- 1615 apps, personnel employee data, and data that could include trade secrets.

1616 EMM technology can be set up in different ways within the enterprise, and different architectures are

- possible. The two primary methods focus on the location of the EMM and associated technology. These
 methods are on-premise and cloud-based, sometimes referred to as the Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)
 model. These are described below.
- 1619 model. These ar 1620

1621 **5.3.1.1 On-Premise Architecture**

1622 On-premise (i.e., *on-prem*) instances of the EMM technology are less common. Organizations install and

1623 configure the EMM themselves, and also pay for any software licenses for any underlying platforms or

1624 components. Some EMM vendors offer images and containers that can help ease the burden of

1625 installation and configuration. Organizations are encouraged to double-check the images or containers for

1626 commonplace software vulnerabilities. The primary benefit of this model is that enterprise data resides

within the organization, other than the allowed devices that can query and receive information they areauthorized to obtain. Enterprises can monitor this traffic alongside all of the authentication from the EMM

- 1629 to other devices. Finally, physical security of the EMM can be ensured for this model.
- 1630 Below is a sample architecture demonstrating an on-prem implementation of the mobile security
- 1631 technologies. MTD applications are sometimes cloud-based, even if the organization's management


1632 technology is on-prem. Figure 4 shows the MTD as part of the cloud, although real-world deployments

1633 may significantly differ. The EMM components are hosted via on-prem servers owned and managed by

1634 the enterprise. This architecture requires considerable installation and maintenance of the technologies by

- 1635 the enterprise, but also provides the enterprise with more control over how the enterprise data is
- 1636 transmitted and managed.

1637



- 1638 1639
- 1640

Figure 4 - On-Premise Mobile Architecture

1641 **5.3.1.2 Cloud Architecture**

1642 The cloud solution is an alternative to the on-prem architecture that allows mobile security technologies 1643 to be hosted external from the local enterprise network. When using the cloud solution, the mobile 1644 security technology provider gives the enterprise the ability to use its applications, which are run on a 1645 cloud infrastructure. This is also known as SaaS, and mobile security and management services are 1646 delivered via the internet to the enterprise [24].

1647 Cloud-based EMM deployments are often easier to set up and begin using. They involve signing up for a 1648 web-based service, and users are quickly taken to the primary dashboard after payment is provided. The 1649 most difficult aspects of setup are joining the EMM to an Active Directory service and proving that the 1650 email domain being used actually belongs to the company. The EMM vendor often provides unique

1650 information that must be placed into DNS, and then can be externally checked. Another benefit of the


1651 information that must be placed into DNS, and then can be externally checked. Another benefit of the

1652 SaaS model is that problems or issues can be more easily addressed by the vendor, since they have access 1653 to the EMM instance and underlying platform. Finally, with this model the enterprise data resides outside

1653 to the EMM instance and underlying platform. Finally, with this model the enterprise data resides outside 1654 the traditional enterprise, much like the mobile devices the EMMs manage. This is oftentimes a key factor

1655 in organizations deciding not to use this model. Below is a sample architecture demonstrating a cloud-

1656 based mobile enterprise architecture (e.g., MDM server, app vetting server).



1657 1658

Figure 5 - Cloud-Based Mobile Architecture

1659

1660 **5.3.2** Integration of EMM into the Enterprise Service Infrastructure

1661 Both large and small enterprises may connect their EMM system to existing enterprise infrastructure 1662 services to improve security management of mobile devices. Such services support authentication, 1663 identification and access control to enterprise networks and resources. Remote Authentication Dial-In 1664 User Service (RADIUS) is a standard network authentication service protocol, providing authentication of 1665 access credentials followed by policy-based network resource assignments (e.g., Internet Protocol [IP] 1666 address, permitted network connection time). Directory services such as Microsoft's Active Directory 1667 map network resources (e.g., volumes, printers, users, devices) to network addresses. Enterprise systems 1668 use the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) to communicate with directory services. Another 1669 set of services enables remote connectivity via a VPN to enterprise systems.

By integrating an EMM with enterprise backend infrastructure services such as RADIUS or directory services, an organization can enable finer-grained management of mobile device access to mission-critical

- 1672 enterprise resources. System administrators can set policy-based configurations for mobile devices to
- 1672 constrain access to sensitive resources, depending on mobile device conditions (e.g., connection from a
- 1674 public WiFi network or user-managed device running a corporate application). When enterprises deploy
- an EMM without integrating it with their backend security infrastructure, mobile device connections to
- 1676 the enterprise network may be managed via global passphrases for connection to the enterprise WiFi
- 1677 network. Mobile devices with WiFi network access can then reach any of the services on the enterprise

- 1678 network, meaning that when a device is connected to the WiFi network, it can access everything on the
- 1679 typical enterprise network.

1680 **5.3.3 Set Policy, Device Configuration and Provision**

1681 In certain deployment models, mobile devices should be properly set up before they can be provided to 1682 enterprise users. IT-focused and business-focused decision-makers should work together to define a 1683 mobile device usage policy acceptable for these devices. The usage policy should address the standard 1684 security protections to be applied to all enterprise mobile devices, as well as specifying the permissions 1685 and special configurations that apply to users with different organizational roles. Devices can then be 1686 properly configured and provisioned to enforce the chosen policy. For organizations with a less stringent 1687 stance on device usage, such as BYOD, users should be made aware of the mobile device usage policy 1688 and signal their acknowledgement of the policy.

1689

1690 5.3.3.1 Define EMM Policy

1691 An EMM policy is a set of rules that defines what a user is allowed (or not allowed) to do on their mobile

1692 device and the mobile device configuration requirements. EMM policies are put in place to assist in

1693 securing the enterprise data within the mobile device. To do so, the enterprise must understand the type of

1694 data the user handles (e.g., sensitive data), the risk factors and the proper way to protect that data from

accidental or intentional threats. Upon understanding these key factors, the enterprise then documents the

1696 EMM policy and applies the policy configurations within the EMM.

1697 These policies may vary per user or device since a particular user group or role within the enterprise may

have different permissions to adequately perform its duties. If the EMM policy is not well defined, the

1699 user permissions may not accurately reflect the policy requirements and a user may be given too much or

too little access to enterprise data. This could negatively impact an employee's ability to accomplish their

1701 work or allow the employee unauthorized access to enterprise information. Some examples of elements to

- include within an EMM policy include password requirements, device encryption, VPN requirements and
- 1703 geo-fencing.

1704 **5.3.3.2 Consider Personal Account Usage**

1705 One of the primary means of communication within an enterprise is email. While most businesses provide

1706 work email accounts to their employees, others might allow an employee to use a personal email account

to handle business communication. Email may be used for general communication between employees,

account establishment, password initiation/reset, the sharing of sensitive information, and enterprisealerts/notifications.

1710

1711 Using personal email accounts leaves the enterprise without security control over the personal email 1712 accounts. Similar issues also arise with other cloud-based services, e.g., cloud-based storage and sharing

1712 of documents. Without this control, sensitive enterprise information could be transferred to unauthorized

recipients, the enterprise cannot control or have knowledge of what servers its emails are transmitted

1714 recipients, the enterprise cannot control of nave knowledge of what servers its emails are transmitted 1715 through, and it cannot apply enterprise-level security protection of its emails. Another concern is litigation

- against the enterprise; the inability to backup or archive personal email accounts could make it difficult
- 1717 for an enterprise to respond to a demand for discovery or a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.
- 1718 If an employee resigns or is terminated, the enterprise is unable to remove that person's access to
- 1719 enterprise emails that were sent to their personal email address. This security gap could allow a former
- 1720 employee to retain access to sensitive enterprise data.
- 1721

- 1722 Enterprise email is the prime option for establishing account access for individuals because—as
- mentioned above—enterprise email addresses give an enterprise optimum control over its data. Access-
- 1724 control policies and privileges can be provisioned to a specified enterprise email account, which coincides
- 1725 with the employee who uses the email address. Personal email addresses can be used in a similar fashion, 1726 but enterprises are left with less control of information sent to them. Finally, shared emails—enterprise or
- personal—make it difficult to manage account access. Each employee on the shared account is given the
- same access privileges and has the ability to repudiate responsibility because there is no way of
- 1729 monitoring individual access. Multiple users having access to a single account eliminates the ability to
- 1730 apply least privilege and separation of duties.

1731 **5.3.3.3 Device Configuration**

1732 Device configuration is the system configuration of a mobile device before it is provisioned to the user.

- 1733 The system configuration may include updating the OS to the most recent release, establishing password 1734 length requirements and/or enabling device encryption. How devices are configured depends on the
- 1735 device deployment model used by the enterprise.
- 1736 The device configuration process for enterprise-issued and BYOD devices is different because of how

1737 devices are ultimately provided to users. Enterprise-issued devices can be preconfigured in-house, or the

1738 enterprise can have a mobile device vendor preconfigure the devices prior to shipping them to the users,

1739 such as Apple's Device Enrollment Program (DEP). In the case of BYOD devices, it is required that the

1740 enterprise requests the device owner bring their device into the enterprise to be properly configured for

1741 enterprise access.

1742 The requirements for device configuration may vary per enterprise. An enterprise may reference

1743 suggested secure mobile-device configuration guidance from established entities. The Defense

1744 Information Systems Agency (DISA) provides Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) that

1745 dictate detailed configuration standards for the Department of Defense (DOD). The Center for Internet

- 1746 Security (CIS) offers the CIS benchmarks, which are "best-practice security configuration guides both 1747 developed and accepted by government, business, industry and academia" [36][37]. NIST hosts the
- 1747 adveloped and accepted by government, business, industry and academia [30][37]. NIST hosts the 1748 National Checklist Program (NCP) [40], which supplies checklists for securely configuring specific types
- 1746 Inational Checkhist Frogram (NCF) [40], which supplies checkhists for securely configuring specific types
 1749 of technology. Device manufacturers may also provide suggested configurations for their mobile
- 1750 products.

1751 **5.3.3.4 Device Provisioning**

1752 Device provisioning enrolls a device into the EMM by installing an EMM certificate onto each device 1753 that provides privileged device access to enterprises alongside in-depth security features. Provisioning a

1754 mobile device requires your device to have the necessary certificate to be enrolled in an EMM service.

- 1755 This certificate is installed on a device and allows the EMM to verify the device can be provisioned. Once
- the device is provisioned to the EMM, the appropriate EMM policies are applied to the mobile device
- 1757 and, if the device configuration is not automatically updated, the device will need to be configured to 1758 meet the policy requirements. After the provisioning process is complete, the device user has access to
- 1750 meet me poncy requirements. After the provisioning process is complete, the device user has access to 1759 enterprise data (e.g., email, calendar, contacts) and the enterprise is able to monitor the device and ensure
- 1760 it is compliant to their enterprise policies.

1761 Devices may be provisioned in-person or remotely. In-person provisioning requires an administrator to

1762 physically have the device to install the EMM certificate and confirm the device is properly provisioned.

- 1763 Remote provisioning requires the device user to implement the provisioning process on their own. The
- 1764 user may not provision the device properly, which may render the device and enterprise data vulnerable
- 1765 because it may not be compliant to enterprise policies.

1766 **5.3.4 Verification Testing**

To protect the operational enterprise environment, as well as enterprise and user data, it is important to
verify the device configurations and software installed on mobile devices that connect with the enterprise.
Before deploying an app, a software update, or a patch throughout the enterprise, enterprise
administrators may run pre-deployment tests to provide insight into how the change may impact the
security or functionality of existing enterprise systems. For significant software deployments or major
updates, administrators may want to first deploy to a limited group of users to enable assessment of the

1773 impact to the production environment.

1774 Allowing mobile devices to access enterprise resources can better enable staff members to execute the 1775 enterprise mission. However, mobile devices also carry security risks for enterprise systems, data and

- 1776 users. Verifying that mobile devices and their applications have acceptable configurations is essential to
- ensure that the benefits of mobile access outweigh the security risks that they present to the enterpriseecosystem.
- 1779 Mobile device or app-level configurations can significantly impact the security posture of the enterprise,
- thus permissions for the device or individual apps may be granted depending on specific configuration
- settings. Network configurations may include an obligation to authenticate and use a VPN before
- 1782 permitting connection to an enterprise wireless network. A geofencing policy may specify that a device
- 1783 operating within a particular geographic region be granted different permissions than the same device
- used within a different region. Different users, devices or apps may be granted different permissions for accessing enterprise backend services (e.g., a database holding sensitive information), depending on the
- accessing enterprise backend services (e.g., a database holding sensitive information), depending on the app or device configurations. In many cases, mobile device security features are configured to better
- protect the enterprise in addition to the mobile device itself: device data encryption, screen lock timeout,
- protect the energitise in addition to the moone device risen, device data energyption, select fock timeout, password and application firewall requirements are configurable and contribute to the security posture of
- 1789 the enterprise. Finally, enterprise policy may restrict the apps that may be installed on the device, require
- 1790 updates to apps or the mobile OS, or limit access to some of the device features in order to protect
- 1791 enterprise systems or data.

1792 **5.3.5 Deployment Testing**

1793 Enterprise networks and applications require software updates to improve functionality, patch

- 1794 vulnerabilities, fix bugs, or enable new hardware deployment. To make sound enterprise deployment
- 1795 decisions, systems and network administrators may first perform deployment testing before pushing new 1796 software into the production environment.
 - 1790

Administrators consider a broad spectrum of test scenarios to evaluate a software update, deciding what
tests will be sufficient to indicate that the update is ready for the production environment. A phased
approach to component level, feature, network, and enterprise-wide testing is typically recommended for
deployment testing.

1802

For example, when introducing a new enterprise capability such as managed mobile devices or mobile application vetting, the administrator should consider rolling out a limited trial with only a small set of carefully chosen users. After the trial deployment has been operating satisfactorily for a predetermined period of time, and if the user experience and satisfaction has met its target level, the organization may

- 1807 then be ready for an enterprise-wide deployment. Following this approach not only ensures minimal
- 1808 disruption to the enterprise operation and a satisfactory user experience, but also facilitates the discovery
- 1809 of security issues as early as possible in the deployment process.

1810 **5.4 Operate & Maintain**

1811 It is necessary to design and implement security controls to protect enterprise systems, as well as 1812 enterprise and user data. However, initial deployment of controls is not sufficient to protect an operational 1813 enterprise. In addition, IT audits should be used to periodically evaluate the effectiveness of security 1814 controls for protecting the evolving enterprise, identify security issues, and modify or add controls to 1815 better protect the system in the future. Auditors need data to perform those evaluations, and mobile device 1816 usage logs provide important data for assessing the effectiveness of controls on the mobile computing 1817 environment.

1818 **5.4.1 Auditing**

1819 In order to keep up with a rapidly changing attack surface and cybersecurity landscape, the enterprise
1820 security team may practice and conduct security assessments. An essential component of such
1821 assessments is the periodic audit of the enterprise IT and mobile networking infrastructure. A
1822 comprehensive audit should cover the following:

- Enumerating the enterprise audit objectives,
- Establishing a security baseline through periodic (e.g., annual) audits,
- Relying on auditors with well-established (and verified) security assessment experience,
- Developing an automated audit process to cover all of the enterprise IT infrastructure, including mobile devices,
- Analyzing the data generated by the audit process, rather than relying on compliance checklists, and
- Using a third-party auditor to report risks facing the enterprise.

Periodic audits should include the enterprise mobile infrastructure and device management systems, including components such as EMM/MDM, services for mobile app vetting, integration with backend services, and the employees' mobile devices and their applications. The audit should help the enterprise security team to assess whether the benefits of mobile access outweigh the security risks that they present to the enterprise ecosystem.

1836 **5.4.2 Device Usage**

An organization should develop security and privacy policies for mobile device (and app) usage. A key 1837 1838 element of that policy is enterprise monitoring of device/app usage. EMM, MAM and many mobile 1839 network monitoring systems enable enterprise administrators to track or monitor many mobile user 1840 activities, including identification of all device apps, app usage patterns (e.g., downloads, when/how often 1841 an app is launched), device features used by each app (e.g., microphone, camera), data used by an app 1842 (e.g., user location, contacts), device/user geographical location, and phone calls (e.g., phone number, 1843 name, time duration, date, location). An appropriate monitoring policy for devices/apps should consider 1844 many factors, including organization mission (and how the mobile device/app supports that mission), 1845 security/privacy characteristics of the enterprise data and systems accessed via the device, user 1846 relationship to the enterprise (e.g., employee, contractor, employee of a partner organization, members of 1847 the general public), deployment model (e.g., enterprise owned, BYOD), and user privacy. A monitoring 1848 policy that is appropriate for enterprise-owned devices carried by employees in a very high-sensitivity

1849 environment might include location tracking the device/user and geo-fencing the use of certain

- applications. Such a policy would be unacceptable (and likely infeasible to implement) for individuallyowned devices of employees of a partner organization who are visiting the enterprise site.
- 1852

User privacy is an important consideration because most devices will contain some personal user
information, and certain types of monitoring (e.g., geolocation) may bring enterprise interests into conflict
with privacy regulations. Organizations that do business within the European Union (EU) also should
consider how the EU's privacy and data protection regulation—the General Data Protection Regulation
[30]—constrains mobile device/app usage monitoring.

1858

1859 **5.5 Dispose of and/or Reuse Device**

Mobile devices may hold sensitive information such as passwords, account numbers, emails, voicemails,
text message logs or mission-specific data such as law enforcement sensitive information. When a mobile
device must be disposed of, it is important to take the proper steps to ensure that sensitive information
does not fall into the wrong hands.

1864 While techniques such as degaussing, memory overwriting or even physical grinding can be used to

1865 sanitize magnetic media, these techniques are not effective for sanitizing the solid-state memory used in 1866 mobile devices. However, most mobile devices now store user data on Self-Encrypting Drives (SEDs),

1867 which provide "always-on" encryption. Mobile OSs leverage the encryption inherent in the SED to

1868 provide "hard reset" or "factory reset" functionality to clear nearly all information from the device's

1869 memory using a "cryptographic erase" technique [16]. Cryptographic erase is accomplished by sanitizing

1870 the encryption key for the drive, rendering the encrypted user data unreadable. Some devices offer a

1871 choice to encrypt all user data when the device is initialized. It is essential to activate whole-device 1872 encryption before a device is deployed and to perform a "factory reset" operation to cryptographically

1872 encryption before a device is deployed and to perform a factory reset operation

1873 erase all user data before disposing of a device.

1874 There are two additional considerations for secure device disposal: assured destruction of the drive

1875 encryption key and destruction of user data on removable memory cards (e.g., SIM or Secure Digital [SD]

1876 cards). If the device encryption key is backed up or escrowed outside the device, it is possible that the key

1877 could be used to recover user data on the device. The organization should address the existence and

1878 location of such backups when designing device sanitization procedures.

1879 In addition to storing information such as photos and downloaded documents on the device's internal

1880 memory, many mobile devices store such information on an external SD card. Contacts, voicemails and

1881 text message logs may be stored on a SIM card as well as in the device's internal memory. A factory reset

1882 will not clear the information contained on SIM or SD cards used with the device. To remove all

- 1883 information from these cards they should be physically removed and destroyed. A thorough device
- 1884 disposal process includes both a factory reset and removal of any associated cards.

1885

1886 **References**

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1888	security.

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1889

1890 Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations

1891 Selected acronyms and abbreviations used in this publication are defined below.

1000	4.10	
1892	AP	Access Point
1893	API ATARC	Application Programming Interface
1894		Advanced Technology Academic Research Center Business-to-Business
1895 1896	B2B BVOD	
	BYOD	Bring Your Own Device
1897	CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program Chief Information Officer
1898	CIO	
1899 1900	CISO	Chief Information Security Officer
1900	CMVP COPE	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
1901	CYOD	Corporately Owned, Personally Enabled Choose Your Own Device
1902	DEP	Device Enrollment Program
1903	DHS	Department of Homeland Security
1905	DLP	Department of Homeland Security Data Loss Prevention
1905	DRM	Digital Rights Management
1907	EMM	Enterprise Mobility Management
1908	FCC	Federal Communications Commission
1909	FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
1910	FISMA	Federal Information Security Modernization Act
1911	FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
1912	GFE	Government Furnished Equipment
1913	GLONASS	Global Navigation Satellite System
1914	GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System
1915	GPS	Global Positioning System
1916	HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
1917	HTTPS	HTTP Secure
1918	IMEI	International Mobile Equipment Identity
1919	IMSI	International Mobile Subscriber Identity
1920	ІоТ	Internet of Things
1921	IPsec	Internet Protocol Security
1922	IR	Interagency/Internal Report
1923	IT	Information Technology
1924	ITL	Information Technology Laboratory
1925	L2TP	Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol
1926	LAN	Local Area Network
1927	LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
1928	MAM	Mobile Application Management
1929	MAV	Mobile Application Vetting
1930	MCDF	Mobile Computing Decision Framework
1931	MDM	Mobile Device Management
1932	MitM MTD	Man in the Middle
1933	MTD MTD	Mobile Threat Defense
1934 1935	MTP	Mobile Threat Protection Near Field Communication
1935	NFC NGO	
1936	NGO NIAP	Non-Governmental Organization
1937	NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership
1930	14151	National Institute of Standards and Technology

1939	NSA	National Security Agency
1940	OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturer
1941	OMB	Office of Management and Budget
1942	OS	Operating System
1943	PAN	Personal Area Network
1944	PID	Process Identifier
1945	PII	Personally Identifiable Information
1946	PIN	Personal Identification Number
1947	P.L.	Public Law
1948	QR	Quick Response
1949	RADIUS	Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
1950	RFID	Radio Frequency Identification
1951	RTOS	Real Time Operating System
1952	SaaS	Software as a Service
1953	SD	Secure Digital
1954	SDK	Software Development Kit
1955	SED	Self-Encrypting Drive
1956	SIM	Subscriber Identity Module
1957	SoC	System on a Chip
1958	SP	Special Publication
1959	SSID	Service Set Identifier
1960	TEE	Trusted Execution Environment
1961	TLS	Transport Layer Security
1962	UICC	Universal Integrated Circuit Card
1963	UID	User Identifier
1964	URL	Uniform Resource Locator
1965	VDI	Virtual Desktop Infrastructure
1966	VMI	Virtual Mobile Infrastructure
1967	VPN	Virtual Private Networking
1968	WiFi	Wireless Fidelity
1969	WLAN	Wireless LAN
1970	XML	Extensible Markup Language
1971		

1972 Appendix B. Supporting NIST SP 800-53 Security Controls

1973 The list below maps mobile security technologies to the appropriate NIST SP 800-53 security controls and to the Cybersecurity Framework

1974 version 1.1 functions, categories, and subcategories.

Mobile Technology	Capabilities	NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4 - Control Families	NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4-Security Controls	NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) Functions, Categories, Subcategories		
				Function	CSF Category	CSF Subcategory
Enterprise Mobile Management	Access Control	Access Control	AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, AC-7, AC-8, AC-11, AC-14, AC-16, AC- 17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20	Protect	Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control	PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-5, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7
(EMM) or Mobile Device					Data Security	PR.DS-5
Management					Protective Technology	PR.PT-4
(MDM)				Identify	Asset Management	ID.AM-3
		Identification & Authentication	IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-6, IA-7, IA-10	Protect	Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control	PR.AC-1
		Security Assessment and Authorization	CA-1, CA-9	Identify	Asset Management	ID.AM-3
					Governance	ID.GV-1, ID.GV-3
	Data Protection	Media Protection	MP-5, MP-6, MP-7	Protect	Protective Technology	PR.PT-2
		System and Communications Protection	SC-3, SC-4, SC-7, SC-12, SC-13, SC- 23, SC-24, SC-28, SC-39, SC-43	Protect	Protective Technology	PR.PT-4, PR.PT-4
					Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control	PR.AC-5
					Data Security	PR.DS-1, PR.DS-2, PR.DS-5
	System Integrity	System and Information Integrity	SI-2, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7	Identify	Risk Assessment	ID.RA-1
				Protect	Data Security	PR.DS-5, PR.DS-6
				Detect	Anomalies and Events	DE.AE-3
					Security Continuous Monitoring	DE.CM-1, DE.CM-4, DE.CM-7
				Respond	Analysis	RS.AN-1

Mobile Technology	Capabilities	NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4 - Control Families	NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4-Security Controls	NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) Functions, Categories, Subcategories		
				Function	CSF Category	CSF Subcategory
		Configuration Management	CM-2, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, CM-7, CM-8, CM-11	Protect	Information Protection Processes and Procedures	PR.IP-1
				Detect	Security Continuous Monitoring	DE.CM-7, DE.CM-3
	Detection and Monitoring	Audit and Accountability	AU-2, AU-3, AU-5, AU-7, AU-8, AU-9,	Identify	Supply Chain Risk Management	ID.SC-4
			AU-10, AU-12, AU-14	Protect	Protective Technology	PR.PT-1
				Respond	Analysis	RS.AN-3
		Incident Response	IR-5	Detect	Anomalies and Events	DE.AE-3, DE.AE-5
				Respond	Analysis	RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
		Security Assessment and Authorization	CA-9	Identify	Asset Management	ID.AM-3
Virtual Private		Access Control	AC-4, AC-17	Identify	Asset Management	ID.AM-3
Network (VPN) Endpoint				Protect	Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control	PR.AC-3, PR.AC-5
					Data Security	PR.DS-5
					Protective Technology	PR.PT-4
		Identification and Authentication	IA-3	Protect	Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control	PR.AC-1, PR.AC-7
	Data Protection	System and Communications Protection	SC-8, SC-11	Protect	Data Security	PR.DS-2, PR.DS-5
	System Integrity	System and Information Integrity	SI-4	Detect	Anomalies and Events	DE.AE-1, DE.AE-2
					Security Continuous Monitoring	DE.CM-7

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